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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines two key areas where macroeconomic policy and stabil- 
ity in international financial markets intersect. Part one examines the extent 
to which economic policy can limit the development of misalignments in ex- 
change rates, without sacrificing policy tools that are needed to maintain 
internal macroeconomic balance. This issue is addressed in a model where 
endogenous exchange rate fluctuations axe generated by traders selecting al- 
ternative forecasting strategies on the basis of an 'evolutionary fitness rule', 
in the spirit of work by Brock and Hommes (1997,1998). In this setting 
it is shown how, by changing the relative profitability of available strate- 
gies, sterilized intervention can coordinate traders onto strategies based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Empirical evidence in support of the model 
is provided based on data from interventions by the Japanese authorities 
in the 1990's. In addition, simulations of the estimated model are used to 
calculate confidence intervals for the ex ante probability that interventions 
of a given size will be effective in pricking bubbles in the exchange rate. It 
is also shown how stability in foreign exchange markets can be enhanced by 
imposing a type of exchange rate target zone, and furthermore that through 
the use of sterilized intervention, this can be achieved without inducing a 
commensurate increase in instability elsewhere in the economy. 
Part two then moves on to examine the implications for macroeconomic pol- 
icy of the exponential growth in recent years of the use of financial deriva- 
tives. A theoretical model is developed which demonstrates how firms' use 
of derivatives for risk management purposes, while increasing the robust- 
ness of the financial system to shocks, at the same time reduces the impact 
of monetary policy on the macroeconomy. This effect arises because the 
agency costs, which enhance the impact of monetary policy through the 
credit channel, are reduced by firms' usage of hedging instruments, in par- 
ticular interest rate swaps. Using quarterly data on total outstanding swap 
contracts from 1990, empirical evidence is then presented to show how in- 
creased usage of derivatives may have influenced the impact of monetary 
policy in the United States. 
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Part I 
Managing Instability in 
Foreign Exchange Markets 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
In 1972 the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates was rapidly 
approaching a state of crisis. The pursuit of expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies by the U. S. authorities, partly in order to finance the war 
in Vietnam, had led to irresistible inflationary pressure in the other major 
industrialized countries'. The credibility of the national monetary author- 
ities' commitment to maintain the system was thus seriously undermined, 
and in 1973 the Bretton Woods system broke down, and bilateral exchange 
rates between the U. S., Europe and Japan were allowed to be determined 
freely by market forces. 
The shift to floating exchange rates between the major global currencies 
in 1973 was widely expected to both aid adjustment to shocks, as well 
"See the essays in Bordo and Eichengreen (1993) for detailed accounts of possible 
causes of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
5 
as to promote stability in the international financial system. In the face 
of a shock, standard theory suggested exchange rate flexibility could ease 
pressure on the domestic price level and the real sector to adjust, which 
would have clear economic benefits by reducing the volatility of output and 
unemployment. Furthermore, flexible exchange rates should also promote 
macroeconomic stability by automatically adjusting to a level consistent 
with underlying economic conditions. 
The economic processes underlying this adjustment mechanism were out- 
lined by Freidman (1953). A key argument in favour of the move to floating 
exchange rates was based on the notion that, following an external shock, 
speculators in the foreign exchange market would act to stabilize the ex- 
change rate at its fundamental value, i. e. the value consistent with underly- 
ing economic conditions. Acting in this manner, speculators in the foreign 
exchange markets would ensure that the exchange rate would not persist at 
the wrong value for long periods, i. e. persistent misalignments would not 
arise. 
In practice however, since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, 
G-3 exchange rates (i. e. bilateral dollar, yen and mark/euro rates) have 
exhibited both high short run volatility and persistent misalignments which 
seem largely unconnected with macroeconomic fundamentals. Figure (1.1) 
6 
plots the history of bilateral monthly dollar, yen and dm. exchange rates 
since the collapse of Bretton Woods and the advent of (managed floating) 
in 1973. The high degree of variability is striking. 
Figure (1.2) plots the recent history of these exchange rates (since 1990), 
as well as the history of the (synthetic) euro along with estimates of the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) levels of these exchange rates2- We see that 
on average, over periods of several years, while the simple PPP relation- 
ship' appears to provide an anchor for these exchange rates (Frankel and 
Rose (1995)), they are also characterized by periods of pronounced 'mis- 
alignments'. In other words, the short to medium-term movements in real 
exchange rates seem to be driven by forces which are only loosely connected 
to underlying economic conditions. 
However not only have deviations from PPP been large and persistent, they 
have also been volatile. The short run volatility of G3 real exchange rates is 
one of the most robust - and to many observers disturbing - characteristics 
of the post Bretton Woods floating exchange rate experience. It reflects, at 
2The levels of the PPP exchange rates illustrated here are calculated as the sample 
average deviations of each exchange rate from the ratio of CPIs. 
3ppp, or purchasing power paxity, dictates that due to the forces of axbitrage, the 
same good should sell for the same price both at home and abroad when expressed in a 
common currency. If PPP were to hold continuously then the path of the real exchange 
rate E should be described by the ratio of domestic prices P to foreign prices P*, so that 
E= pp.. 
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least in part, the fact that nominal exchange rates are forward looking asset 
prices that adjust to clear the global capital market whereas money goods 
prices are often sticky and adjust only gradually to cleax the international 
goods markets (Dornbusch (1976); Mussa (1982)). Figure (1.3) depicts for 
each bilateral nominal exchange rate a rolling standard deviation of monthly 
log changes since 1979. It is clear from the figures that the 'noise' that dom- 
inates short-run changes in G3 nominal exchange rates has not, in general, 
diminished appreciably over the last 25 years. The volatility of G3 exchange 
rates that is actually observed was greatly underestimated by the early ad- 
vocates of floating exchange rates such as Harry Johnson (Obstfeld (1995)). 
They predicted that "flexible exchange rates would tend to remain constant 
so long as underlying economic conditions (including government policies) 
remained constant... [I]f economic changes or policy changes occurred... 
the flexible exchange rate would gradually either appreciate or depreciate 
as required to preserve equilibrium. " 
A disturbing feature of these stylized facts is that they have proved ex- 
tremely difficult to reconcile with standard macroeconomic theory, at least 
in a consistent manner. In seminal research by Meese and Rogoff (1983), it 
was found that standard macroeconomic models of the exchange rate have 
no predictive value for floating exchange rates. Even ex post, the litera- 
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ture on empirical studies of exchange rates 4 has found that while monetary 
models such as the Dornbusch 'overshooting' theory have some explanatory 
power in the form of reaction to news, in the short run, exchange rates are 
better characterized by a driftless random walk than by models based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The apparent insulation of the macroecon- 
omy from movements in exchange rates has been termed the exchange rate 
'disconnect puzzle' by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). 
While a consistent empirical explanation of short run exchange rate be- 
haviour has remained elusive, more recently there has been some progress 
made in studying exchange rate behaviour at longer frequencies. Indeed, 
recent research' has demonstrated the existence of reversion to levels dic- 
tated by macroeconomic fundamentals in the long run. However this is at 
a lower frequency than predicted by standard macro models. 
As the relative prices of international currencies, exchange rates exert a pro- 
found influence on all international transactions, be they in international 
markets for goods and services, or for financial assets. As such, there axe 
a number of key areas where the path of the exchange rate can influence 
domestic macroeconomic stability. In particular, the exchange rate can po- 
4see, inter alia, Frankel and Rose (1995) for a survey 
'See, amongst others, Taylor and Sarno (1998,2000) and Taylor and Peel (2000). 
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tentially impact domestic inflation, and through its impact on international 
trade and the value of foreign assets, the growth of domestic output. 
The high volatility and long swings observed in exchange rates thus poten- 
tially have severe consequences for economic welfare, and a large number of 
studies have investigated the costs associated with observed exchange rate 
behaviour. For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) conduct a theoreti- 
cal analysis which finds that exchange rate volatility could lower welfare 
through both direct and indirect channels. The direct channel is based on 
the assumption that people have a distaste for fluctuations: in other words, 
they would choose a constant value of consumption over an uncertain value 
that is more variable. The indirect channel on the other hand stems from 
the costs firms incur to protect themselves from exchange rate volatility. If 
firms that preset prices understand the risks of future exchange rate move- 
ments, they will try to hedge against those risks. When setting the price for 
their goods, they will attach a risk premium as an extra markup to cover 
the costs of fluctuations. This higher price dampens demand, production, 
and, hence consumption to levels that are less than optimal for society. 
Despite the plausibility of these arguments, it has proved surprisingly dif- 
ficult to find widespread evidence of an adverse impact of exchange rate 
volatility on international trade amongst industrialised countries. This has 
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even led some authors, for example Rogoff (2003) to describe as a 'fallacy' 
the notion that "... G3 exchange rate volatility is a disaster". The main ar- 
gument is that although ex6hange, rates fluctuate widely in comparison with 
goods prices it is not obvious from the data that exchange rate volatility has 
direct effects on the underlying macroeconomy 6. In addition, the costs of 
excessive short-run exchange rate volatility are thought, by many authors, 
to be manageable - but not trivial - due to the ready and ever increasing 
availability of financial derivative products such as futures and options for 
hedging short and medium run foreign exchange exposures. The general 
assessment is that the feedback to the real economy is far slower and less 
pronounced than a model based on the Mundell-Fleming framework would 
predict. 
That a direct link between exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic 
performance is difficult to observe in the data is less surprising when con- 
sidered in the light of the empirical failure of exchange rate models based 
on macroeconomic variables discussed above. If exchange rates only re- 
spond to changes in fundamentals over the medium to long-term, it should 
not be surprising if the reverse were also true: that the macroeconomic 
'Baxter and Stockman (1989) were the first to point out the difficulty in demonstrating 
that exchange rate volatility affects macroeconomic fundamentals, though some research 
has succeeded in showing that exchange rate variability can correlate negatively with 
trade and foreign direct investment (see, e. g. Frankel and Wei (1993) and Goldberg and 
Klien (1998). 
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stability would be most sensitive to persistent long-run misalignments in 
exchange rates. In this respect, the exchange rate - macroeconomy 'discon- 
nect' maybe something of a two-edged sword: the low frequency response of 
the exchange rate to developments in the macroeconomy is mirrored in the 
apparent insulation of the macroeconomy to mudi of the short-run exchange 
rate volatility witnessed. 
Does this imply that international monetary authorities can do no better 
than the current non-system of 'benign neglect': whereby major bilateral 
currencies are in principal determined wholly by market forces? There are 
a number of counter arguments to this proposition. Typically, the debate 
surrounding the optimality or otherwise of achieving macroeconomic sta- 
bility by targeting the exchange rate has focused on how stability in one 
maxket can only be achieved by shifting the burden of adjustment to shocks 
onto another market. This trade-off was first highlighted by Poole (1970), 
who shows how the optimality of a given policy (e. g. an exchange rate 
target versus an interest rate target) depends on whether the shock imping- 
ing on the economy originates in the goods market or the money maxket'. 
The paradigm underlying this view of the costs of managing exchange rates 
asserts that exchange rates change only in response to changes in underly- 
7A recent paper which employs the same underlying rationale to argue against reform 
of the international monetary system is Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) 
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ing macroeconomic factors. As such, attempts at reducing exchange rate 
volatility will result in increased variability of other economic variables, 
such at output or prices. However, this need not be the case when swings in 
exchange rates are to some degree disconnected from the changes in macroe- 
conomic fundamentals. In this case it should, in principle, be possible to 
reduce the vaxiability of the exchange rate without significantly reducing 
stability somewhere else in the system. 
Furthermore, although macroeconomic conditions maybe to some extent 
insulated from short-run exchange rate movements, it is also important to 
note that there can be other, indirect, costs associated with extreme short- 
run movements in exchange rates. The existence of volatility in the sense of 
random fluctuations adds to uncertainty in foreign trade transactions. The 
uncertainty can be reduced by hedging in forward markets but this does not 
solve the problem. In the first place, it is not always possible to hedge when 
the foreign cash inflows or outflows to be hedged are themselves uncertain. 
In addition, hedging involves costs and these costs may be measured by the 
bid-offer spreads in the forward markets. It is interesting to note that these 
spreads have risen sharply since 1979, reflecting the increase in uncertainty 
in global foreign exchange markets. 
Moreover, when any manufacturer enters into a hedge to protect the price 
13 
of her inputs and products, the counterparty selling that insurance must 
take on that risk. The financial institutions which facilitate this by activity 
selling financial derivatives then attempt to diversify away those elements 
of risk they are not willing to bear by engaging in further risk spreading 
activities such as dynamic hedging. However, the models employed by such 
institutions for risk management purposes can often breakdown under ex- 
treme movements in asset prices such as exchange rates. This can lead to 
large losses for some institutions, and if the shock is widespread, or is trans- 
mitted to other financial intermediaries, can threaten the stability of the 
whole financial system. 
Another important limitation is imposed by the fact that hedging is possible 
only over a relatively short period, typically six months and at most a year. 
While this is adequate for trade payments lags, it is not adequate for longer 
period contractual payments obligations as for example on debt servicing. 
At present no effective mechanisms exist to hedge against exchange rate 
movements over longer periods as many countries may wish to do especially 
in so far as debt obligations are concerned. 
The net result of these vulnerabilities is that the costs of long-run, persis- 
tent exchange rate 'misalignments' are believed to be "extremely harmful 
to macroeconornic stability and microeconornic efficiency (McKinnon and 
14 
Ohno (1997) p. 52). By altering international relative prices (the terms 
of trade), domestic relative prices (of non traded goods), and the prices 
of traded commodities relative to traded differentiated products through 
a process McKinnon and Ohno (1997) label 'price diffusion', excessive ex- 
change rate volatility and persistent misalignments are often held responsi- 
ble for depressing bilateral trade flows, distorting investment decisions, and 
misallocating the outsourcing locations chosen by multinational firms. Fur- 
thermore, these costs can often lead to pressure for protectionist legislation, 
which increase the damage to international trade further still. 
Long swings in exchange rates can entail other profound structural conse- 
quences for the economy. For example, Devereux (2005) provides a theoret- 
ical investigation of the implications of exchange rate rules for the flexibility 
of nominal prices, and shows how internal price flexibility may be increased 
by pegging the exchange rate. A further example is given by the pricing 
behaviour of firms. Empirical studies have convincingly demonstrated that 
producers of tradable goods in many countries practice third-degree price 
discrimination, tailoring the prices they chaxge to individual market des- 
tinations. Such pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior seems to be prevalent 
among many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (see Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). A stylized fact of 
15 
this literature is that in response to a 10 percent depreciation of a tar- 
get countrys currency, exporters lower the exports own-currency price by 
around 5 percent in the same year. That is, the median pass-through of 
currency depreciation to manufacturing import prices tends to be axound 
50 percent over a one-yeax horizon. Not only is exchange rate pass-through 
low for many industrialized countries, evidence suggests it has been falling 
consistently sine the mid 1980s. One possible explanation of this is that 
firms have been increasingly adopting PTM behaviour in response to laxge- 
scale misalignments in exchange rates. Thus the degree of exchange rate 
disconnect maybe a result of an endogenous response of firms to increased 
exchange rate variability. This has potentially large-scale implications for 
economic welfare which are not immediately obvious from short-run changes 
in macroeconomic variables. 
While the implications of persistent misalignments in C3 exchange rates for 
industrialised countries have proved somewhat'difficult to disentangle, the 
implications for Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and the developing 
world are somewhat more clear. Firstly, developing countries typically do 
not find it easy to engage in derivatives market activity so that the effective 
scope for hedging available to economic agents in developing countries are 
relative limited. This provides one potential explanation for the clear impact 
16 
of G-3 exchange rate volatility on developing countries. For example, Es- 
quivel and Laxrain (2002) find that G3 exchange rate volatility has a robust 
and significantly negative impact on developing countries' exports. They 
find that a one percentage point increase in G-3 exchange rate volatility 
decreases real exports of developing countries by about 2 percent on aver- 
age. Furthermore, they present evidence that G3 exchange rate volatility 
has a negative influence on foreign direct investment to certain regions, and 
increases the probability of occurrence of exchange rate crises in developing 
countries. 
Crucially, for reason of inflation stabilization or to facilitate their integration 
into the global capital market, most countries outside the G3 invoice a large 
proportion of their international commerce and denominate an even greater 
portion of their international borrowing in a C3 currency (especially US 
dollars). As a result, the wide swings in bilateral C3 exchange rates that 
we observe have large effects on the trade flows, capital flows, portfolio 
composition, and - as Krugman (1997) demonstrates - the vulnerability to 
speculative attack in those countries that choose to peg their exchange rates 
to the dollar, yen, or euro. For this reason, McKinnon and Ohno (1997) 
recently characterized the yen-dollar exchange rate as the 'loose cannon' 
behind the Asia crisis. 
17 
This part of my thesis explores the forces which lead to long swings and 
high volatility in exchange rates, and examines policy measures by which 
they can potentially be reduced. In the next chapter, I begin by examining 
possible explanations for the exchange rate disconnect put forward in the 
literature. I then go on to examine some policy responses which have been 
proposed to limit the development of long swings in G3 exchange rates. The 
following chapter then develops a theoretical model which describes erratic 
exchange rate movements as being the results of the evolutionary selection 
of competing forecast rules by participants in the foreign exchange market. 
Within'this framework, I show how sterilized foreign exchange interven- 
tion can be employed as a tool to reduce long swings in bilateral exchange 
rates while leaving macroeconomic fundamentals largely unaffected, thus 
providing a 'free-lunch' of economic stability. The final chapter in this part 
presents results from the empirical estimation of the model on 12 years on 
data on the dollar-yen exchange rate. In addition to providing empirical 
support for the model, I also demonstrate how the model implies a vari- 
ant of an exchange rate taxget zone - the monitoring band - maximizes the 
efficiency of foreign exchange policy. 
18 
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Chapter 2 
Exchange rate dynamics and 
exchange rate management 
2.1 Introduction 
The weight of evidence provided by research into the determinants of ex- 
change rate behaviour strongly suggests that, at short horizons, macroeco- 
nomic variables play only a limited role. This chapter addresses two key 
questions raised by this evidence. FirstlY, given the empirical failure of 
structural macroeconomic models, what does drive movements in exchange 
rates? Secondly, given the possible answers to the first question, what kind 
of policy tools are available to effectively limit the development of misalign- 
ments in exchange rates? 
Over the course of the past twenty years, a large quantity of research has 
been undertaken to address issues raised by these questions. The intention 
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of this chapter is not to provide a thorough review of this literature, rather, 
the aim is to examine how research in a number of key areas can be drawn 
together, thereby providing some orientation as to how the approach taken 
in this dissertation fits in to the broader literature. 
2.2 Macro fundamentals and the determi- 
nants of exchange rate movements 
The well documented failure of traditional macroeconomic models to explain 
exchange rate behaviour (e. g. Meese and Rogoff (1983); Cheung, Chinn, and 
Pascual (2006)) has led to a enormous amount of empirical reseaxch aimed 
at understanding the forces that drive exchange rate dynamics, and what 
role macroeconomic variables play in their determination. 
A key finding in this research effort has been that traditional macroeconomic 
theories of exchange rate determination, for example Purchasing Power Par- 
ity (PPP) and the monetary model of the exchange rate, do seem to hold 
as medium to long-run equilibrium conditions. Evidence has been most 
forthcoming in recent years from studies employing panel data techniques 
or long horizons of data, see amongst others, Mark (1990), Lothian and 
Taylor (1996), and MacDonald (1999). 
While the cumulative evidence from these studies recovers a role for macroe- 
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conomic fundamentals in exchange rate determination, by themselves they 
fail to explain the very slow speeds of convergence to equilibrium implied 
by the apparent near random walk behaviour of exchange rates. For exam- 
ple, Rogoff (1996) notes that the typical estimates of half-lives of deviations 
from PPP of 3 to 5 years are way in excess of those predicted by theo- 
retical. models of exchange rate adjustment, and christens this finding the 
I purchasing power parity puzzle'. 
One potential explanation for these findings is that real exchange rate ad- 
justment is nonlinear, with deviations from PPP falling more rapidly the 
larger the misalignment. A key theoretical basis for this view relies on the 
presence of market frictions that impede inter-country commodity trade 
and arbitrage. E. g. Berminga and ProtoPapaclakis (1988); Williams and 
Wright (1991); Dumas (1992), Uppal (1993), Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle 
(1995) and Coleman (1995,2004) develop dynamic general equilibrium mod- 
els of real exchange rate determination which take into account transaction 
costs and show that the process of adjustment of RERs towards a PPP- 
equilibrium is non-linear. These costs include, inter alia, transport costs, 
trade barriers and costs of setting up or buying foreign retail distribution 
networks. 
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In many of these models, proportional or "iceberg" transport costsl create a 
band for the real exchange rate within which the marginal cost of arbitrage 
exceeds the marginal benefit. As a result, deviations from PPP within these 
bands are left uncorrected. However, deviations outside these bands (i. e., 
where price differences exceed transaction costs) will be axbitraged away by 
market forces. 
Another theoretical rationale for nonlinear dynamics stems from the obser- 
vation that adjustments in relative prices across borders will also be affected 
by the perceived uncertainty in exchange rate movements. For example, 
with a greater degree of uncertainty, firms become less willing to change 
their prices since the exchange rate may move back after the price change 
and another price change in the opposite direction may then be necessaxy 
(Delgado (1991)). This again predicts the existence of "bands of inaction" 
in exchange rate adjustment whose width is related to the uncertainty re- 
garding the permanence of the shocks causing price changes, within which 
arbitrage is not profitable due to sunk costs (Dixit (1989) and Krugman 
(1989)). 
In addition, some of these studies draw on the theory of investment under 
"'iceberg" because a fraction of the goods axe presumed to "melt" when shipped, 
with the fraction melting depending on the distance traveled. 
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uncertainty to show that the thresholds should be interpreted more broadly 
than simply as trade barriers and shipping costs, but also as arising from 
the sunk costs of arbitrage and the resulting tendency for traders to wait 
for sufficiently large arbitrage opportunities to appeax before entering the 
maxket (e. g. Dumas, 1992 and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
Rogoff (1996) concludes that the presence of frictions such as transportation 
costs, threatened or actual tariffs, nontariff barriers, information costs or 
lack of labor mobility, create a large buffer within which nominal exchange 
rates can move without producing an immediate proportional response in 
relative domestic prices. 
Other authors have investigated whether exchange rate policy actions by the 
authorities could themselves inject a source of nonlinear adjustment into ex- 
change rates. For example, Hsieh (1992) develops a rational expectations 
monetary model with stochastic intervention rules. In his model, the au- 
thorities react to large appreciations and depreciations (rates of change) by 
intervening more strongly. This results in the exchange rate moving more 
rapidly toward fundamentals when deviations axe large. This is in contrast 
to the target zone approach to the management of floating exchange rates, 
where the level of the exchange rate (or rather, its proximity to ceilings or 
floors) is relevant for signalling interventions. However, while these models 
26 
do provide a possible rationale for nonlinear exchange rate adjustment, they 
fail to explain why misalignments should arise in the first place. 
An important step in understanding the causes of real exchange rate mis- 
alignments is to determine the relative contribution of price and nominal 
exchange rate adjustment. In contrast to standard rational-expectations 
sticky-price models, which impose the same reversion speed for nominal 
exchange rates and prices, a recent study by Engel and Morley (2001) ex- 
amines an empirical model that allows those variables to adjust at different 
speeds. 
Formulating the adjustment equations as a state-space model (Morley et al., 
2003), Engel and Morley evaluate the speeds at which nominal exchange 
rates and prices converge to their respective equilibrium levels that are 
unobserved. Empirical results from state-space model estimation indicate 
that while prices converge relatively fast, nominal exchange rates converge 
slowly. The differing-speed finding is intriguing. It suggests that the torpid 
rate of PPP reversion may come largely from slow nominal exchange rate 
adjustment rather than from slow price adjustment. 
In a another study, Cheung, Lai, and Bergman (2004) provide supporting 
evidence on the mechanism by which PPP deviations are corrected. Us- 
ing an empirical approach different from Engel and Morley (2001), they 
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employ a Vector Equilibrium Correction (VEC) Model, and find further 
evidence for the difference in convergence speed between nominal exchange 
rates and prices. Although there are significant differences between the two 
approaches, their results corroborate and reinforce Engel and Morleys find- 
ing: it is nominal exchange rates, not prices, that converge slowly toward 
PPP. 
What could explain the result that prices converge fairly quickly in each 
country to their equilibrium levels, but the exchange rate moves only very 
slowly to the PPP value? One possible explanation is that persistent real 
shocks are important. 
While the PPP models of Engel and Morley (2001) and Cheung, Lai, and 
Bergman (2004) do not incorporate real shocks, one can imagine how a 
model with real shocks could produce persistent nominal exchange rate 
deviations. If nominal prices adjust quickly, but there are real shocks that 
imply a slowly- adjusting real exchange rate, then the nominal exchange 
rate necessarily will adjust slowly to the PPP equilibrium. However, Engel 
and Morley are skeptical that real shocks can explain their findings. They 
note that the extreme volatility of real exchange rates suggests that the 
underlying source of shocks is monetary or financial. 
It seems then, that the balance of empirical evidence suggests persistent 
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misalignments observed in real exchange rates can best be attributed to the 
behaviour of nominal rates. However, it is not clear how transaction costs, 
which should be relatively insignificant for foreign exchange markets, can 
account for the slow convergence of nominal exchange rates. This poses a 
direct challenge to theoretical models to explain the surprising behavior of 
nominal exchange rates. 
Engel and Morley (2001) speculate that, when goods maxket frictions are 
present, there is more scope for herding behavior and bubbles in exchange 
rate markets. Bubbles or herding might temporarily send the exchange rate 
off on disequilibrium paths that result in the appearance of slow convergence 
to the equilibrium. Over the course of the last two decades a growing 
body of research has examined the causes of the surprisingly persistent 
misalignments in nominal exchange rates, with the focus being on the role 
of informational asymmetries. It is to this body of work which we turn in 
the next section. 
2.3 Modelling exchange rate dynamics un- 
der rational expectations 
A useful framework for examining potential theoretical explanations for the 
observed behaviour of nominal exchange rates stems from the insight that 
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the exchange rate, as the relative price of two monies, should be viewed 
as an asset price. The price of a financial asset may be represented as the 
discounted present value of the future stream of its payoffs. Denoting the 
payoff at time t by Zt, and the (spot) asset price by Pt, the return on a 
financial asset at t+1 is given by: 
I? t+ 
Pt+l + Zt+l 
Pt 
Campbell (1991), extending work by Campbell and Shiller (1988), uses a 
log-linea, r approximation to show that the excess (i. e. unexpected) return 
on the asset can be written 
r oo 00 rt+, -Etrt+l = (Et+, -Et) PiAzt+l+j -E pirt+l+j+ lim pi (Pt+i -zt+j)] 
j=l 
3ý00 
(2.2) 
where lower case letters represent log variables, and p is a parameter of 
linearization 2. This equation identifies a number of potential explanations 
for unexpected asset returns. Fluctuations in the first term in the bracket 
in (2.2) represent changes in expectations of future fundamentals, while 
changes in the second term capture changes in the discount rate. Discount 
'In paxticular, p= 1/(l + exp(zt - pt). 
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rates, in turn, can change because of changing expectations of future risk- 
free rates, changing forecasts of risk or changing risk aversion. 
While at first sight there appear to be many ways of introducing variation in 
excess asset returns, it has become clear that, at least under the assumption 
of perfectly rational agentS3, most of them cannot form a basis of an explan- 
tation of excess volatility or persistent mispricing of assets. For example, 
Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) show that changing forecasts 
of growth in fundamentaIS4 , cannot be used to 
drive excess returns since, 
if these forecasts are fully rational, it must be that excess returns predict 
cash-flow growth in the time series, which they do not. Neither can chang- 
ing forecasts of future risk-free rates be used: once more, if the forecasts are 
rational, excess returns must predict interest rates in the time series, which 
they do not. Even changing forecasts of risk cannot work, as there is little 
evidence of excess returns predicting changes in risk in the time series. 
The only story which remains when one assumes agents axe fully rational is 
that of changing risk--aversion. This idea is made operational by the Camp- 
bell and Cochrane (1999) model of aggregate stock market behaviour. They 
3The term 'rational agents' as used here refers to an assumption that agent form 
so-called 'strong form' rational expectations, so that prices reflect all available relevant 
information (both public and private). 
4 The work of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) examine this equation in the 
context of stock returns, hence the measure of fundamentals they examine is dividend 
growth. 
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propose a habit formation framework for modelling stock market returns in 
which changes in consumption relative to habit lead to changes in risk aver- 
sion and hence variation in excess returns. This variation helps to plug 
the gap between the volatility of fundamentals and the volatility of asset 
returns. In addition, the introduction of habit into agents utility functions 
introduces a source of persistence into returns which can explain persistent 
misalignments in asset prices. 
However, this approach to reconciling high short run volatility of asset prices 
with low volatility of fundamentals implies that agents' preferences must be 
highly volatile in the short run. This requirement lies in stark contrast with 
the notion that agents' attitudes towards risk are an intrinsic feature of 
their behaviour. Rather, the notion that agents switch on mass from being 
risk averse to risk loving at daily frequencies is aiguably inconsistent with 
the very notion of risk preferences. 
A final possibility is to introduce variation in excess returns through the 
third term in equation (2.2). This kind of model is known as a 'rational 
bubble'. The intuition of these models is that prices are high today because 
they are expected to be high next period; and that they are higher next pe- 
riod because they are expected to be higher the period after that, and so on, 
forever. In their simplest form, this requires market participants to expect 
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explosive growth in excess returns for an indefinite period. However, sub- 
sequent modifications such as Blanchard (1979) relax this by, for example, 
introducing an small exogenous probability of the bubble bursting. 
In fact the bubble term in equation (2.2) represents an infinity of possi- 
ble solutions to the asset pricing formula. However, researchers typically 
side-step this issue by assuming a priori that it is zero. While models in- 
corporating rational bubbles at first seem appealing, a number of papers, 
most recently Santos and Woodford (1997), show that the conditions under 
whicli rational bubbles can survive are extremely restrictive. 
It is clear then, that under the stringent demands of the strong-form ra- 
tional expectations hypothesis, there are few available explanations for the 
observed behaviour of asset prices in general, and exchange rates in partic- 
ular. The principle exception is to introduce time variation in agents' risk 
aversion, for example, by means of a 'habit term' in their utility functions. 
If however the assumption of complete information and frictionless trad- 
ing is relaxed, a variety of possible explanations for observed exchange rate 
dynamics present themselves. Furthermore, as we shall see in subsequent 
sections, there is a wealth of empirical and experimental evidence to support 
the view that asymmetries in agents information sets can be important, as 
can limits on agents capacity to process that information. 
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2.4 Bounded rationality, market microstruc- 
ture and behavioural models of exchange 
rate dynamics 
One solution to the puzzles presented by exchange rate dynamics is to relax 
the requirement that agents have costless access to all relevant information. 
This forms the basis of a large literature on structural uncertainty and 
learning, in which agents do not know the parameters of the process gov- 
erning fundamentals, but have to learn them over time. This approach has 
enjoyed some success in matching the empirical volatility of exchange rate 
changes (see, for example, Brennan and Xia (2001) and Veronesi (1999)). 
In these models, variation in excess returns comes precisely from changing 
forecasts of fundamentals. While these forecasts axe not subsequently con- 
firmed in the data, agents are not considered irrational - they simply don't 
have enough data to infer the correct model. In related work, Barsky and 
DeLong (1993) generate return volatility in an economy where investors 
forecast fundamentals using a model that is wrong, but not easily rejected 
with available data. 
An important implication of models with fully rational actors is that any 
changes in exchange rates must be due to news: i. e. unexpected public in- 
formation concerning changes in fundamentals. Under rational expectations 
34 
and efficient maxkets, the news contained in public information announce- 
ments is directly impounded into prices with there being no role for trades in 
this process of information assimilation. However, a laxge number of stud- 
ies (see, for example, Engel, Ito, and Lin (1990), Goodhart, Ito, and Payne 
(1996) and Peiers (1997)) have found that the timing of exchange rate move- 
ments is only very weakly connected to macroeconomic news. These results 
are summarized by the findings of Evans (2002) that "public news is raxely 
the predominant source of exchange rate movements over any horizon" (p. 
1, italics in the original). These studies argue for a closer look at the be- 
haviour of different market participants in order to more fully understand 
the price formation mechanism. 
The role of information imperfections in explaining the observed behaviour 
of exchange rates can be more fully appreciated by allowing for different 
types of actors in foreign exchange markets. Real financial markets are 
composed of multifaceted people with multifactor motivations. These in- 
clude motives and objectives such as international trading, international 
investing, noise trading, speculation, arbitrage, relative value or 'hedge' in- 
vesting, dealing or market-making, underwriting and so on. Many market 
participants have more than one of these motivations. The different roles 
enacted by different players in the markets can be summarized by i) the 
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information available to them, and ii) the way that information is used. 
The introduction of heterogeneity in the type of information available to 
agents, and the manner in which information is processed by different mar- 
ket participants is desirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is realistic. 
As will be discýssed in section (2.4.2), examination of the structure of finan- 
cial markets demonstrates how the institutional axrangements under which 
trading takes place form one natural classification system under which to 
examine the price formation process move closely. 
Furthermore, the variety, quantity and quality of information available to 
market participants is vast. Models which introduce some limitations in 
market participants' ability to process this information efficiently can prove 
highly successful in accounting for observed 'aberations' in exchange rate 
behaviour, a selection of these models axe reviewed in sections (2.4.3) to 
(2.4.4). 
2.4.1 A brief digression: heterogenous beliefs and 'ad 
hoe' assumptions 
A common criticism leveled at models employing heterogenous agents is that 
they are add-hoc: i. e. they contain elements which are not attributable to 
any rigourously defined economic structure. The implication is that the 
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results from such a model are difficult to interpret properly, and hence are 
of little use in improving understanding of the phenomena under investiga- 
tion. In fact, an increasing number of models of this type are based upon 
rigourously specified theories of choice, such as prospect theory, which ex- 
plicitly deal with the issues raised by the experimental failings of expected 
utility theory'. Other models do not fully specify the choice theoretic foun- 
dations of agents behaviour, but only draw more generally on recent re- 
search in that area6. Such modelling approaches can still provide important 
insights in to the determinants of asset price behaviour, and often amount 
to sensible shortcuts on the way to examining the phenomenon under in- 
vestigation. In a similar way, macroeconomists write models with cash-in- 
advance constraints, money in the utility function, sticky prices and so on, 
not because they literally believe in these specifications but as a convenient 
shortcut to a money demand curve on the way to studying something else, 
without waiting for the 'microfoundations of money' project to be finished. 
Finally, it is important to note that depending on the type of imperfection 
employed to account for exchange rate dynamics (and hence how different 
market participants are classified), the relative efficacy of alternative policy 
5 For a discussion of prospect theory, see Tversky and Kahneman (1992), while Starmer 
(2000) provides a survey of non-expected utility theory in general. 
'Such models fall under the heading of behavioural finance, and are reviewed by 
Barberis and Thaler (2002). 
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measures to mitigate exchange rate instability can vary widely. The differing 
policy implications of different models provides a powerful tool by which to 
select amongst competing alternatives. 
2.4.2 Mispricing, Volume, Liquidity, and Order Flow 
The apparently endemic mispricing in foreign exchange markets following 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement has coincided with an enor- 
mous surge in turnover in foreign exchange markets. On a typical day in 
the foreign exchange market approximately $1.2 trillion changes hands (BIS, 
2001). This means that in less than a week foreign exchange transactions 
have exceeded the annual value of world trade. 
In order to appreciate how this high volume of transactions is linked to the 
behaviour of exchange rates, it is important to examine the institutional 
setting of the foreign exchange markets. The spot foreign exchange maxket is 
best chaxacterized as a decentralized multiple dealer maxk-et (Lyons (2001)). 
Each dealer stands ready to buy at her bid quote and sell at her offer 
quote. However, there is no centralized location where customers can obtain 
quotes from many different dealers in a consolidated format (unlike, for 
example, the NASDAQ in the U. S. ). Neither is there any physical location 
or exchange where dealers meet with customers. 
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When setting their bid and offer quotes, each dealer observes the flow of 
buy and sell orders from their customers and from this flow is able to form 
an estimate of the fair, or 'arbitrage-free' level of the exchange rate. In 
addition, dealers also trade intensively with one another, and by doing so 
can to some extent extract the private information of other dealers, and 
hence improve upon their view of the fair price of each currency. Evidence 
indicates that around 80% of total trades are carried out between dealers 
themselves, not the end 'users' of foreign exchange. 
The efforts of many researchers to explain 'mispricing' in asset markets in 
general is closely linked with the efforts to explain this observed high volume 
of transactions'. At a basic level, if there is some impact on the price of an 
asset from purchases or sales, then clearly highly variable turnover will be 
closely associated with high variability in exchange rates. After all the idea 
that, for example, large scale sales reduce prices is hardly revolutionary - 
downward sloping demand curves are a standard feature of markets which 
are less than perfectly competitive. However, the existence of a large body 
of active arbitrageurs in financial markets leans the presumption much more 
toward a flat demand curve. For this reason, we should be more surprised 
7 This research effort comes under the banner of 'market microstructure' research. 
An excellent survey of this literature is provided by O'Hara (1995), while Lyons (2001) 
extensively examines its application to foreign exchange markets. 
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to see 'price impact' of regular or expected sales or purchases in relatively 
frictionless financial markets. 
An issue closely related to the price impact of a trade is liquidity: roughly 
speaking, some concept of how much of an asset is for sale at current quoted 
bid-ask spreads. Dramatic falls in liquidity are commonly observed in peri- 
ods of instability in asset prices and market crashes. Intuitively, crashes in 
asset markets, or equivalently bursting asset bubbles, occur when the mar- 
k-et becomes 'one-sided': market participants wishing to sell their holdings 
of the asset cannot find buyers willing to purchase the all of their assets at 
quoted bid-ask spreads. Reduced liquidity is often indicated by larger bid- 
ask spreads, but is most commonly quantified by the actual price impact of 
trades. 
There are two key theoretical channels which can account for possible price 
impacts. The first of these arises from the presence of 'inventory risk' for 
exchange rate dealers. If one makes the (realistic) assumption that foreign 
exchange dealers are risk averse, then they will only carry higher positions 
on their books if a higher risk premium is paid. Dealers incentives are set 
such that they wish to close out their positions by the end of a working day. 
As such, the build up of large open positions in their books caxries increased 
inventory risk - the risk that the value of the inventory will decline before 
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it's sold. 
Maiket microstructure models have an additional story for price-impact: 
asymmetric information. When conducting inter-dealer trades, each dealer 
has access to a set of private information: the buy and sell orders they 
receive from their customers. This information is summarized in the 'order 
flow': signed volume of trades which simultaneously indicates both the size 
of a trade and whether the dealer bought or sold the asset in question. 
This order flow constitutes a noisy signal of customers information about 
the fundamental determinants of the asset price. Furthermore, by trad- 
ing with other dealers, it is possible for dealers to gain some information 
regarding other dealers private information by observing their order flOW8 
In addition, the informational asymmetries in the customer-to-dealer and 
dealer-to-dealer relationships create scope for strategic behaviour on the 
part of market participants. 
In a series of papers, Evans and Lyons (1999,2001,2004) show that exchange 
rate movements are highly correlated with order flow. This is in particulaxly 
stark contrast to the low correlation between macroeconomic fundamentals 
and exchange rates. In particular, recent work by Marsh and O'Rourke 
8That order flow can play a role in price determination stems from the idea that 
rationaJ trades can occur in transition to the new equilibrium price as long as buyer/seller 
imbalance is unknown to the dealer. 
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(2005) has demonstrated that the correlation between exchange rates and 
the order flow from different institutional sources varies dramatically, and 
studies of disaggregated order flow have shown how the information content 
of orders varies considerably from source to source. 
Evans and Lyons interpret this correlation as causal, i. e. that order flow 
causes the exchange rate to move, running into the illiquidity, "downwaxd 
sloping demand, " or "limited ability to beax risle' of dealers. However there 
are at least two alternative interpretations of this correlation. For example, 
in a similar study of the bond market Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) inter- 
pret the correlation between order flow and price movements as evidence 
for 'price discovery' rather than for 'illiquidity' or 'price impact. In a max- 
ket of symmetric information, that information raises prices without any 
trading. In a market with asymmetrically informed agents, those with the 
information will trade on that information as prices rise, so that price rises 
and buy orders will indeed be correlated. 
An alternative explanation for this correlation is that the causality actually 
runs backwards: perhaps changes in prices encourage traders to 'follow the 
trend, ' and pile volume in the same direction. This explanation is the 
subject of the following section. 
In summary, while the results of the order flow approach are encouraging, 
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it must be remembered that order flow cannot bear more than a proximate 
relationship to exchange rate movements. As yet this literature has little to 
say about the relationship between inter-dealer orderflow, macroeconomic 
variables and the forces which drive customer order flow. Ultimately, the 
determinants of exchange rates will not be fully understood until customer 
order flow unrelated to economic fundamentals is explained more fully. 
2.4.3 Chartism, heterogenous expectations and ex- 
change rate dynamics 
The microstructure literature discussed in the previous section principally 
focuses on the relationship between inter-dealer order flow and exchange 
rate dynamics. In doing so, the motivations and information available to 
the customers placing orders with dealers are largely treated as a black box. 
An alternative literature, which has developed in parallel with work on or- 
der flow, has focused instead on the behaviour of customers, whilst treating 
inter-dealer relationships as a black box. This work attempts to explain the 
large misalignments and high volatility in exchange rates by augmenting 
macroeconomic models of exchange rates by explicitly modelling the expec- 
tation formation of currency traders, and the forecasting techniques they 
employ (e. g. Jeanne and Rose (2002)). There is wide spread evidence (see, 
e. g. Allen and Taylor (1990)) that, rather then base their forecasts solely on 
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economic fundamentals, traders base their short-run forecasts on the past 
movements of exchange rates, thus extrapolating recent trends. This body 
of theory essentially suggests that the high volatility of exchange rates can 
be understood to be due to fads or bubbles generated by the use of trading 
rules. 
In the literature, particular focus has been given to the role of chartist or 
'technical' rules employed by practitioners when forecasting exchange rates. 
While 'fundamentalist' trading strategies employed by traders are based on 
underlying economic determinants of the exchange rate, chartism or 'techni- 
cal analysis' refers to forecasting techniques employed by traders which use 
past realizations of exchange rates to detect patterns which they extrapolate 
into the future, thus ignoring information embodied in 'structural' exchange 
rate models. In addition to simple charts of past exchange rate behaviour, a 
technical analyst may use a variety of trading rules based on statistical and 
mathematical techniques. Popular examples include the 'head and shoul- 
ders' reversal pattern, and a variety of moving average rules for predicting 
turning points. The behaviour of traders using chartist techniques adds a 
'positive feedback' into the exchange rate, tending to accentuate deviations 
from the equilibrium level implied by economic fundamentals. In contrast, 
the behaviour of traders forecasting on the basis of fundamentals adds a 
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'negative feedback' into the exchange rate, since when the exchange rate 
deviates from its equilibrium value they expect it to return there. 
There are now a large number of survey articles which document the widespread 
use of technical analysis in forex markets the world over. Allen and Taylor 
(1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) conducted a survey of 400 chief forex 
dealers in the London markets, and found that approximately 90 percent of 
respondents based their forecasts to some degree on chartist techniques at 
short time horizons. As the time horizon increased from one month to one 
year, they found that the weight given to economic fundamentals increased. 
Similax studies have been carried out in the German markets (Menkoff(1997, 
1998)), the Hong Kong markets (Lui and Mole (1998)), the Hong Kong, 
Tokyo and Singapore markets (Cheung and Wong (1999,2000)), and the 
US markets (Cheung and Chinn(1999)). In general, these studies find that 
the vast majority of forex dealers employ some sort of technical forecasting 
technique, especially at short horizons. 
2.4.4 The Noise Trader Approach 
An alternative approach to the chartist fundamentalist framework outlined 
above, which builds largely on the model of the stock market by De Long et 
al (1990), views analysts who employ chartist techniques as 'noise traders'. 
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The essential difference between these models and those outlined above is 
that the presence of noise traders injects an additional element of volatility 
in the mean of asset returns: in contrast to fundamentalists, noise traders 
have imperfect knowledge of the fundamental determinants of the exchange 
rate. Whilst they are typically assumed to perceive the second moments 
of returns correctly, their perception of the first-moments is assumed to be 
affected by noise that is unrelated to economic fundamentals. For example, 
in the De Long et al (1990), in each period the noise traders price the asset 
as its true fundamental value plus an error term. Such incorrect pricing 
generates additional risk in holding the asset. This risk limits the willingness 
of the fundamentalist traders to go against the noise traders even if they 
know the true value of the asset. Hence axbitrageurs do not drive the asset's 
price toward economic fundamentals. In addition, the risk generated by the 
noise traders results in them earning higher average returns than those of 
the sophisticated traders, so that the noise traders are difficult to drive out 
of the market. Crucially, this is also accompanied by a higher variance of 
returns. In this way, the noise trader approach is well suited to modelling 
the excess volatility in exchange rates, but provides fewer insights into the 
formation of the persistent exchange rate misalignments which axe of most 
concern from a macroeconomic policy perspective. 
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Chartist-Fundamentalist Models 
Since the seminal paper by Frankel and Froot (1986), there have been a 
large number of models which attempt to model the dynamics of exchange 
rates with the heterogeneity of expectations which is implied by the use of 
fundamentalist and technical trading strategies. Most of these models can 
be represented in the following simple form: 
market st = zt + c(Et Ist+11 - SO (2.3) 
which summarizes the 'asset mark-et view' of the exchange rate, where st 
represents the spot exchange rate, zt a vector of economic fundamentals. 
, arket Here, Et [st+, ] represents the markets expectation of the exchange rate 
next period, and is given by a weighted average of the forecasts made with 
fundamentalist and technical trading strategies, so that: 
ar e Ist, l] = wtE 
chart 
- wt)Etf"d[st+, ] Et' 
ktt Ist+, ] + (1 (2.4) 
The various models in the literature differ principally in the process by which 
the weights given to each strategy, wt, evolve. For example, in Frankel and 
Froot's (1986) model, it is postulated that 
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Lot - Wt-i : -.,: 47)t-l - Wt-i) (2.5) 
where O)t-1 is defined as the weight, computed ex post, that would have 
accurately predicted the contemporaneous change in the spot rate. This 
weight 4ýt-j is defined as 
EDt-i = 
Ast (2.6) 
O(ä - st-i) 
so that the change in weight becomes 
wt - wt-i =3 
Ast 
- 3wt-l (2.7) u79 --st-i) 
The value of 6 is crucial for the stability of the system. It determines the 
importance of the most recent information on updating the weights. If J is 
large, then the system is stable. If it is small, then the system is unstable. 
Exactly how large 6 needs to be for stability depends on 0. 
In this model, both groups of traders behave in a different manner because 
they have different information sets, so that each agent is acting rationally 
subject to certain constraints. The information set of fundamentalists in- 
48 
cludes fundamentals, while that of chaxtists contains only past values of the 
exchange rate which they use to extrapolate into the future. 
The De Grauwe, Dewatcher, and Embrechts (1994) model is similar to that 
of Frankel and Froot with two exceptions. First the Chartist equation takes 
an autoregressive form for the expected future exchange rate, so that it 
nests Frankel and Froot's specification. Secondly, the weights are assumed 
to evolve according to 
Wt = 1- 
1 (2.8) 
[1 + b(9 - St_1)2] 
where b>0. Hence the weight on the fundamentalist element is an increas- 
ing function of the deviation from economic fundamentals. 
De Grauwe et al's rationale for this weighting function appeals to a normally 
distributed noise term in agents forecasts of the fundamental exchange rate. 
When the actual value of the exchange rate is equal to the fundamental 
value, half of the fundamentalists view the exchange rate as overvalued, 
and half as undervalued. This difference in opinion makes fundamentalist' 
net demand zero so they have no effect on the market. When the exchange 
rate is far from the true fundamental value, the majority of fundamentalists 
are able to agree whether the exchange rate is under or overvalued. This 
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agreement results in the fundamentalists working together to move the ex- 
change rate back towards fundamentals, with the degree of mean reversion 
increasing with the deviation from equilibrium. 
This model also highlights an intriguing possibility: that the apparent un- 
predictability of the exchange rate is caused by the underlying dynamics 
being chaotic. The authors show that when the degree of extrapolation by 
chartists is sufficiently high, the dynamic path of the exchange rate becomes 
highly sensitive to small variations in the initial values of the parameters 
(technically, this is termed sensitive dependence upon initial conditions). 
Furthermore, the time series produced by the model seem apparently ran- 
dom in the time domain, in spite of the fact that no noise is added to the 
model. This finding is important, because it shows that the model provides 
a structural theory which can account for the apparent failure of economic 
models to forecast exchange rates. 
While chaotic series appear random in the time domain, they do contain well 
defined structure in the frequency domain. This allows for the construction 
of statistical tests which can potentially distinguish between series domi- 
nated by deterministic chaos, and those which are largely stochastic. These 
tests include the BDS test (Brock, Dechert, and Scheinkman (1987)), as 
well as tests based upon correlation dimensions and maximum Liapunov 
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exponents. However, extensive testing by a number of studies (see, in- 
ter alia, Hsieh (1989) and LeBaron (1994)), have typically been unable to 
find evidence of chaotic dynamics, and have instead attributed the evidence 
of nonlinear dynamics in exchange rates to lower dimension nonlinearities. 
These findings provide some of the motivation for the types of nonlinear 
behaviour studied in subsequent chapters. 
2.5 Policy Options to Address Misalignments 
2.5.1 The Tobin Tax 
The explosion in foreign exchange trading since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods agreement in 1973 has coincided with a string of spectacular currency 
crises, with recent examples ranging from the collapse of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-3 to the contagious currency crises which 
ripped through Asia in 1997, and the traumatic experience of Argentina in 
2001, amongst others. One view which gained popularity in the mid 1990s 
was that there is a strong connection between these crises and the extremely 
high foreign exchange trading volume discussed in the previous section. 
This has led some researchers and policy makers to postulate that if there 
is a causal relationship from trading volume to exchange rate volatility, 
then policy measures which reduce the 'wrong-kind' of trading could help 
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stabilize exchange rates. Surveys suggest9 that more than 40% of all trans- 
actions in foreign exchange markets involve round trips of fewer than three 
days. Since this type of short term trading is unlikely to be for purposes of, 
e. g. long-term capital investment, it has been highlighted as a likely source 
of short-run volatility. Because of this, there have been periodic calls to 
" throw sand into the wheels of international capital markets" in order to 
reduce the destabilizing speculation blamed for the apparent inefficiency in 
foreign exchange markets. 
One policy measure which is designed to achieve this goal is the 'Tobin tax'. 
In its original form this is a small tax rate applied to transactions in foreign 
currency. First fully articulated by Tobin (1978), the goal of such a tax 
would be to reduce the influence of destabilizing speculative activity in for- 
eign exchange markets. Some of the intended benefits include the following: 
a) Reduce the volume of foreign exchange transactions and thereby reduce 
the volatility of foreign exchange rates. b) Reduce the returns to short- 
term speculation. c) Reduce the amount of speculation and the incidence 
of speculative currency attacks. d) Reduce the volume of speculative flows 
of 'hot money' and other short-term investments, and encourage long-term 
investment. e) Reduce the volatility of international capital flows. 
'See, BIS (2002) 
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The key feature of a Tobin tax is that it designed to discourage short-term 
speculative trading. Because it is a tax on transactions, it is paid twice, 
once when purchasing an asset, and once when selling it. As such it auto- 
matically discriminates against short-horizon capital flows. For example, a 
0.2% tax on a round-trip investment to another currency costs 48% a year 
if transacted every business day, 10% if every week, 2.4% if every month. 
But it is a trivial charge on commodity trade or long-term investments. 
An important assumption inherent in the Tobin tax proposal is that a signif- 
icant proportion of short-run trading wnounts to destabilizing speculation. 
Frenkel (1996) develops a variation of the chartist-fundamentalist model 
outlined in section (2.4.4) to illustrate how a Tobin tax can weaken desta- 
bilizing forces in this case. He distinguishes between two groups in the 
market: investors and speculators. The behaviour of investors is oriented 
on the long term, and they trade only on deviations of the exchange rate 
from its fundamental equilibrium value. Speculators, by contrast, take a 
short-term view and buy currency that is already (slightly) overvalued, i. e. 
they exacerbate exchange rate misalignments. The total demand for home 
currency is given by a function that captures the different behaviour of the 
two groups. 
Now assume that the actual exchange rate (expressed in units of foreign 
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currency per unit of home currency) is higher than its equilibrium value, so 
that the foreign currency is overvalued. Investors will then buy the home 
currency which tends to depreciate the exchange rate, whereas speculators 
sell. The Tobin tax then emerges as an instrument that strengthens demand 
by long-term investors with stabilizing expectations since the tax only has 
a small impact on their (relatively infrequent) trades, whilst having a large 
impact of the (frequent) trades of speculators. 
The underlying effects of the tax are modelled more fully in an evolution- 
ary framework by Westerhoff (2003). He develops a model of heterogeneous 
interacting agents who either speculate by employing a trend-following fore- 
casting rule, invest on the basis of macro fundamentals, or abstain from the 
market completely. Their decision depends on both the past profitability 
of different strategies, as well as communication between agents. He shows 
how, in this set up, the imposition of Tobin tax leads to a crowding out 
of speculators and stabilizes the dynamics. However, since to a lesser ex- 
tent fundamentalists are crowded out as well, their decreasing numbers can 
result in persistent misalignments if tax rates are too high. 
These models provide a broad picture of the likely effects of the tax on 
dealers. A tax on foreign exchange transactions must increase the bid-ask 
spread of dealers and reduce the volume of trading. At the same time, the 
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average maturity of foreign exchange transaction would increase in length. 
This is illustrated in existing markets, where bid-ask spreads caused by 
transactions costs explain a relatively strong decline of spot transactions 
relative to outright forward contracts. 
While the bifurcated view of the mark-et given above provides a useful model 
for understanding the causes of exchange rate volatility and misalignments, 
the theoretical effects of the tax are significantly altered once allowance is 
made for the risk-management role of inter-dealer trading. In fact, there is 
a significant risk that a potentially dramatic reduction in trading volume 
which could be produced by a Tobin tax, may well lead to an increase in 
erratic movements in markets. 
As mentioned in the section (2.4.2), around 80% of trades in the foreign 
exchange market are carried out between dealers in 'hot potato' trading. 
Having received an order from a customer, hot potato trading is the search 
process for a counterparty which is willing to accept the new currency posi- 
tion. Lyons (2001) suggests hot potato trading is consistent with a dealer's 
optimizing behaviour. Every currency dealer wants to restore the equilib- 
rium befitting her degree of risk aversion when she is too long or short a 
currency due to a customer order. Thus the passing of unwanted positions 
is a consequence of dealers' risk management. 
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There are two key implications of this process: first, the price decline of the 
foreign currency will be smaller if many dealers carry only a fraction of the 
initial order instead of one dealer who is willing to hold all. This stems from 
the (realistic) assumption that dealers are risk averse. Higher positions will 
only be carried if a higher risk premium is paid. Second, total risk is shared 
amongst many dealers and therefore can be spread around more efficiently. 
When viewed from this perspective, the levying of a Tobin tax could have 
severe consequences for market efficiency. As De Grauwe (2000) points out, 
a tax on each trade causes the search for risk spreading to become more 
expensive, and consequently ends up with more risky positions being taken 
in the maxket and higher volatility. 
In response to these concerns, Tobin (1996) suggests that the tax should only 
be applied to customer-dealer transaction, not to inter-dealer. However, it 
is not clear how this could be achieved in practice. On the one hand, 
exempting inter-dealer trades from the tax would simply encourage tax-free 
transactions by and through intermediaries; while taxing them would entail 
efficiency costs (Spahn (1996)). 
Furthermore, a Tobin tax might prove a greater burden on an international 
(real) trade transaction followed by hot potato trading than for short-term 
speculative transactions without hedging. By way of example, Davidson 
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(1997) compares the effect of a Tobin tax of 0.5 percent on a purely specu- 
lative trade, and foreign trade in goods and services followed by a chain of 
four hot-potato trades. The former would be equivalent to a tax of 0.5%, 
while the latter would amount to a tax of 2% - exactly the opposite of the 
tax's original intention. 
The customers of wholesale dealers range from exporters and importers, di- 
rect investors or portfolio investors (such as hedge funds, investment funds, 
insurance companies) and other institutional investors. The government and 
central bank also take part as actors on foreign exchange mark-ets. Finally, 
a small proportion of the trade is executed in retail transactions through 
commercial banks or credit card companies for tourism or for cross-border 
transactions of private households. 
Final customers in general, and particularly traders in the retail segment 
are able to profit from relatively large bid-ask spreads. These spreads are 
wider, the lower the liquidity in the particulax segment of the market, the 
less price-elastic local demand, and the higher the degree of information 
asymmetry that warrants some monopoly rents. If the effect of the tax 
is a widening of spreads and a reduction in wholesale trading, this would 
affect different market participants in the following way (see Felix and Sau 
(1996)). 
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At the shortest end of the market, i. e. in particular for 'covered interest 
rate arbitraging', transactions costs create something like a 'neutral zone' 
within which there are no profits from arbitrage and transactions therefore 
do not take place at all (Spahn (2002)). This zone would be widened by 
the transactions tax, making it more difficult for currency traders to pass 
on their 'hot potatoes' to other traders. 
A similar argument also applies to currency trading by hedge funds. The 
risks of highly speculative and risky trading conducted at uncovered in- 
terest parity (i. e. through the deliberate exposure to risks through 'open 
positions'), are extremely high, and frequently amplified by leveraged bor- 
rowing. As a result, the hedge fund market segment requires large bid-ask 
spreads. For this reason, a transactions tax with a relatively small rate 
adding to an already laxge neutral zone for trading is unlikely to exhibit 
deterring effects (Spahn (2002)). 
However, a Tobin tax could potentially contribute to lower volatility and 
therefore limit the scope of action for speculative trading by hedge funds 
(Felix and Sau (1996)). Note however, that this would only be the case if the 
tax did indeed lower volatility, not increase it as may in fact be the case (see 
above). Felix and Sau also argue that the central bank could use the greater 
freedom to act under the umbrella of a Tobin tax to speculate against the 
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hedge funds and therefore reduce (or even eliminate) their profits - although 
this scenario seems somewhat far-fetched. 
In addition to these concerns, the Tobin tax also faces considerable problems 
of enforceability. If the tax were imposed in only part of the world, then it 
would lead to the relocation of trading into other, untaxed countries. This 
would suggest that enforcement of the tax would require global political 
cooperation. Tobin (1996) axgued that cooperation might be enforced by 
allowing local governments to keep the tax revenue, but this would simply 
shift the problem to the size of the tax rather than enforcement per se. 
Although it was originally proposed that the tax would only be applied 
to foreign exchange transactions, it is clear that it would be possible to 
avoid the tax by trading in derivatives. The markets would likely develop 
cash substitutes that would escape the tax; hypothetical short-term instru- 
ments, similar to banker's acceptances and commercial paper, could be used 
to evade a cash-based tax, as could foreign exchange market funds and re- 
purchase agreements (made against collateral and not settled on central 
bank accounts). Moreover, financial derivatives (such as forwards, futures 
and swaps) permit the transformation of 'long trading' into 'short trading' 
with important repercussion on spot markets. 
This problem cannot be resolved simply by extending the tax to transactions 
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in derivatives because the size of such transactions cannot be related to the 
underlying long transactions in a straightforward manner. A Tobin tax 
on the transactions themselves would understate the volume of funds that 
can be channeled through foreign exchange markets; however, taxing the 
notional value of a derivatives contract would probably severely damage 
the efficiency of derivatives markets. Given the important role played by 
the forwards and futures markets in hedging risks related to exchange rate 
fluctuations, the weakening of derivatives markets would also increase the 
sensitivity of the economy to spot market fluctuations. 
Another option which has been proposed by Spahn (1996) to avoid these 
problems is the so-called 'two-tiered' Tobin tax. This proposal has two 
levels of taxation, one low rate which applies during 'normal' market con- 
ditions, and a so-called 'exchange rate surcharge': a high tax rate intended 
to deter speculation, and triggered only when the exchange rate crosses a 
pre-determined threshold. 
The Spahn (1996) proposal is aimed at addressing a major problem of a 
Tobin tax: if imposed at a high rate the tax would seriously impair the 
normal operations of financial markets; while if the tax is imposed at a low 
rate it would not deter currency traders who expect significant short-term 
changes in currency values. The top tier of Spahn's proposed tax-the ex- 
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change surchaxge-would function as an automatic circuit breaker whenever 
speculative attacks against currencies occurred. Spahn argues that when 
the surcharge was triggered, transactions costs would rise enough to cause 
some traders to delay transactions, thus smoothing out changes in the value 
of the currency. Revenues from the tax might be allocated to the countries 
of origin, to an international body, or in some other fashion. 
Unfortunately, this two-tiered tax also suffers from a number of problems. 
Firstly, in common with Tobin's original proposal, in particular the impact 
on liquidity of the exchange rate surcharge would potentially be enormous, 
and could severely damage traders' risk management. Furthermore, the 
two-tiered tax would also suffer from the need for worldwide enforcement 
and potential tax evasion via the derivatives markets. In addition to these 
concerns, Spahn's proposal suffers from other problems due to the use of a 
variable rate tax. In practice, such taxes are rarely used. The main reason 
for their unpopularity is that they create uncertainty over prices in max- 
kets. This is, in fact, the feature of Spahn's proposed variable surcharge 
that could make it effective in altering market behavior. But at the same 
time, in the absence of volatility, the additional uncertainty it would create 
in financial markets is likely to impair their operation and increase spreads. 
Variable-rate taxes are also rarely used because they complicate consider- 
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ably the burdens on taxpayers and tax administrations. This effect would 
be particularly severe in the case of a two-tier Tobin tax because the number 
of separate transactions to which the tax would apply is so huge. 
In general then, although the Tobin tax seems an appealing approach at 
first sight, there axe clearly many problems with its potential use for the 
reduction of exchange rate misalignments. In the next section, I turn to a 
policy measure which has most frequently been employed by industrialized 
countries since 1973, that of sterilized intervention. 
2.5.2 Managed floating and sterilized intervention 
2.5.3 Foreign exchange intervention 
The Tobin tax discussed above represents a controversial policy measure 
to tame excessive exchange rate fluctuations. The simplest alternative is 
for monetary authorities to maintain their bilateral exchange rates within 
some bounds via sales or purchases of foreign currency. However this kind of 
intervention amounts to the dedication, at least to some degree, of monetaxy 
policy to maintaining a stable exchange rate. 
In this way, large, persistent deviations in exchange rates from equilibrium 
can create something of a dilemma for monetary policy makersio, since 
loSee, for example Wadhwani (2000) 
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monetary policy targeted at correcting exchange rate misalignments may 
be at odds with maintaining internal balance in the economy. In order to 
avoid the problems which may arise in using monetaxy policy to correct 
exchange rate misalignments, monetary authorities occasionally engage in 
ste7ilized foreign exchange intervention. 
In a non-sterilized intervention, the authorities may try to influence the 
exchange rate by purchasing foreign currency denominated bonds using do- 
mestic currency. In this way the authorities' demand for foreign bonds 
would put upward pressure on the foreign currency, and hence tend to lower 
the value of the domestic currency. However, the domestic central bank has 
to increase the domestic money supply in order to fund the purchase, and 
thus puts pressure on domestic interest rates to fall. 
To offset this pressure, the authorities can 'sterilize' the intervention. To do 
so, they must reverse the pressure on domestic interest rates by selling home 
currency denominated bonds in return for domestic cash. The net effect is 
to raise the relative supply of home currency verses foreign-currency bonds 
held by the public. The 'portfolio balance' theory of intervention holds that, 
if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, then a risk averse 
public will require an increased return on the domestic currency bonds to 
willingly hold the increased supply which, given that interest rates have 
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remained constant, can only be effected by a depreciation in the domestic 
currency. 
At the outset it should be noted that there are several important caveats 
which, in theory at least, limit the potential impact of sterilized intervention. 
For example, the rational described above for the effect of sterilized inter- 
vention depends on a change in the relative supplies of domestic and foreign 
outside assets. Outside nominal assets axe those nominal assets which do 
not net out when aggregating across the private sector; that is, non-indexed 
government bonds and the monetary base. However, the distinction between 
inside and outside bonds is meaningless in models where infinitely lived ho- 
mogeneous agents leave bequests to their infinitely lived family units. For 
example, Obstfeld (1982) and Stockman (1979) rigourously demonstrate the 
impotence of sterilized intervention in such models, even where bonds de- 
nominated in different currencies are imperfect substitutes due to exchange 
rate risk. 
Furthermore, sterilized intervention will alter the government's net asset 
position and thus necessitate fiscal changes that maintain intertemporal 
budget balance. Therefore in a world where Ricardian equivalence holds, 
so that private agents offset expected future tax payments (which will be 
required to service extra government debt) against currency holdings of do- 
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mestic bonds, imperfect substitutability alone would no longer be sufficient 
for sterilized intervention to influence the current exchange rate. 
In addition to these theoretical concerns, how effective interventions are in 
practice is also a matter of some controversy. The evidence that intervention 
operations have the desired effects on exchange rates through conventional 
channels: by changing the 'fundamental' level of the exchange rate through 
portfolio balance channels, or by signaling to markets the future course of 
monetary policy is somewhat mixed. 
The majority of previous literature has focused on the workings of sterilized 
intervention either through the portfolio balance effect, or via the signal- 
ing of future government policies. There are many excellent and detailed 
surveys are on the empirical evidence regarding these effects of sterilized 
intervention, provided, for example by Dominguez and Frankel (1993b), 
Edison (1993) and Almekinders (1995), and more recently by Sarno and 
Taylor (2001). As described above, the portfolio-balance effect can be mo- 
tivated by the theory of mean-variance portfolio selection, where risk averse 
agents choose their optimal portfolio, which is composed of domestic and 
foreign currencies and bonds, so as to maximize their terminal wealth. Then 
sterilized intervention will affect the exchange rate when agents readjust 
their portfolios of domestic and foreign-denominated bonds in line with the 
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changes in the outside supplies of those assets. This approach has been 
pursued by Dominguez and Frankel (1993a, b), with critiques provided by 
Humpage (1988), Obstfeld (1989), and Ghosh (1992). Given the small size 
of intervention operations compared with the size of asset stocks, there can 
be little surprise that evidence in support of the theory is in short supply. 
The second channel whereby intervention can influence exchange rates is 
termed the signalling, or information channel. This view of intervention as 
a signal of the central banks's future monetary policy implies that a ster- 
ilized purchase of foreign currency is expected to lead to a depreciation of 
the exchange rate if the purchase is assumed to signal a more expansionary 
domestic monetaxy policy. Klien and Rosengen (1991) find no consistent re- 
lationship between intervention and monetary policy, while Kaminsky and 
Lewis (1996) report that the impact of intervention on the exchange rate has 
sometimes been inconsistent with the implied monetary policy. Humpage 
(1997) concludes that the US authorities in the 1990's had no information 
superior to the market so that intervention could not be viewed as signalling 
new information about monetaxy policy. The apparent failure of the sig- 
nalling hypothesis is perhaps not so surprising given the monetary model's 
failure to predict exchange rate movements. If there is little direct trans- 
mission between changes in relative money supplies and movements in short 
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term exchange rates, then it is also unclear why signalling monetary policy 
should have a substantial effect on exchange rates. 
The noise trader channel 
The general view taken by monetary authorities of how sterilized interven- 
tion effects exchange rates in practice seems to differ mark-edlY from the 
'traditional' channels outlined above. Rather than attempt to influence the 
equilibTium level of the exchange rate, sterilized intervention operations are 
generally undertaken when the authorities view the exchange rate to be 
under or overvalued. Thus interventions axe carried out with the intent of 
reducing current misalignments, or indeed excessive volatility. The rationale 
for this kind of intervention operation is best viewed in the light of the use 
of technical analysis by FOREX traders discussed in the previous section. 
Wadhwani (2000) notes "Under some circumstances, FX intervention can 
give the fundamentals-based traders greater confidence to initiate positions 
during overshoots. Alternatively, in an over-extended market, interven- 
tion can sometimes directly affect the behaviour of the momentum-based 
traders. " The analogy employed by Dominguez and Rankel (1993b) for FX 
intervention emphasizes this nicely. They liken the role of intervention to 
the role of herd dogs amongst cattle. Clearly a small number of dogs cannot 
always sustain control of the steers. So, when a stampede gets underway 
67 
because each panicked steer is following its neighbours, the herd can wander 
off quite fax from their initially desired direction. However, the dogs can be 
helpful in a stampede because, by turning a few steers around, they might 
induce the herd to follow. 
While this provides a strong intuitive description of how intervention may 
'prick bubbles' in exchange rates, it is only very recently that researchers 
have begun to rigorously examine the mechanisms by which intervention 
may produce this kind of effect. One notable example is work by De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2003). Independently of the work undertaken for this disser- 
tation, these authors employ a similar approach to that taken here, investi- 
gating the impact of sterilized intervention in a model based on the frame- 
work introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997). However these authors 
focus on the impact of intervention on the second moments, or volatility of 
the exchange rate. They find that sterilized interventions can be effective 
in reducing the noise generated by the use of trading rules. Other related 
work is conducted by Jeanne and Rose (2002), who have employed the noise 
trader approach to provide an explanation of the excessive volatility of ex- 
change rates under a float. In a similar spirit to the model presented here, 
they show that the presence of noise traders can lead to multiple equilibria 
in the forex market. Employing an exchange rate "target zone" following 
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Krugman and Miller (1993), they show how an exchange rate target zone 
can allow the policymak-er to co-ordinate activity to a low volatility equilib- 
rium while leaving macroeconomic fundamentals unchanged. An important 
difference between the research presented here and that of Jeanne and Rose 
(2002) is to show how essentially the same goal can be achieved by using 
sterilized intervention. 
In addition there are two empirical studies which test for the kinds of effect 
modelled in this dissertation. Hung (1997), employs a noise trading frame- 
work to explain the impact of US intervention on exchange rate volatility. 
He finds that intervention by the US FED reduced both yen/dollar and 
DM/dollar exchange rate volatilities during 1985-1986, but increased them 
during 1987-1989. Taylor (2003) examines the effectiveness of intervention 
within the context of a Markov-switching model for the real exchange rate. 
The probability of switching between stable and unstable regimes depends 
nonlinearly upon intervention, the degree of misalignment and the duration 
of the regime. Applying this to dollar-mark data for the period 1985-1998, 
he finds that intervention increases the probability of stability when the rate 
is misaligned, and that its influence grows with the degree of misalignment. 
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Chapter 3 
Sterilized intervention in a 
model with trader 
heterogeneity: theory 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to examine the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in a frame- 
work where there can be large and persistent deviations from equilibrium 
exchange rates, I focus on models of the forex market which explain ex- 
change rate dynamics as in a world with heterogenous expectations. In 
particular, I draw on the work of Brock and Hommes (1997,1998,1999) on 
periodically collapsing bubbles in the stock market. In their work, traders 
are modelled as selecting alternative forecasting strategies on the basis of an 
'evolutionary fitness rule'. Le. The forces of evolution - the survival of the 
fittest - determine which trading strategies survive to be used in the follow- 
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ing period. The 'fitness' of a trading strategy can be modelled in a variety 
of ways, e. g. as a function of realized net profits or mean squared prediction 
errors. A key parameter in these models is the 'intensity of choice', which 
measures how sensitive traders are to differences in fitness across strategies 
when selecting their optimal trading rule. In this framework, Brock and 
Hommes have demonstrated how price fluctuations are characterized by 
irregular switching between phases of fluctuations close to fundamentals, 
phases of optimism where most agents follow an upward trend, and phases 
of pessimism with small or large market crashes. This class of model pro- 
vides an explanation for temporary speculative bubbles which are triggered 
by noise and reinforced by evolutionary forces. 
Within this framework, I model the effects of sterilized foreign exchange 
intervention in the spirit of the portfolio-balance class of models: where 
intervention changes the outside supplies of domestic and foreign assets, 
resulting in a change in the risk premium. In general this 'portfolio balance 
effect' has only found weak support in empirical studies: the size of ster- 
ilized intervention operations conducted by monetary authorities are gen- 
erally deemed to be too small to have significant portfolio balance effects 
in practice. However, in the evolutionary model presented here, changes 
in the supplies of assets may affect the exchange rate substantially: by in- 
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ducing a change in the composition of the forecasting rules employed by 
traders in the market. Since realized profits are determined by the real- 
ized excess return of foreign bonds, realized profits axe also influenced by 
the risk premium. Thus the fitness of a forecasting strategy may also be 
influenced by sterilized intervention operations. The authorities may use 
intervention to co-ordinate traders on to trading strategies which are based 
on economic fundamentals rather than strategies based on technical trading 
rules and trend-chasing. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section (3.2) presents the model, while 
the numerical analysis of the exchange rate dynamics in the model without 
intervention are examined in section (3.3). The effects of intervention on 
the exchange rate are analyzed in section (3.4), and section (3.5) concludes. 
3.2 The model of strategy choice 
While the chartist-fundamentalist models outlined in chapter 1 have con- 
siderable intuitive appeal there seems to be room for improvement on a 
number of fronts. The key implication of Frankel and Froot's model is that 
in the short run, the weight of traders who employ each strategy changes 
according to the group's respective wealth. As long as chartists continue 
to make money, in the long run fundamentalists will be driven out of the 
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market entirely. This would imply an explosive path for the exchange rate, 
with the potential for no mean reversion. An appealing alternative to this 
approach is developed in a series of papers by Brock and Hommes (1997, 
1998,1999). 1 draw on their work to model how beliefs are updated over 
time i. e. how the fractions wht evolve. The framework they develop rep- 
resents a significant advance on previous studies for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, rather than select the appropriate trading strategy on the basis of 
the essentially ad hoc measures proposed in other studies, agents select fore- 
cast rules in a (boundedly) rational manner, on the basis of a 'fitness' or 
'performance' measure which is a function of the profits from each strategy. 
Agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they choose the strategy 
with the highest fitness, so that strategies with highest performance will 
dominate the evolutionary dynamics. Brock and Hommes make this evolu- 
tionary selection operational by drawing on random utility models and the 
theory of discrete choice. 
3.2.1 The set of available trading strategies 
In order to keep the discussion as simple as possible, heterogeneity in the 
expectations of traders is modeled in the following way. Each period, given 
the level of last periods exchange rate st, traders may either pay a fixed 
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cost', C, to purchase a forecast based on macroeconomic fundamentals: 
ff.,,, d, t = VSt-I 0<v<1. 
or they may simply extrapolate recent trends by employing a generic chartist 
rule: 
fchart, t '-- gSt-1 9> 11 
(3.2) 
The assumption that g>1 implies that traders following the chartist strat- 
egy expect the overvaluation of a currency to extend further next period. 
0<v<1 implies that traders using the fundamentalist strategy expect 
any currency overvaluation to be reduced next period, at a rate of 1-v. 
3.2.2 Selection between competing trading strategies 
The model of strategy choice extends work by Brock and Hommes (1997), 
so that traders select their strategy on basis of an evolutionary 'fitness mea- 
1This cost represents the information gathering cost necessary to correctly forecast 
the level of the equilibrium exchange rate, and may by no means be insignificant. For 
example, De Grauwe, Dewatcher, and Embrechts (1994) note that in a world where 
authorities are bound by few commitments the number of possible future paths of debt 
and money is increased. This is due, both to the move toward floating exchange rates, and 
also to the dramatic increase in international capital mobility allowing for a much wider 
range of debt financing options than before. The net effect is that correct forecasting of 
the equilibrium exchange rate is more difficult, and hence costly. 
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sure'. There are a number of possible candidates for the vaxiables which 
influence the fitness of each strategy. Brock and Hommes specify the fitness 
rule as depending on accumulated realized profits, while Gaunersdorfer and 
Hommes (2000), specify evolutionary fitness given by risk adjusted profits. 
In a recent paper, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004) develop a model of the 
forex market where the fitness measure is a function of the one-period earn- 
ings of investing in the foreign asset. The authors point out that this ensures 
strategy selection is influenced only by the relative profitability of the strate- 
gies, and not by the amount invested. They motivate this specification of 
the fitness rule by it's emphasis on the selection of strategy independent of 
agent's stock of wealth. In Brock and Hommes (1998) it is shown how, with 
realized profits as the fitness measure, stock prices may be characterized by 
endogenously expanding and collapsing bubbles. However, with this sim- 
ple form this result is only obtained either when traders beliefs are biased 
in some way, or when traders employing all strategies continuously make 
losses. 
One method of rectifying this situation to adopt the approach of Gauners- 
dorfer and Hommes (2000), for example. In that paper, the fitness of any 
strategy is assumed to be conditioned upon the deviation from equilibrium. 
This has the effect of ruling out explosive paths for the asset price, even 
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when the profits to traders following chartist strategies increase as more 
traders co-ordinate onto that strategy. Hommes (2000) justifies this condi- 
tioning upon fundamentals as a weakening of the transversality (no bubbles) 
condition in a perfectly rational world, allowing for temporary speculative 
bubbles. 
In this thesis I adopt an alternative approach to those discussed above. 
In addition to evaluating past realized profits from each strategy, traders 
are also assumed to consider their opportunity cost from not investing an 
identical amount in the alternative strategy. In effect, traders care about 
both the potential winnings from a gamble, as well as their observation 
of the gambles past performance. Thus, in this thesis the fitness of each 
available strategy is assumed to be given by a weighted function of past 
realized profits, and expected profits next period'. 
The fitness of strategy h then takes the form: 
Uh, t --z 
(1 
- 6)PtZh, t-I + 
6Zj, 
tZh, t - Ch) 
(3.3) 
where pt is the excess return on the risky asset, Zh, t represents the demand 
'It should be noted that at a technical level this amounts to including additional lags 
in the fitness function, and is observationally equivalent to traders having longer memory 
when comparing past realized profits. 
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for the risky asset by traders employing strategy h and zj, t strategy j, and J 
is an exogenous parameter giving the weight traders place on the expected 
component of the fitness function. Ch represents the cost of purchasing each 
strategy, and for the chartist strategy is assumed to be zero so that C, = 0, 
and Cf = c. This form of fitness function assumes that, when deciding 
upon which strategy to employ, traders compare both the realized profits 
last period, and the size of expected profits next period from each strategy. 
While the fitness measures of all trading strategies are publicly available, 
they are subject to noise arising from shifts in preferences. The random 
utility model for evaluating such rules is given by 
Uht ý-- Uht + Eht (3.4) 
where Cht is III) across h=H and drawn from a double exponential 
distribution. As the number of traders goes to infinity, the probability that 
an agent chooses the fundamentalist strategy is given by the discrete choice 
model: 
Wf, t 
= 
1 
(3.5) 
1+ exp(O(U,, t-l - Uf, t-1))' 
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Thus the higher the fitness of trading strategy h, the more traders will 
select h. The 'intensity of choice' parameter 3 measures the proportion of 
traders who select the optimal prediction strategy. 0 is inversely related to 
the variance of the noise terms Eht- If 3=0, the variance of the noise is 
infinite, so that traders are unable to discern any difference in the fitnesses 
of available strategies and all fractions (3.5) will be fixed over time to equal 
11H. The other extreme case 3= oo corresponds to the case without 
noise, so that the deterministic part of the fitness measure can be observed 
perfectly, and in each period, all traders choose the optimal forecast. In 
general, higher values of the intensity of choice 3 represent an increase in 
the degree of rationality of traders when selecting their strategy. 
To summarize: financial markets axe modeled as an evolutionary system be- 
tween competing trading strategies, following Brock and Hommes (1997,1998). 
While all traders are aware of the fitness of each competing strategy, they 
are unaware of the proportion of traders employing each strategy at any 
given time. The fitness of each strategy is modelled as a function of it's 
realized profits last period, and it's prospective gain next period. 
As will be seen later, these evolutionary dynamics can result in the exchange 
rate displaying persistent, endogenous, exchange rate fluctuations which 
are triggered by a rational choice between speculative, self-fulfilling trading 
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strategies. 
3.2.3 Foreign Exchange Market 
To establish the equilibrium level of the exchange rate implied by macroe- 
conomic fundamentals, we begin by considering a simple monetary model 
of the exchange rate. With money market equilibrium in the home and 
foreign countries, and assuming PPP holds continuously 
7nt - pt :. - ^Iyt - ait (3.6) 
m* - p* = -yyt* - ait* (3.7) tt 
St ý-- A- pt* (3.8) 
so that: 
st = (mt - mt*) - 7(yt - yt*) + a(it - i*) (3.9) t 
Sterilized foreign exchange intervention is introduced into the model via 
the portfolio-balance view that changes in the outside supplies of assets 
denominated in domestic and foreign currency alter the risk premium on 
foreign bonds. Let Eh, t denote the forecast of a trader employing strategy 
type h. Then such a trader who has entered the foreign bonds market 
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invests Zh, t in foreign bonds so as to maximize the utility of her end of 
period wealth, expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Then, traders 
following strategy h are assumed to have the following portfolio allocation 
problem at time t: 
max Zh, t Uh, t = Eh, t[-exp(-alVh, t+, )] (3.10) 
where Wh, t+l is the end of period wealth of trader type h. Wealth dynamics 
axe given by 
lVh, t+l = a(l + i)Wh, t + (1 - a)(Pt+l)Zh, t 
where pt+l is the excess return on foreign bonds between t and t+1, and 
a is the share of the investors portfolio in domestic bonds. It is well known 
that maximizing (3.10) when returns are normally distributed, is equivalent 
to the problem 
t+11 _ 
aV 
-I t+j, (3.12) max-,,,, t 
I Eh, t tW 2 h, t[W 
} 
so that, solving the maximization problem we have 
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Zh, t :: - 
Eh, t[pt+ll 
aVh, t[pt+ll 
(3.13) 
Assuming that Vh, t [pt+ I] = o, ' Vh, the demand for foreign bonds by a trader 
of type h can be written as 
Zh, z - 
Eh, t[pt+ll (3.14) 
ao, 2 
so that total demand for foreign bonds is given by 
H Eh, t[pt+ll Zt =E Wh, t 
ao, 2 
(3.15) 
h=l 
In equilibrium, equating world demand for foreign bonds with world sup- 
ply, it can be shown (see, for example Flood and Maxion (2000)) that the 
linearized risk premium on foreign bonds is given by 
H 
ao, '(c + bt - bt* - st) = it - i* - (3.16) tE Wh, t 
Eh, t 
[St+ 
1- Stj 
h=l 
Equation (3.16) is the interest parity condition, which shows how the domes- 
tic interest rate deviates from the foreign interest rate, it*, by the markets' 
H 
expectation of the rates of change of the exchange rate, Eh=l WtEh, i [St+l 
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st], plus a time varying risk premium, au'(. ). The risk premium is influ- 
enced by the relative private holdings of domestic and foreign government 
securities, agents's attitudes towards risk, and uncertainty about the future 
exchange rate. The term (bt - bt* - st) measures the worldwide private hold- 
ings of domestic relative to foreign government securities. The term au 2(. ) 
summarizes how desired asset holdings are influenced by tastes toward risk 
and uncertainty about returns. If intervention operations increase the sup- 
ply of domestic relative to foreign assets held by the market, then investors 
will require a higher expected return on domestic assets to willingly hold the 
larger outstanding stock, leading to a depreciation of the domestic currency. 
In order to directly consider the effects of sterilized intervention on the 
determination of the exchange rate, note that the relative stock supplies of 
outside assets are equivalent to cumulated intervention 3 -ft. 
So that (3.16) may be written 
H 
st = (i; - it) + au 2Tt + (3.20) t 
1: 
Wh, tEh, t 
[St+ll 
h=l 
3Sterilized intervention is equivalent to the change in demand for foreign bonds, i. e. 
So that 
aa2Tt = Et[pt+ll - Et-, [pt] (3.17) 
= Et[pt+ll(l - L) (3.18) 
Et[pt+, ] = (1 - L)-laa2Tt (3.19) 
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Integrating the interest parity relation (3.20) and the simple monetary 
model implied by (3.9) we can express the market equilibrium equation 
as 
1a 2Tt+ a (mt-M*--y *))+7 10, EWh, tEht[St+ll st + ce) t 
(yt - yt -a) t+ a) h=l 
(3.21) 
Which is essentially a standard portfolio balance model of the exchange rate, 
augmented to allow for heterogenous expectations of market participants. 
3.2.4 Updating Beliefs 
In the above model of the forex market, realized profits may be written as 
(i; - it + 
Eh, t[st+l - st]) 
7rh, t : -- (it* - it + (St+l - St)) 
t 
aor2 
(3.22) 
Now, denoting relative money velocity zt = (mt - m*) - -y(yt - yt*), and t 
substituting in for the interest differential from (3.9), the excess return at 
time t from holding foreign bonds is given by the following expression 
83 
Pt = (it-, - it-0 + (St - St-1) (3.23) 
1 
Z-t-l + St 
+ a) 
st-I (3.24) 
aa 
It is useful to rewrite the model in terms of deviations from the benchmark 
fundamental, rational expectations (perfect foresight) level of the exchange 
rate, st*. So that 
St = Xt + St (3.25) 
where xt is the deviation of the exchange rate from fundamentals. Then, 
1 (1 + a) 
Pt =Xt + St* ,a -1-1 a 
(xt-l + st-1) (3.26) 
=Xt 
+ a) 
Xt-l + St* +1 Zt-i -+ 
a) 
st*-, (3.27) 
ce aa 
Since from the equilibrium equation (3.21) 
1 (1 + a) 
s; ,= -aor (3.28) St* +a Zt-i -a t- 
2, ft_I 
we then have 
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Xt 
+ a) 
xt-I - all2-ft_l (3.29) a 
Using this to express the fitness rule (3.3) for each strategy in terms of 
deviations from fundamental equilibrium, the relative fitness of the chartist 
strategy can be simplified considerably. Letting q=g-v, and combining 
the model of equilibrium in the forex market with the equations governing 
updating of beliefs, the general form of the model may then be written as 
ag aq 
Wf, t-lxt-i + Et (3.30) xt + a) 
xt-1 
+ a) 
Wf, t =1+ exp(fl(U, 
1 (3.31) 
"t-, - 
Uf, t-, )) 
Uc, t-i - Uf, t-l = J)xt-l 
+ 5)(1 + a) Xt-2 + 6(9 + V)Xt-3 (3.32) 
a 
- (1 + 
J)ao, 2 It-2) qXt-3 + C- (3.33) 
ao, 2 
Note that a stochastic term, -t, is introduced to represent model approxi- 
mation error 
3.3 Exchange Rate Dynamics in the Absence 
of Intervention 
The evolutionary selection of trading strategies by maxket participants de- 
scribed in previous sections can lead to endogenous fluctuations in the ex- 
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change rate which are unrelated to economic fundamentals. In this section, 
the processes by which these fluctuations arise are examined in detail. Ini- 
tially, exchange rate dynamics are examined in the case where there is no 
intervention, i. e. where the outside supply of foreign bonds is normalized 
to zero. In conducting the stability analysis, we will initially consider the 
dynamics of the deterministic skeleton of (3.30) - (3.33). However, later we 
will conduct some simulation exercises in the presence of iid noise to better 
gauge the effect of interventions. 
3.3.1 Analysis of Steady States 
In the absence of intervention, the model closely resembles that considered 
by Brock and Hommes (1998). A key parameter governing the dynamics 
of the system (3.30) - (3.33) is the intensity of choice fl. Recall that this 
parameter captures how sensitive the mass of traders are to deviations in 
expected profits from the available strategies. Thus, as P increases, the 
proportion of traders on the most profitable strategy in net terms increases. 
The existence and stability of the steady states of the system as the intensity 
of choice varies is examined in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 (Existence and stability of steady states with T= 0). Let 
the steady state mass of chartists, w* =2- 1". Then for g<', there is q qC1 a 
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a unique fundamental steady state Eo = (O, w**), with w** = 1/(1+exp[Ocj). 
For g>1', there are two possibilities: 
1. Eo is the unique steady state if either 
(a) 
(g+v) > 2+ 
1+6) 
and exp(OC) >1 
W* ( 
aj W* 
or 
(b) 
(g+v) < 2+ 
1+ý) 
and exp(OC) <1 
W* ( 
-aJ W* 
2. The fundamental steady state EO is unstable, and there are two stable, 
non-fundamental steady states El = (x*, w*), E2 = (-x*, w*) if eithen 
(a) 
(g+v) <2+ 
1+6 
a6 
and exp(#C) > 
or 
(b) 
(g+v) > 2+ 
1+5) ( 
a6 
and exp(OC) < 
W* 
W* 
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From Lemma (1), we can see how the number and stability of the steady 
states changes according to the degree of extrapolation by chartists g. When 
this is low, (0 <g< then the fundamental steady state EO is globally 
stable. If costs C=0, half of the traders are trend chasers, and half are 
fundamentalists for any value of fl. If c>0, then the mass of traders 
employing the fundamentalist strategy decreases to zero as P or c tends to 
+oo. As the intensity of choice 8 increases the proportion of traders on the 
most profitable strategy in net terms increases. 
When chartists strongly extrapolate recent trends, so that g> ('±-') and 
there are positive information costs for obtaining the fundamentalist strat- 
egy, for large a enough value of 0, the qualitative behavior of the system 
changes. For 0=0, exp(oc) < whereas for large, 6, exp(, 3c) > 
Hence, as the intensity of choice increases, a pitchfork bifurcation occurs for 
some 0 =, 8*, in which the fundamental steady state E, becomes unstable 
and two additional stable, non-fundamental steady states E2 = (x*, w*) 
and E3 = (-x*, w*) are created, one above and one below the fundamental. 
These non-fundamental steady states correspond to a special case where 
there are a constant proportion of traders using both the fundamental- 
ist and chartist strategies. However, if these steady states were stable, it 
would imply that traders do not adjust their strategy choice despite the 
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fact that both strategies consistently produce incorrect forecasts 4. How- 
ever, as we shall see in the next section, as the value of 3 increases further, 
the non-fundamental steady states become unstable leading to endogenous 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. It is these fluctuations around the non- 
fundamental steady states which we refer to as 'bubbles' in this paper. 
3.3.2 Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
As P increases still further above 3*, the exchange rate begins to exhibit 
periodic fluctuations about the non-fundamental steady states. This process 
is described in Lemma (2). 
Lemma 2 (Secondary bifurcation, 0= 0). Let El and E2 be the non- 
fundamental steady states as in Lemma (1). Assume c>0 and g> 
and let 0* be the pitchfork bifurcation value. Then as 0 increases above 3* 
there exists some 0** at which El and E2 undergo a Hopf bifurcation at 
which El and E2 become unstable, and two limit cycles are created about El 
and E2. 
41t is interesting to compare the weighting of traders in the non-fundamental steady 
states here with that implied by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004). In their paper traders' 
strategies are defined in terms of exchange rate changes, with chartists expecting no 
change and fundamentalists expecting a move toward the fundamental equilibrium. In 
this case the non-fundamental steady state occurs where all traders follow the chartist 
strategy - so that the totality of traders expected no change in the exchange rate, thereby 
generating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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For sufficiently high values of 3 the exchange rate dynamics axe character- 
ized by limit cycles around the unstable, non-fundamental steady states. 
An example is illustrated in the phase diagram, figure (3.1) below. 
Figure 3.1: Limit cycles around the unstable non-fundamental steady states 
El and E2. 
It is useful at this point to examine in some detail the processes at work in 
the market which lead to these periodic fluctuations, as illustrated in figure 
(3.2). The top two figures (a) and (b) show the path of the deviation of 
the exchange rate from equilibrium. It is characterized by movements away 
from equilibrium which gain in momentum, before a short dip in towards 
the fundamental, followed by a maxk-et crash. The one period excess returns 
to holding foreign bonds are illustrated in figures (c) and (d). Returns 
grow to a maximum as the exchange rate moves away from equilibrium to 
it's peak, and become negative when the crash occurs. Figures (e) and 
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(f) show the demands for foreign bonds by traders employing the chartist 
and fundamentalist strategies respectively. It is clear from the figures that 
chartists purchase larger quantities of foreign bonds the further the exchange 
rate gets from equilibrium, while fundamentalists sell foreign bonds ever 
more strongly. 
Profits to traders following each type of strategy axe show in figures (g) and 
(h). Clearly, as long as the exchange rate moves away from the fundamental, 
chartists make profits, however, when the market crashes large losses are 
suffered by those traders who continue to follow the chartist strategy. Fun- 
damentalists endure losses from the cost of obtaining the strategy, together 
with trading losses that rise as the deviation from equilibrium increases. 
However, once the market reversal begins, large gains are made. 
Finally, the proportions of traders following each strategy are illustrated in 
figures (i) and (j). Crucially, as the deviation from equilibrium rises, the 
mass of traders on the chartist strategy falls. This is because, as the devi- 
ation from equilibrium increases, the prospective gains from implementing 
the fundamentalist strategy rise at a faster rate than those of the chartist 
strategy. As a result, the relative prospective profitability of the chartist 
strategy over the fundamentalist strategy falls the further the exchange 
rate moves away from fundamentals. This leads traders to switch from the 
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chartist to the fundamentalist strategy at an increasing rate as the degree 
of misalignment increases. 
Note that an essential element of this story is the assumed asymmetry 
between the chartist and fundamentalist strategies highlighted in section 
(3.2.2). Le. agent's loss aversion leads them to select values of g and v such 
that the speed of mean reversion, (1 - v), is greater than the speed of trend 
extrapolation, (g - 1). 
The process which sustains the cycle of growth and collapse of bubbles in 
the model now becomes clear. Due to costs of obtaining the fundamental 
strategy, the majority of traders employ a chartist strategy when the ex- 
change rate is close to fundamentals. The chartists push the exchange rate 
further and further away from equilibrium in the desire to reap profits from 
the (self-fulfilling) bubble. However, the larger the bubble becomes, the 
greater the difference in the prospective profits from following the funda- 
mentalist strategy over the prospective profits from following the chartist 
strategy, leading traders to switch to the fundamentalist strategy at an in- 
creasing rate. As soon as the mass of traders on the chartist strategy is no 
longer sufficient to maintain the growth of the bubble, the exchange rate 
dips slightly toward the fundamental, profits to the chartist strategy be- 
come negative prompting a sudden switch to the fundamentalist strategy, 
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and the bubble collapses. 
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Figure 3.3: Hopf bifurcations without noise (a) and with noise (b). With 
corresponding ratios of fundamentalists to chartists, (c) and (d) . 
Given this apparently simple, periodic behavior in the absence of noise, it 
is tempting to question whether sudi apparently predictable fluctuations 
could represent a plausible description of exchange rate behavior. One may 
postulate that given apparently predictable turning points of fluctuations, 
traders would soon learn to exploit the opportunities for profits that they 
represent, such that these kinds of fluctuations could be ruled out by a 
process of back-ward induction. However, once the dynamics of the exchange 
rate are examined in the presence of noise, it immediately becomes clear that 
predicting market crashes or turning points is no easy task. 
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The same model is illustrated in figures (3.3) (a) and (b) in the case where 
the system is being buffeted with noise. Here, the random shocks to the 
system result in flips between the steady states E, and E2, and periods close 
to the fundamental. 
Thus, in the absence of intervention, the exchange rate can exhibit pro- 
longed deviations from equilibrium, periods of high volatility, and market 
crashes. Qualitatively, this behavior is consistent with the observed behav- 
ior of floating exchange rates. Fýirtherrnore, it is clear that the shocks to the 
exchange rate result in fluctuations which appear random to the naked eye, 
thereby making the exploitation of periodic fluctuations by arbitrageurs all 
but impossible. 
3.4 Official Intervention Policy 
3.4.1 Exchange Rate Dynamics Under Intervention 
The previous section examined the processes which can lead to endogenous 
exchange rate fluctuations and persistent deviations from levels implied by 
economic fundamentals. From the monetary authorities point of view a key 
question is to what extent can intervention reduce these prolonged devia- 
tions from equilibrium, i. e. 'burst' bubbles. In this section we begin by 
examining the effects of a one-off intervention operation on the exchange 
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rate dynamics'. We then proceed to discuss how the authorities can exploit 
the processes governing the endogenous collapse of exchange rate bubbles 
to increase the efficiency of intervention operations. 
Lemma 3 (Existence and stability of steady states under constant 
intervention: T= ±0). Let El, E2, E3, be the steady states as in Lemma 
(1). Consider intervention operations such that for x>0, the authorities 
conduct sterilized sales of foreign bonds of size 0, so that T= -0. Similarly, 
for x<0, T=0. Then, as the size of interventions increase, the non- 
fundamental steady states are drawn towards the fundamental equilibrium. 
Le. As 101 --+ oo, jx*1 --+ 0, and furthemore, for large enough 0, the non- 
fundamental steady states E2, E3 become stable. 
Lemma (3) shows how interventions operations reduce exchange rate fluc- 
tuations by firstly shifting the non-fundamental steady states closer toward 
the fundamental, and secondly, reducing the amplitude of fluctuations about 
the non-fundamental steady states. 
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the implications of the 
exchange rate dynamics described by the model. Observed deviations in 
'Strictly speaking, the theory outlined in section (3.2.3) emphasizes how the stock of 
intervention can influence the risk premium. However, the flow of intervention may also 
influence the risk premium if the rate of adjustment of asset stocks held is proportional 
to the difference between desired asset stocks (a function of the risk premium), and the 
actual holdings of asset stocks (Dominguez and Frankel (1993b)). 
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exchange rates from economic fundamentals are due to the evolutionary 
selection of trading strategies by market participants. In such a setting, 
intervention can only be effective in reducing persistent deviations from 
equilibrium if it can increase the proportion of traders employing strategies 
which forecast a move towaxds the fundamental equilibrium. Upon exam- 
ination of the system (3.30) - (3.33), the role of intervention in the model 
becomes clear: strong interventions, indicated by a large value of 0, reduce 
the realized profits from chartist strategies and result in a larger ratio of 
fundamentalists to chartists in the market. Increasing 0 represents the au- 
thorities selling overvalued currencies more vigorously - thereby inflicting 
losses on chartists who have been pushing the currency up. As the chartist 
rules become less profitable, the proportion of traders selecting those rules 
declines, and the exchange rate moves back toward equilibrium. 
Intervention has an equivalent effect to a reduction in traders' sensitivity 
to differences in profits between strategies. So that under intervention, the 
mass of traders on the most profitable strategy at any point in time is 
reduced. Thus intervention reduces the amplitude of periodic fluctuations 
about unstable steady states, reducing short and medium run volatility. In 
addition, interventions draw the non-fundamental steady states closer to 
the fundamental. Both of these effects are illustrated in figure (3.4). 
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Figure 3.4: The effect of intervention on the non-fundamental steady states. 
Stronger interventions draw El and E2 closer to the fundamental, and re- 
duce the amplitude of associated limit cycles. 
3.4.2 The Magnitude of Effective Interventions 
In practice, given that any exchange rate bubbles which develop will in- 
evitably collapse, it is possible for the authorities to limit the degree of 
exchange rate fluctuations without continually intervening in the markets. 
Rather, the authorities can exploit the processes governing the endogenous 
collapse of exchange rate bubbles to increase the efficiency in intervention 
operations. Indeed, if the goal of the authorities is to maintain the exchange 
rate within a band or target zone about equilibrium, all that is needed is 
a series of one-off interventions of sufficient size when the exchange rate 
reaches the edge of targeted band 6. 
'Note that Lemma 3 investigates the dynamic implication of continuous intervention, 
and the results do not carry over to the discrete intervention case. In practice, one- 
off interventions will not change shape of limit cycles: this could only be achieved by 
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To see why this is the case, recall the discussion in the previous section which 
highlighted a mechanism for the endogenous collapse of exchange rate bub- 
bles. This is due to the proportion of traders employing chaxtist strategies 
deceasing as the deviation from the fundamental equilibrium increases, since 
the expected loss from employing a chartist strategy in the event of a col- 
lapse in the bubble rises with the deviation from equilibrium. The bubble 
bursts (endogenously) when the weight of traders on the chartist strategy is 
no longer sufficient to maintain it's growth. Thus, in order to maintain the 
exchange rate within a desired band all that is required is for intervention 
to be large enough to effect a temporary shift towards fundamentals, after 
which the mechanism governing endogenous collapse of a bubble will take 
hold, returning the exchange rate to equilibrium. 
A further implication of this is that, since the proportion of traders em- 
ploying the chartist strategy is falling as the deviation from equilibrium in- 
creases, relatively smaller interventions are required for the weight of traders 
using the fundamentalist strategy to reach the 'critical mass' necessary for 
the bubble to collapse. Essentially, since when the deviation from equilib- 
rium is large there are relatively few traders still employing the chartist 
interventions lasting for several periods. This implies that sustained intervention over 
a period of days may be more effective than simple 'one-off' intervention operations. 
In this regard it is interesting to note (as shall be seen in the following chapter) that 
in practice the Japanese authorities often conduct intervention operations in 'bursts' of 
sustained intervention lasting a number of days at a time 
100 
strategy, the authorities need to turn fewer traders to the fundwnentalist 
strategy to facilitate a return to equilibrium of the exchange rate. Alter- 
natively, interventions of a fixed size become more effective the greater the 
deviation from equilibrium. This effect is illustrated in the model without 
noise in figure (3.5) below. 
2000 - 
1750 - 
1500 - 
1250 - 
1000 - 
7SO - 
500 - 
250 - 
0-I 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
Deviation From Fundamental 
Figure 3.5: Absolute Value of Intervention Necessary to Create Miming 
Point 
This feature of the model provides a rationale for the infrequent nature 
of intervention operations conducted by monetary authorities. The cost 
of effective interventions when the exchange rate is close to equilibrium is 
prohibitively high, and welfare losses associated with poor competitiveness 
are only likely to become a significant problem when the exchange rate 
persists at large deviations from fundamentals. Thus interventions are likely 
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most cost effective when triggered by the exchange rate passing through a 
predetermined band. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter a model has been developed of the effects of sterilized in- 
tervention in a setting where endogenous exchange rate fluctuations are 
generated by the use of trading rules by market participants. Recent work 
on the presence of noise traders and chartists in the foreign exchange market 
suggests that the large and persistent swings evident in G-3 exchange rates 
have little relation to movements in economic fundamentals. Monetary au- 
thorities and policy makers the world over seem well aware of this exchange 
rate disconnect. As a result, intervention operations are frequently designed 
specifically to influence the strategies of traders in the foreign exchange mar- 
kets, in an attempt to reduce the severity of such swings. 
The central hypothesis of the model presented here is that such interven- 
tions can be successful by reducing the profitability of destabilizing trading 
strategies, thereby inducing market participants to base their forecasts on 
economic fundamentals. It has been shown how even when interventions 
are sporadic in nature they can significantly alter the path of the exchange 
rate in the medium term, effectively bursting bubbles in the exchange rate. 
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In the next chapter, we turn to empirical testing and estimation of the 
model in the context of the Japanese experience with sterilized intervention 
in the 1990's. In addition, we shall also examine the influence of shocks to 
the exchange rate on the efficiency of intervention operations. This analysis 
will permit an examination of the implications of the model for exchange 
rate policy. In particular, it will inform a discussion in the next chapter of 
the implications of the model for the choice of exchange rate regime. 
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3.6 Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. Firstly, note from the market equilibrium equation (3.30), 
that the only possible steady states occur when either x* = 0, or 
+a) 
=g- w*q (3.34) a 
w. =+a (3.35) 
q qce 
Now, we require that 0< w* < 1, so that non-fundamental steady states 
exist only if w* < 1, so that 
+> (3.36) 
a 
which always holds. Also, if w* > 0, then 2- 1+01 > 0. Le. q qa 
+ (3.37) 
a 
When T=0, the steady state deviation from equilibrium, x*, is given by 
the solutions (if they exist) to 
+ exp 
[- 
1 
6(2ci+l)+l 1 
(3.38) 
,,,, 
(X*)2 (J(g + V) a ý14 
) +, acl 
in which case 
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, ßq *)2 
(2a + 1) +1 (6(g 
+ v) -, -) + ßc = ln[l 
- w*], (3.39) 
aor2 
(X 
a w* 
and 
aaU2 (1 
-) 
(ßC 
- In 
[1- w* ] ). (3.40) 
ßq 1+ ö(2a + 1) - aö(g + v) w* 
Now, these values for the non fundamental steady states, x*, are real if 
either 
1. 
(g+v) < 2+ 
1+ 
and exp(, 6C) > 
W* 
or 
2. 
(g + v) >2++j and exp(OC) < 
W* 
Thus non-fundamental steady states exist if is small and g+v > 2+ Oz 
NO 
or if 0 is large and (g + v) <2+ a6 
0 NO. 
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3.6.1 Stability of steady states 
Consider the change of variables given by 
Xt-3) 
= 
(Ylt) 
Yt-i t-2 Y2t (3.41) 
(Xxt-l 
Y3t 
Now define the functions: 
fl Y2t (3.42) 
f2 Y3t (3.43) 
aa f3 9Y3t-4)(Ylt7Y2t)Y3t)070)C) F, +- a) (1 + a) 1+ a) 
qy3t (3.44) 
where 
q) (-) = (1 + exp [, y (ylt, y2t, y3t) ]) - 1, (3.45) 
and 
+ 6)(1 + a) 
Y2t + 6(9 + V)Ylt 
qylt +, 6C, (3.46) 
ce aor2 
where 0= (1+J)ao, 'Tt-2 represents a one-off intervention by the authorities. 
The system (3.30) - (3.33) may then be represented by 
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Yt = '(Yt-i) (3.47) 
where 
( 
fl f2 (3.48) 
f3) 
The Jacobian of this system is given by 
. 9f, 49YI 
af, 
49Y2 
im 
49Y3 
ýL2 
49yl 
ýL2 
19Y2 
t9f 2 
49Y3 
(3.49) 
ah 
49YI 
i9h 
49Y2 
i9h 
49Y3 
Observe that 
2f-l =0 21-1 =1 21-1 =0 oyl OY2 aY3 
(3-50) 
2L2 
=0 
49h 
=0 
Oh 
=1 Oyl 49Y2 49Y3 
The remaining derivatives are calculated as follows. 
49h a A) 
Jýj 
qy3t 
y1t 
(3-51) 
aylt + lt 
19f3 a &D (3.52) qy3t 
aY2t + Y2t 
09h a 
-9- 
a 
q4) -aq YU - (3.53) aY3t + a) Tl-+ a-) (1 + Ct) OY3t 
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Now since 
094) 
=- 
19-Y exp[-y](1 + exp[-y] )-2, i=1,2,3, (3.54) ayit 09yit 
and, evaluated at the non-fundamental steady state x*, 
(1 + exp[-tl, =,. 
])-l (3.55) 
(1 - w*) = exp [-y ] (1 + exp [-t ]) -1 (3.56) 
so that 
exp[-Yl, =,. 
](1 + exp[-yl, =,. 
] )-2 = W*(1 _ W*), (3-57) 
at the non-fundamental steady state we have 
a-1) I ==--L-yl W*(l-w*). (3.58) ayit X=X* ayit x=x* 
These derivatives are given by 
(1 + 5)(1 + a) J)Y" - V2t + 25(g + v)ylt - -Lq (3.59) ýYlt a ao, 2 
a^j =- 
(1 + 5)(1 + a) 8q (3.60) 
Y2t a ao, 2 
(i 
oq 
(3.61) - 6) ýO-r2 ylt jYT3t 
Now define 
Lq2 
(X, )2W, (1 (3.62) 
aU2 
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then from (3.52) - (3.53) and (3.58), we have 
19A 
(2aJ(g +v- 1) - (1 + 6) a(l + J)au 
2ý 
(3.63) 
aylt (1 + a) + a)x* 
19f3 
-(l + J)Cý (3.64) TY2t 
x=x* 
= 
09h 1+ a(l - 
6) 
(3.65) 
TY3t 
x=x* 
= (1 + a) 
where the last relation follows since at the non-fundamental steady state 
+ a) 
g 
a) 
qw* (3.66) 
Similarly, evaluating these derivatives at the fundamental steady state, x= 
0, yields: 
ah 
0 (3.67) 
Oylt 
1 
() 
ah 
0 (3.68) DY2t 
x=O 
ah 
-q(l + exp[ßc])-1 (3.69) DY3t 
--=0 
(1 ++ a) 
Stability analysis of fundamental steady state 
The characteristic equation for the system at the fundamental steady state 
is constructed by evaluating the Jacobian at x=0. Then, from (3.68)-(3.69) 
corresponding Jacobian is 
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010 
001 (3.70) 
ýo 0g- q((l + exp[Oc]-')/ 
The chaxacteristic equation is then 
-A i 
0 -A 0 (3.71) 
cl 00 (I+a)g - (, +,,, )q((l + exp[, 
8c]-') -A 
Expanding gives 
A2 aa 
T -1 q((l + exp[, 3c]-') - A) =0 (3.72) 
(+ 
a) 
g- Tl-+-a-) 
So that the eigenvalues axe 
i /\2 = 
07 A3 =a (3.73) 
+ a) 
q «1 + exp [ßc] 
Note firstly that since q=g-v, q<g and also (1 + exp[Oc])-l < 1, so that 
A3 must be real and positive. 
Now, the fundamental steady state looses stability when the eigenvalue A3 
crosses the unit circle. 
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A3 >1 iff 
a 
+ ce)g 
q((l + exp[ocl-') > 1, (3.74) ýl T a) 
or 
v+g exp[oc] >+ 
a) ++ a) exp[oc]. (3.75) 
aa 
Consider the following sketch of the left and right hand sides of the in- 
equality (3.75) under the assumption that g> ('+'). Since v< ('+') and aa 
g> while for small 3 the LHS of (3.75) is less than the RHS, as 3 
increases there must be some value whereafter (3.75) is satisfied. 
Cl 
Figure 3.6: Level of intensity of choice where fundamental steady state 
undergoes pitchfork bifurcation 
In general then, for g> as 3 increases there exists some 0* for which 
A3 7ý 1, where a pitch-fork bifurcation leads to the creation of the two 
ill 
non-funda. rnental steady states. 
112 
Stability analysis of non-fundamental steady states with no inter- 
vention 
Turning to the characteristic equation for the system at the non-fundamental 
steady states, 
-A 10 
0-A10 (3.76) 
01 02 (03 - 
where Oi = -9f' I for i=3,2,1 respectively. The characteristic equation (9ytt x=x* 
is then 
03, \2 - 02A - 01 -«:: -- 0) 
(3.77) 
so that substituting in for 03 7 02 7 01 from equations 
(3.64)- (3.65) and setting 
0 gives 
\3 1+a 
(1 J) 
() A2 + (1 + j) 
2aJ (g +v- 1) - (1 + 
+ a) + a) 
) 
(3-78) 
At the pitchfork bifurcation value 3= 3*, x* = 0, so that C=0. For 
0 slightly larger than 0*, C is slightly larger than 0 and (3.78) has three 
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real eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Hence, for 3 slightly larger than P% 
the non-fundamental steady states (±x*, w*) are stable. As 0 increases, C 
also increases, and C --* +oo as 3 --ý +oo. Hence, one of the eigenvalues 
must cross the unit circle at some critical 8= 8** and the non-fundamental 
steady states E, and E2 become unstable. 
Now, for 6> 0*, 
2(l + J) + 2aJ(2 -g+ v) (3.79) 
(1 + a) 
Which, for (g + v) <2+ a& 
is positive for all C, implying eigenvalues 
(1+01 
of A= +1 are not allowed. 
Similarly, 
-2 - 2a 
J(g + V) +1 (3.80) 
( 
(1 + a) 
is negative for all C, so that eigenvalues of A= -1 are also not allowed. 
Thus, as C --+ oo there must be a complex conjugate pair of eigenvalues 
crossing the unit circle at 3= 0**, implying that a Hopf bifurcation occurs 
at 0= 0**. 
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Model with intervention 
Under a one off intervention of size (1 + J)ao, 
2-ft 
= j, the steady state 
deviations from equilibrium, ±x*, are given by the solutions (if they exist) 
to 
W* =1 (3.81) 
1+ exp X*)2 (J(g + V) - 
6(2a+l)+l + cl, 
in which case the non-fundamental steady states are gives by 
it ± v/FI---4i9 (3.82) 
2 
with 
a (1 
+ J(2a + 1) - aJ 
- (g + 
(3.83) 
au 2 11 In[ 
1 -W OC). (3-84) 7-q 
(1 
+ 6(2a + 1) - aJ(g + v)) 
( 
W* 
As for the case with no intervention, these values for the non fundamental 
steady states, x*, are real if either 
1. 
(g+v) <2+ and exp(, 3C) > 
or 
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2. 
(g+v) >2+ 
+ 
and exp(OC) < 
W* 
W* 
Furthermore, - 1! is the abscissa of the turning point of the polynomial which 2 
has x* as its solution. Clearly this is zero when there is no intervention 
by the authorities, and the two non-fundamental steady states axe equally 
spaced about zero. When x is positive, the authorities intervene to purchase 
domestic assets so that 0 is negative. This shifts the positive solution of 
x* closer to the origin. Similarly, when x is negative the authorities sell 
domestic assets which shifts the negative solution of x* closer to the origin. 
3.6.2 Effects of Intervention on Stability of Steady 
States 
In the simplest case, such that for positive deviations from equilibrium, 
and interventions are given by T= -0, and for negative deviations from 
equilibrium T=0, characteristic equation is given by 
, 
\3 - 031X2 - 02A - 01 : -- 01 
where 03,02 ý 01 are as in equations (3.64)- (3.65) with 
j00. 
(3.85) 
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Now, recall that the roots of the general cubic polynomial must satisfy the 
following conditions: 
Al + A2 + A3 : -- 03 (3.86) 
AlA2 + AIA3 + A2A3 --` -02 
(3.87) 
AlA2A3 --` 01 (3.88) 
Furthermore, complex conjugate roots cross the unit circle when 
AIA2 --` 1 (3-89) 
JAI + A21 <2 (3.90) 
Combining these conditions, we find that the following condition must hold 
when complex conjugate roots cross the unit circle: 
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- Oll < 2. (3.91) 
Substituting in for 01 and 03, this reduces to the condition 
+ 
((l + 5)(1 + a) - 2ozJ(g + v) a(l + J)ao, 2§ < 2. (3.92) (i + a) (1 + a)x* 
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For reasonable values of the paxameters, the numerator of the first fraction 
in this condition is positive. Now consider the situation where there is 
initially no intervention so that 0=0, and 3, and hence C is just large for 
the non-fundamental steady states to become unstable, i. e. 3= 3**. At 
the corresponding value of C condition (3.92) will be satisfied. However, 
whatever the value of ( we can always find some j=ý such that (3.92) no 
longer holds, and the non-fundamental steady states are stable. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical evidence 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents some empirical evidence in support of the model us- 
ing data on sterilized intervention operations conducted by the Japanese 
authorities during the 1990s. Estimating the model amounts to a joint test 
of nonlinear exchange rate behaviour and the coordination channel of inter- 
vention. Section (4.2) provides a brief survey of the empirical literature on 
nonlinear behaviour in exchange rates, and also the literature on the effec- 
tiveness of sterilized intervention. The following section details the model 
estimation procedure and results. In section (4.4), a procedure is devel- 
oped to quantify the efficiency of intervention operations from the model 
estimation results. Drawing on these results, section (4.4.1) discusses the 
implications of the findings for the choice of exchange rate regime for the 
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C-3 economies. Perhaps the most striking result to emerge is strong support 
for a type of exchange rate target zone, in paxticular a so-called 'monitoring 
band'. The calculations of the efficiency of interventions are then employed 
in section (4.4.2) to examine the relative success of the various policy styles 
used by the Japanese authorities when conducting intervention operations. 
Section (4.5) then concludes. 
4.2 Evidence of nonlinear adjustment in ex- 
change rates 
While many studies have found evidence of nonlinearity in the volatility of 
exchange rates (principally of the GARCH type), there has been somewhat 
less examination of the evidence for nonlinearity in the conditional mean of 
exchange rate returns. 
Ea, rlY work in this axea focused on broad tests for nonlinearity of unspecified 
type in exchange rates. For exwnple, both Hsieh (1989), who used daily ex- 
change rate changes for five currencies between 1974 and 1989, and Kruger 
and Lenz (1990), with weekly data for ten currencies in the period 1979 to 
1989, found nonlinear dependence in some series which was not of the pure 
ARCH or GARCH type by applying the correlation dimension-based inde- 
pendence test [the BDS-testj proposed by Brock, Dechert, and Scheinkman 
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(1987). 
As recent advances in nonlinear time series econometrics have become more 
widely disseminated, researchers have begun to model the nature of the 
nonlineaxity in exchange rates more explicitly. In testing for nonlinear ex- 
change rate adjustment, most research to date has focused on reduced form 
models. In particular, analysis has concentrated on the simplest type of 
nonlinearity possible: that of a switching process between two (or more) 
linear processes. Of the possible types of switching regime models, there are 
three which have received most attention in the literature. These model the 
switching process as either a discrete change in the parameters of the model 
when some predetermined variable reaches a critical value - the so-called 
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model; a smooth shift in the parameters 
of the model, so that at any point in time the exchange rate is modelled as 
a weighted function of two linear processes - the Smooth Týransition autore- 
gression (STAR) model; and finally a probabilistic process governed by a 
Markov (or semi-Markov) process - the Markov Switching (MS) model. We 
now turn to a brief survey of the findings of each of these classes of models 
with respect to exchange rate dynamics. 
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4.2.1 Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) models 
The TAR model is discussed extensively in Tong (1990). It assumes that 
the regime is determined by the value of an observed variable relative to a 
threshold value c. A special case arises when the threshold variable is taken 
to be a lagged value of the time series itself, in which case the resulting 
model is termed a Self-Exciting TAR (SETAR) model. For example, if an 
AR(1) model is assumed in both regimes, a 2-regime SETAR model is given 
by 
Yt = 
too'l + ol, lyt-i +, Et if yt-1 :! ý C, 
00,2 + 01,2Yt-I + ft if Yt-I >C 
where it is typically assumed that ft - iid(O, a 2). 
TAR-type behaviour in exchange rate adjustment is suggested by a number 
of the economic rationales for nonlinear exchange rate adjustment surveyed 
in Chapter 2. Perhaps most attention in the literature has focused on the 
role of transactions costs in producing TAR adjustment in real exchange 
rates. For example, Obstfeld and Taylor (1996) employ disaggregated data 
on different commodity classes from 1980 to estimate a TAR model for the 
US real exchange rate, and find evidence that adjustment outside a 'band 
of inaction' implies half-lives of price deviations measured in months rather 
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than years. nirthermore, they find that the thresholds correspond to pop- 
ular rough estimates as to the order of magnitude of actual transportation 
costs. In contrast, using broad aggregated data for a range of countries in 
a TAR specification, OConnell (1998) finds evidence that laxge deviations 
from PPP between most countries appeax to be at least as persistent as 
small deviations, and perhaps even more so. However he does find evidence 
for exceptions for some intra-EC real exchange rates. The conclusion he 
draws is that maxket frictions alone do not explain the observed extent of 
the persistence of deviations from PPP. 
The use of stabilizing, non-sterilized interventions by monetary authorities 
as a source of TAR adjustment in nominal exchange rates has also been 
tested by a number of researchers. Krhger and Kugler (1993) use such a 
model to empirically implement the rational expectations monetary model 
of stochastic (non-sterilized) intervention rules due to Hsieh (1992). How- 
ever, they do not employ data on actual intervention operations, but instead 
appeal to Hsieh's framework to justify the presence of possible threshold dy- 
namics. They find statistically significant threshold affects for five curren- 
cies using a decade of weeklY data. Clements and Smith (2001) update the 
work of Krdger and Kugler (1993), and in addition consider the forecasting 
performance of two SETAR exchange rate models, again drawing on Hsieh 
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(1992) to justify their approach. They find convincing evidence against lin- 
eax adjustment for the yen/dollar exchange rate, and also some evidence 
against for the deutschemark/dollar exchange rate. In addition, they con- 
clude that whether nonlinearities in the data can be exploited to forecast 
better than a random walk depends on the regime the process is in at the 
time of forecasting, and that evaluation of the whole density of the two 
models may offer further improvements. Similar studies. by Brooks (1997), 
Brooks (2001) and Boero, and Marrocu (2004) provide further supporting 
evidence. Chiarella, Peat, and Stevenson (1993) also detected nonlinearity 
of the bilinear and threshold varieties, in a study of eight European and 
Pacific Basin currencies using monthly and weekly data from 1978 to 1993, 
as well as daily observations between 1983 and 1992. 
4.2.2 Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) mod- 
els 
Granger and Ter5svirta (1993) observe that while economic theory often 
suggests switching or threshold models with a shaxp switch, if the economy 
consists of many firms or individuals, each of whom switches sharply but at 
different times, a smooth model may be more appropriate for the aggregate. 
One such reduced form model discussed by Granger and Te6svirta, (1993), 
which has become increasingly popular in empirical studies, is the smooth 
124 
transition autoregression model. In this class of model, a variety of contin- 
uous, so-called 'transition functions' on the interval (0,1) are employed to 
weight the two regimes. The resultant model may be written 
yt =(0o, l + Ol, lyt-1)(1 - G(yt-,; -y, c)) 
(4.2) 
(00,2 + 01,2Yt-1)(G(Yt-l; ^/7C)) + lEt- 
In the empirical exchange rate literature, a populax choice for the transition 
function is the exponential function, so that 
G(yt-1; -y, c) =1- exp(-, y(Yt-d - C)2)3 (4-3) 
and the resulting model is referred to as an exponential STAR (ESTAR) 
model. The parameter -y in these models determines the smoothness of the 
change in the transition function, and thus the transition from one regime 
to another. Small values of -y indicate relatively smooth transition, while 
as y approaches infinity, the transition function approaches a step function 
and the model resembles a TAR model. 
Another popular form for the transition function is the logistic function, 
where by 
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G(yt-1; -y, c) =1 (4.4) 1+ eXP(-Y(Yt-d - C)) 
Here, the paxameter c can be interpreted as the threshold between the two 
regimes corresponding to G(yt-1; -y, c) =0 and G(yt-1; -y, c) = 1, in the 
sense that the logistic function changes monotonically from 0 to 1 as yt-I 
increases, while G(c; -y, c) = 0.5. 
Note that an important difference between the ESTAR and LSTAR models 
is that while the logistic function is odd, in the sense that G(-oo) =0 
and G(+oo) = 1, the exponential function is even, so that G(±oo) =0 
and G(O) = 1. This has led some authors a priori to model exchange 
rate adjustment with ESTAR models, whereby the exchange rate follows a 
random walk when close to equilibrium, and a mean reverting process far 
from equilibrium. The ESTAR model seems more suitable since it enforces 
symmetric adjustment whether the exchange rate is under or overvalued. 
A number of authors have estimated ESTAR models of real exchange rate 
adjustment on aggregate data. For example, Michel, Nobay, and Peel (1997) 
find that the mean reversion is significant for sizeable deviations from PPP. 
Other studies find similar supporting evidence for a range of and time pe- 
riods, a paxtial list is Bleaney and MIzen (1996b, a), Goldberg, Gosnell, 
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and Okunev (1997), Taylor and Sarno (1998), and Taylor, Peel, and Sarno 
(2001). 
Nonlinear adjustment in nominal exchange rates has been modelled with 
STAR models by, amongst others, Taylor and Peel (2000) and Westerhoff 
and Reitz (2003). 
4.2.3 Markov Switching Autoregressive (MS) models 
While TAR and STAR models assume model parameters shift according 
to the value of some observed, predetermined or exogenous variables, it is 
also possible to model such shifts as the outcorAe of unobserved variables. 
One class of models which models the switch with an unobserved, discrete 
stochastic variable, is the Mark-ov switching model introduced by Hamilton 
(1989). In these models, the dynamic properties depend on the present 
regime, with the regimes being realizations of a hidden Markov chain with 
a finite state space. 
For example, if we denote the unobserved state variable by st, in the case 
of only two regimes, st can be assumed to take on the values of 1 or 2. 
Assuming an AR(1) model in both regimes then gives 
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yt = 
too'l + olot-I + Et if St = 1, (4.5) 
00,2 + 01,2Yt-1 + Et if st = 2. 
Or, using an alternative notation, 
Yt Oo,. gt + 
Oi, styt-i + Et. 
(4.6) 
The model is completed by specifying the process by which st evolves. The 
simplest (and most popular) model is to assume a first-order Markov pro- 
cess, so that the current regime, st is determined only by the previous 
period's regime, st-1. The evolution of the Markov chain is determined by 
the transition probabilities: 
P(st = 11st-I = 1) = pil 
P(st = 21st-, = 1) = P12 
P(st = 11st-1 = 2) = P21 
P(st = 21st-1 = 2) = P22- 
Popular extensions consider increased numbers of regimes, different pro- 
cesses in each regime, and time variation in the transition probabilities. 
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Mark-ov switching models have been applied to exchange rate modeling 
by a umber of authors. For example, Engle and Hamilton (1990), En- 
gle (1994), Vigfusson (1997), Bollen, Gray, and Whaley (2000), Dewachter 
(2001), Klaassen (2002), Beine, Laurent, and Lecourt (2003), and Dueker 
and Neely (2004), among others, investigate regime switching in foreign 
exchange rates; 
Engle and Hamilton (1990) have found evidence of regime shifts in US real 
exchange rates leading to so-called 'long swings'; Bollen, Gray, and Whaley 
(2000) argue that different exchange rate policy regimes give rise to different 
exchange rate behavior; and Vigfusson (1997) constructs a two state Markov 
switching model for exchange rate dynamics, based on the Frankel and Froot 
(1986) model of chaxtists and fundamentalists in the market, and identifies 
their corresponding regimes, using daily Canada US exchange rates. Ahrens 
and Reitz (2003) apply Vigfussons empirical model to German US data. 
4.2.4 Structural models of nonlinear exchange rate 
adjustment 
While the empirical literature on modelling nonlineax exchange rate adjust- 
ment has met with some success, the interpretation of these results can be 
difficult. Typically, rather than specifying the model on the basis of an eco- 
nomic model, the underlying form that nonlinearity takes is often simply 
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assumed in a somewhat ad hoe manner. 
Unfortunately, statistical difficulties in selecting amongst non-nested models 
also make model selection on empirical grounds difficult. For example, 
while statistical tests axe available to assess the evidence for a given type 
of nonlinearity against a specified alternativel, the range and variety of 
nonlinear models is boundless (in the sense that everything which is not 
linear is nonlineax), and the researcher clearly cannot test against every 
available alternative model. 
For this reason, when examining evidence for nonlinearities in data, it be- 
comes increasingly important to carefully articulate the economics structure 
which is expected to give rise to the nonlinearity under examination. A key 
element of the approach taken in this dissertation is the integration of such a 
theoretical model with empirical estimation, in an effort to extract as much 
economic content from the estimation results as possible. There axe a small 
number of other examples of this approach in the literature, for example 
the empirical implementation by Krdger and Kugler (1993) of the stochastic 
intervention rule model of Hsieh (1992). The approach taken here is very 
much in the spirit of this earlier work. 
There are a number of distinctive features suggested by the theoretical set 
lFor example, see the discussion in Granger and TerRsvirta (1993). 
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up investigated in the previous chapter which have clear implications for 
empirical testing. For example, an assumption which is often employed in 
empirical work with nonlinear models is that one 'regime' should correspond 
to a random walk. However, the model in the previous chapter indicates 
that under certain conditions exchange rate dynamics can be globally stable 
and bounded even when one regime is mildly explosive. Furthermore, the 
characterization of the dynamics as limit cycles thus implied, also provides 
a plausible explanation for the very large misalignments in G-3 exchange 
rates which have at times been observed over the last 20 years. While an 
intermittent random walk can explain the high persistence of deviations 
from equilibrium, it is more difficult to rationalize the emergence of mis- 
alignments approaching 50% (e. g. in the case of the dollar/mark exchange 
rate in the mid 1980s). 
Another example is the frequently employed assumption of an exponential 
type transition function when estimating STAR models for exchange rates. 
As noted above, these assumption is often made on the grounds that the 
implied adjustment toward equilibrium is symmetric, which would not be 
the case under a logistic transition function. However, the insights provided 
by the modelling in the previous chapter indicate that this need not be the 
case. The model under examination here can be thought of as an example of 
131 
an LSTAR model, albeit with a somewhat complicated transition function. 
As shown in chapter 2, the dynamics implied by the model evolve according 
to two limit cycles, symmetrically position on either side of the fundamental 
equilibrium. 
An important feature of the model developed here is the assumption that 
traders select their strategy on the basis of it's relative profitability; and fur- 
thermore, that sterilized intervention operations can be effective by altering 
this relative profitability. We now turn to a brief survey of the evidence on 
intervention, strategy selection and the profitability of trading rules. 
4.2.5 Empirical evidence on the use of chartist anal- 
ysis 
Not only is there considerable evidence of the widespread use of technical 
trading strategies in the foreign exchange markets', there is also a growing 
body of literature demonstrating it's profitability'. In the model presented 
here, excess trading rule returns for some traders are explained by the pres- 
ence of other traders who employ the 'wrong' strategy. However, many 
authors have speculated that trading rule profitability may in practice be 
2The literature of the use of trading strategies in the foreign exchange markets is 
surveyed in Chapter (2) 
3 See, inter alia, Levich and Thomas (1993), Neely, Weller, and Dittmar (1997), Osler 
and Chang (1999), and Sweeney (1986). 
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a direct result of intervention by the monetary authorities (e. g. Dooly and 
Schafer (1983), Corrado and Taylor (1986), and Sweeney (1986)). Further- 
more, a number of recent studies have found that there is a high degree 
of correlation between interventions and trading rule returns (for example, 
LeBaron (1993) and Szakmary and Mathur (1997)). However, in contrast 
to previous studies, Neely (2002) has directly tested whether the timing of 
intervention and returns supports the hypothesis that intervention gener- 
ates trading rule profits. He finds that in practice, abnormally high trading 
rule returns actually precede intervention operations, and rejects the hy- 
pothesis that they are generated by intervention. This lends support to a 
central result of the model: that intervention by the authorities can reduce 
misalignments by reducing the profitability of destabilizing trading rules. 
Another perspective on the effectiveness of intervention can be gained by 
considering the profits achieved by the intervening authority when they 
conduct intervention operations. For intervention to be effective, it must 
be the case that the monetary authorities buy when the currency is low 
and sell when it is high, in which case they themselves should make profits 
from intervention operations. Ito (2002) finds that the Japanese interven- 
tions earned close to 9 trillion yen during the 1990s from realized capital 
gains, unrealized capital gains, and interest rate differentials. He thus con- 
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cludes that the Japanese authorities were a successful, and thus stabilizing, 
speculator. 
4.2.6 Evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized inter- 
vention 
There is a large literature which empirically examines the effectiveness of 
sterilized intervention, growing in particular since, the 1980's. Empirical 
work designed to test the channel through which intervention is effective 
has met with mixed success. Regarding the portfolio balance channel, be- 
cause of the small size of interventions relative to the outstanding stocks 
of bonds, most authors (e. g. Rogoff (1984)) have been skeptical that in- 
tervention could have a large impact. Indeed, many studies do not find 
evidence to support this channel, and those that do, such as Dominguez 
and Frankel (1993b), Evans and Lyons (2001) and Ghosh (1992), suggest 
that it is weak. The literature assessing the importance of the signalling 
channel has also, as yet, failed to reach a consensus regarding it's impor- 
tance. While Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) find a stronger effect of the 
signalling channel than that of the portfolio balance channel, in order for 
this channel to have an on going effect, the central bank must be seen to fol- 
low through with appropriate changes in monetary policy. However, Faturn 
and Hutchinson (1999) are unable to find an explicit link between inter- 
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vention and future monetary policy, while Lewis (1995) and Kaminsky and 
Lewis (1996) suggest it occasionally operates in the wrong direction. 
More recently, a number of studies have concluded that intervention can 
indeed be effective, but which leave the question of the channel of influence 
open. These papers typically employ an event study or case study approach. 
See, for example, Edison (1998), Fatum (2002), and Faturn and Hutchinson 
(2003). Of paxticular relevance to the study at hand is work by Ito (2002), 
which examines the Japanese experience with intervention in the 1990's. 
Ito finds that Japanese interventions were successful in producing intended 
effects on the yen during the second half of the 1990s. 
4.3 Testing the model 
In this section the model is estimated using monthly Japanese data from 
January 1991 to April 2003. In July 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) took an important step by releasing all data on sterilized interven- 
tion operations to the public 4, which provides a useful and timely test-bed 
for the model. The data indicates that the Japanese monetary authorities 
have intervened frequently, especially in the dollar/yen market, and also 
4 An analysis of the aims and efficiency of these intervention operations is conducted 
in a linear framework by Ito (2002). 
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occasionally in the yen/euro, (yen/mark) market. ' The Japanese experience 
therefore provides a wealth of data, making it ideally suited to empirical 
analysis. 
4.3.1 The equilibrium exchange rate 
In any study of exchange rate 'misalignments', the model employed to cal- 
culate the equilibrium exchange rate is of central importance. The mon- 
etary model offers a simple measure of exchange rate fundamentals, and 
recent studies have concluded that they perform well in the long run (for 
an overview, see Frankel and Rose (1995)). The estimated deviations from 
rational expectations equilibrium, x1t, may then be calculated as the resid- 
uals from an OLS regression of the spot yen/dollar rate on a constant and 
monetary fundamentals: 
st = it + a((mt - yt) - (m* - yt*)) + xt (4.7) t 
where st is the log of the spot yen/dollar exchange rate, mt domestic 
(Japanese) M1, and yt the log of the domestic industrial production index. 
Starred variables indicate similar quantities for the US. 
'This is in staxk contrast to the US authorities, which since 1995 have intervened 
only once in the dollar/euro market (in 2001), and once in the yen/dollax market (in mid 
1998). 
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It is important to note at the outset that, as is familiar from the literature on 
co-integrated time series (see, e. g. Hamilton (1995)), since the money supply 
and real output can be characterized as nonstationary I(1) variables the 
monetary model is only valid if the residuals, xt, axe (globally) stationary. 
Monthly data for the spot Yen/Dollar exchange rate are taken from the 
IMF's International Financial statistics database, as are the data for US 
M1. Industrial production indices axe used as a proxy for aggregate demand 
in the Japan and the US, and these series are also taken from the IFS 
database. Japanese M1 is taken as a measure of Japanese money supply, 
with the data obtained from the Bank of Japan's (BOJ) website, whilst 
data on the Japanese sterilized intervention operations are taken from the 
MOF website. 
Applying Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, it was found that the null hy- 
pothesis of a unit root could not be rejected in any of these variables at 
standard significance levels, furthermore tests indicated that all variables 
are integrated of order one, suggesting there may exist a cointegrating re- 
lationship between them. 
The estimated value of the coefficients in equation (4.7) were A=2.6837, 
and &=0.1562, with standard errors of (0.5890) and (0.0445) respectively. 
If the variables are indeed cointegrated, then OLS regression yields super- 
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consistent estimates of the parameters Stock (1987). However, inference of 
the statistical significance of the variables in complicated by the fact that 
the coefficients do not in general have asymptotic t-distributions. Rather, 
determination of whether the model does indeed represent an equilibrium 
relationship for the exchange rate is determined by whether or not the 
misalignment term, xt, is stationary. 
Figure (4.1) below illustrates the estimated equilibrium exchange rate to- 
gether with the actual spot rate over the period under study. 
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Figure 4.1: Spot yen/dollar exchange rate and estimated equilibrium rate 
Clearly, more sophisticated approaches to the estimation of the equilibrium 
exchange rate could be employed to allow for the influence of factors such 
as productivity differentials (along the lines of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
(see, for example, Froot and Rogoff (1995)), or the size of current account 
deficits (as, for example in the FEER suggested by Williamson (1984)). 
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However, the simple monetary model-based specification used here does 
seem to produce plausible estimates for the equilibrium rate. PPP based 
estimates for the yen/dollar rate typically produce relatively high values 
for the dollar, or the order of 150-170 yen, while FEER estimates are often 
much lower (90-100 yen) (e. g. Wren-Lewis (2000)). The estimates used in 
this paper all range between 111 and 120 yen to the dollar. For example, 
the estimated equilibrium exchange rate reaches a minimum of 111.2 yen 
to the dollar in November 1993, and returned to a level of 119.4 yen to the 
dollar in December 2002. 
4.3.2 Empirical framework 
Graphs of the deviation of the exchange rate from equilibrium implied by 
monetary fundamentals, ýt, together with sterilized monthly sales of Yen 
(in billions of Yen) by the Japanese authorities are given in figure (4.2). 
A general specification for testing the model is 
pp 
xt = Oolntt +E Ojxt-j -EO, xt-jql(-) + ct (4.8) 
j=l j=l 
where ct - iid(O, al). The transition function, T (. ), maybe written in 
reduced form as 
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Figure 4.2: Interventions and Deviation from Equilibrium 
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IF(-) = [1 + exp(--y(-, 6, xt-, + 02Xt-2 + 134Xt-3 - 
05Intt)Xt-3 + C)I-l (4.9) 
It is worth pointing out that the model provides a market based rationale 
for the application of Smooth TYansition Autoregression Models (STAR) 
discussed in section (4.2.2). The function T(. ) maybe recognized as an 
(albeit complicated) form of logistic transition function used in LSTAR 
models. 
Testing for nonlinearity 
Following Granger and TerAsvirta (1993), an LM test for linearity with 
optimal power against the type of nonlinearity implied by the model employs 
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a three step procedure based on a first-order Taylor approximation of the 
transition function around about -y = 0. 
1. Estimate the linear model 
p 
xt = OoIntt +E Ojxt-j + ut (4.10) 
j=l 
and save the residuals fit. Define SSRO =E fit'. 
2. Use these residuals to run the regression 
pp 
OoIntt+E Oljxt-j+E Xt-j 
(? 
P2jXt-1+7P3jXt-2+WjIntt) Xt-3+Vt 
j=l 
(4.11) 
=E and save the residuals Ot. Define SSRo 
ý2 
t 
3. Compute the test statistic LAI = T(SSROSSRI)ISSRO, where T 
is the number of observations. Under the null hypothesis, LM is 
distributed X'(pk). In small samples, the equivalent F statistic is 
F= [(SSRo - SSRI)Ipk]I[SSRol(T - (2pk + 1))]. 
Proceeding in this manner yields an F-statistic of 32.59, so that the null 
hypothesis of the true model being linear is easily rejected at the 95% 
significance level. The test thus provides strong support for the type of 
non-linearity implied by the theoretical model. 
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The question of stationarity 
An important point to consider is that estimation methods for this type 
of nonlineax model axe as yet only applicable to stationary data. However, 
note that it is possible for the dynamics to be explosive in some regions, 
with Eý 1 Oj > 1, as long as the model exhibits global stationarity, which . 7= - 
requires + E; I<1. Indeed, a test of this condition, i. e. a 
test of the stationarity of xt, also amounts to a test of the monetary model 
as an equilibrium relationship, in which case the model may be seen as an 
example of a nonlinear error correction model. 
The question of the global stationarity of the model is also a key feature 
of the theoretical results presented in the previous chapter. To see this, 
observe that the condition for global stationarity, + Eý- ,<1 is -1 
Oj 
equivalent to the condition, (g + v) < 2, i. e. that the rate of extrapolation of 
the chartist strategy is smaller than the rate of mean reversion employed in 
the fundamentalist strategy. Recall that this feature of the model was mo- 
tivated by appealing to prospect theory, in particular investor loss-aversion 
relative to the status quo. In addition, the case where (g+v) <2 was an im- 
portant feature of the theoretical results demonstrating the circumstances 
in which limit cycles could axise in the deterministic model. 
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Aside from these technical issues, the question of stationarity in this frame- 
work also has considerable conceptual importance. A characterizing feature 
of the framework presented here is that the 'equilibrium' described by the 
monetary model is inherently unstable. Rather, a more appropriate no- 
tion of equilibrium is in fact a dynamic one - described by the evolution of 
the limit cycles which characterize the deterministic dynamics. Note that 
even though the 'fundamental' steady state is unstable in this world, the 
misalignments remain stationary since they are bounded - i. e. the limit 
cycles art as the true attractors. A key point arising from this framework is 
the view that the behavioural characteristics of market participants - their 
strategies and the institutional features of their interactions - are in fact the 
true 'fundamentals' which determine the value of the exchange rate most of 
the time. 
Estimation method 
A problem frequently encountered in the literature assessing the impact 
of intervention is that of simultaneity bias. The problem arises because 
exchange rates and asset supplies maybe simultaneously determined. For 
example, a domestic currency appreciation may result in a change in the 
relative supplies of domestic and foreign assets through current account 
imbalances, or through endogenous market intervention. Indeed, the rapid 
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reaction of market paxticipants to official intervention implies that at all but 
the highest frequencies the problem of simultaneity bias is likely to arise. 
Typically, studies that do not take account of simultaneity bias find that 
the estimated coefficients on asset supplies are statistically significant, but 
enter with the wrong sign. 
This kind of bias can complicate estimation of a model since the application 
of a standard least squares estimator would lead to error terms which are 
correlated with the explanatory variables. This leads to parameter estimates 
which are both biased and inconsistent. The standard approach to deal 
with this problem is to apply an instrumental variables estimator to the 
regression 6. 
Consider the following reduced form of the model (4.8): 
Xt ý Zt(4D) + Et, ct - IID(O, a 2), (4.12) 
note that z(4)) is a function of both current endogenous variables (i. e. Intt), 
as well as predetermined variables, xt-i i=1P. 
Instrumental variables (IV) regression employs a matrix of instruments, W, 
which are predetermined variables assumed to be independent of the error 
'For a detailed discussion of instrumental variables estimators, see, for example David- 
son and MacKinnon (1993). 
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terms, e. This set of instruments is then employed to separate the vector 
space described by the dependent variable x, into two subspaces, S(W) and 
S-1-. The IV estimator is then defined to minimize only the portion of the 
distance between x and z(fl that lies in S(W). If indeed W is independent 
of e, all correlation between c and z(4)) must asymptotically lie in S-(W). 
The effects of correlation between c and z(4)) can therefore be avoided by 
restricting minimization to S(W). 
When applying IV to the nonlinear regression model, the parameters are 
chosen to minimize the criterion function 
llpw(x - z«D»i1' = (X - Z(-1»)'PW(X - Z(-D», (4.13) 
where PW is the matrix which projects orthogonally onto S(W). The first 
order conditions that characterize the IV estimates (ý are 
ZT(, ý)p (X _ Z(, 
ý)) = 0, w (4.14) 
where the matrix of derivatives has typical element 
Zti(4)) = 
azt (4)) 
&ýj 
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The foc's (4.14) state that the residuals x- z(ý)) must be orthogonal to 
the matrix of derivatives Z(4)) once they have been projected onto S(W). 
They cannot, in general be solved analytically, but must instead be solved 
using a numerical optimization algorithm. 
Instruments for the model (4.8) were chosen to be xt-, ... xt-6, and 
Intt-, Xt-3 
... 
Intt-6Xt-9 to account for the nonlinear dependencies in the 
data generating process. Estimation was carried out with the RATS soft- 
ware package, using the simplex numerical optimizer. 
Estimation results 
The final parameter estimates, together with bootstrapped confidence in- 
tervals, are given below 7. 
7The procedure used for calculating the confidence intervals was as follows. On each 
replication an axtificial data set was constructed using a draw with replacement from the 
residuals of the estimated model. These residuals were then fed recursively into the model 
to generate a path for the dependent variable, x, while the actual series for intervention 
operations was used at each step. The model was then re-estimated on the simulated 
data, and the paxameter estimates saved. This process was repeated 1000 times, and the 
estimated values of the model parameters from all replications used to form an empirical 
distribution for each parameter. These distributions formed the basis of the confidence 
intervals reported in the table. 
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Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
00 2.62 x 10-6 -8.23 x 10" ± 1.1576 x 
10-05 
01 1.1968 1.1927 ± 0.0686 
02 0.4650 0.4699 ± 0.0878 
01 -8474.2600 -15012.6000 ± 7712.7880 
02 
-10767.3000 -21038.7000 ± 10994.7400 
03 1712.4700 1093.6470 ± 2367.7020 
04 
-3.5227 -4.8025 ± 2.9740 
C -97.5961 -163-6640 ± 92.8260 
xt =2.62 x 10-6 Intt + 1.1968xt-, - 0.4650xt-, 
[1 + exp(-(-8474.26xt-, + 10767.30xt-2 + 1712.47xt-3 - 3.52Intt)Xt-3 + 92.83)]-l 
(4.15) 
The estimation results provide strong evidence of nonlinear behavior consis- 
tent with the theoretical model. The parameter estimates ý, and ý2 indicate 
that the endogenous fluctuations in the exchange rate move away from the 
fundamental equilibrium at a rate of 19.68% per month when all traders 
employ the chartist strategy, and towards fundamentals at a rate of 53.5% 
when all traders follow the fundamentalist strategy. Furthermore, large val- 
ues of the estimates of 01,02,33, and c indicate that switches between the 
extreme cases where all traders employ either one of the available strategies 
occur rapidly, so that the dynamics of the exchange rate can be classified as 
belonging to either an explosive regime or a strongly mean reverting regime, 
depending on the strategy employed. The regime classification suggested 
by the model is illustrated in figure (4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Regime Identification. The estimated proportion of traders 
employing the fundamentalist strategy is indicated by grey shading (left 
scale). 
In the absence of noise the estimation results imply that the true value 
of the intensity of choice is large enough that, consistent with Lemma 1, 
the steady state corresponding to the fundamental equilibrium is unstable, 
and that the exchange rate oscillates about two (unstable) non-fundamental 
steady states. The results suggest the exchange rate follows a pair of limit 
cycles about the non-fundamental steady states, thus giving further empir- 
ical support to the analysis presented in section (5). Were there to be no 
shocks to the exchange rate, the parameter estimates indicate the exchange 
rate would evolve according to a pair of limit cycles as illustrated in figure 
(4.4). 
The parameter d represents the lag with which intervention influences the 
exchange rate dynamics, and a value of d=0 was chosen on the basis of 
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Limit Cycles 
likelihood ratio tests. Consistent with the consensus from previous studies 8, 
the linear effect of interventions on the equilibrium exchange rate is small 
and insignificantly different from zero. However, the data strongly support 
the models' prediction that interventions may have a strong non-linear ef- 
fect on deviations of the exchange rate from fundamentals'. Recall that the 
mechanism by which the nonlinear effect of intervention can significantly 
influence the exchange rate dynamics, while the linear effect is negligible, 
is due to a high degree of sensitivity amongst traders of differences in prof- 
itability between the available strategies. Le. the strong nonlinear and weak 
linear effects of intervention are primarily due to the large estimate of the 
intensity of choice implied by the paxarneter estimates. 
8See, inter alia, Dooley and Isard (1982), Dooley and Isard (1983), Frankel (1982), 
and Rogoff (1984). 
9While the results from the model using intervention flows suggested strong effects on 
the exchange rate, the coefficient on cumulated intervention was not significant, and for 
this reason are not reported here. 
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The finding that only intervention flows have a significant effect on the 
exchange rate are consistent with the common reports in the literature that 
the effects of sterilized intervention are typically short-lived. However, while 
the initial impact of intervention is limited to the short run the highly 
nonlinear dynamics of the exchange rate, and resultant path-dependance, 
result in the actual effects of intervention on the exchange rate being highly 
persistent. This effect is discussed in more detail in section (8). 
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Figure 4.5: Switches to fundamentalist strategy caused by intervention op- 
erations. 
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Figure 4.6: Endogenous switches to the fundamentalist strategy. 
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Figure (4.5) shows the instances in which intervention operations resulted in 
switches from the chartist to the fundamentalist strategy by traders, while 
figure (4.6), illustrates cases where traders switch from the chartist to the 
fundamentalist strategy occurred independently of such interventions. As is 
cleax from the figures, a large proportion (estimated to be 32%) of periods 
when traders employed fundamentalist strategies can be attributed to the 
use of intervention operations by the authorities. However, there are also 
a large number of intervention operations which apparently failed to result 
in a shift from chartist to fundamentalist strategies by market participants. 
Clearly, an important question for the monetary authorities is how large 
should interventions be in order to instigate a movement toward equilibrium 
in the exchange rate? In the next section, this question is addressed directly, 
along with the implications of the results for the conduct of exchange rate 
policy. 
4.4 The Efficiency of Intervention Policy 
In this section it is shown how the model has strong implications for ex- 
change rate policy designed to limit market induced misalignments. Firstly 
we present a simulation procedure for computing confidence intervals for in- 
tervention necessary to reverse misalignments. As will be seen, the results 
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provide a new source of ammunition to the case for exchange rate manage- 
ment based on 'target zones'. The discussion then moves to an assessment of 
the efficiency of intervention policy in Japan during the 1990's. It is shown 
how the estimation results imply that, consistent with the findings of ?, 
interventions under Eisuk-e Sakakibaxa were particulaxly effective. Finally, 
effica, cy of intervention implied by the model is further emphasized with a 
discussion of the counter-factual exchange rate that would have prevailed 
had the authorities failed to intervene. 
The discussion in section (3.4.2) identified how, in the deterministic model, 
it is possible for the monetary authorities to prick bubbles in the exchange 
rate with a one-off intervention of sufficient size. Furthermore, evidence 
from simulations suggested that the necessary size of interventions decreases 
as the size of the misalignment grows. 
When moving to a stochastic environment however, a number of compli- 
cations arise. In particular, the size and sign of exogenous shocks to the 
exchange rate will have important consequences for the efficiency of inter- 
ventions. For example, a shock which reinforces the trend in the exchange 
rate away from fundamentals, and which occurs in the same period as the 
intervention could easily nullify its effects if it is of sufficient size. Con- 
versely, a shock which moves the exchange rate toward equilibrium would 
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result in a smaller than usual intervention being necessary to achieve the de- 
sired objective. Under the assumption that the authorities cannot observe 
the size and sign of shocks before intervening, in this section a bootstrap 
procedure is presented for the calculation of confidence intervals for the size 
of effective interventions (a detailed description of the procedure is given in 
the appendix). 
The model is assumed know, so that sample variability is not taken into 
account. Shocks for periods 0 through s are drawn with replacement from 
the residuals of the estimated model and, for a given initial history of the 
deviation x, fed through the estimated model to produce a simulated data 
series. The data series thus constructed is a forecast of the exchange rate 
conditional on the set of initial values and a given sequence of shocks. Next, 
the same procedure is followed except that a single intervention operation 
of size 0 is included once the absolute value of x has reached a given level 
6. The point of intervention is fixed such that intervention occurs only 
when the exchange rate is following a trend leading away from equilibrium, 
and when the trend would be sustained in the absence of intervention (i. e. 
the baseline forecast is moving away from equilibrium). The intervention 
is deemed to be effective if it results in a movement in the exchange rate 
toward equilibrium, i. e. Ixrl < Ix-r-11, where the intervention occurs at time 
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t= 7-. Conditional on the initial history, sequence of shocks, and threshold 
at which intervention occurs, the smallest value of intervention which is ef- 
fective in moving the exchange rate towards equilibrium is then determined 
by a grid search. Levels of effective intervention are computed in this way 
for 1000 draws from the residuals to give a distribution conditional on the 
initial history and intervention threshold. The process is repeated for 30 
different initial histories of x, and the results averaged to produce a distribu- 
tion of effective intervention conditional only on the intervention threshold. 
Figure (4.7) shows how the 25,60 and 70 percentiles of the distributions 
thus calculated vary as the intervention threshold changes. They give an 
approximate method of determining the probability that total monthly in- 
tervention operations of a given size, carried out at a given deviation of the 
exchange rate jý, will be effective. 
For example, in order to have a 70 percent chance of moving the exchange 
rate toward fundamentals when the deviation from equilibrium is 13 percent, 
interventions of approximately 1 trillion yen are required. To achieve the 
same probability of mean reversion at a deviation from equilibrium of 9 
percent requires interventions of around 5 trillion yen per month. However, 
within the sample there were only 13 months in which total interventions 
exceeded 1 trillion yen, and the largest total intervention in a single month 
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Figure 4.7: Probability of Interventions Effectively Inducing a Miming Point 
was of the order of 2.8 trillion yen. 
Qualitatively, these findings suggest that sterilized intervention can be used 
with greater efficiency when the degree of misalignment is large. Further- 
more, the quantitative results indicate that the efficiency of intervention 
decreases exponentially as the degree of misalignment falls. For example, 
the empirical findings above show that to achieve a reasonable probability 
of mean reversion in the exchange rate when closer to equilibrium than say 
12 percent, the size of intervention needs to be so large that it is unfeasi- 
ble. These predictions have strong implications for the exchange rate policy 
regime (or lack of) adopted by the G-3. The next section examines this 
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issue in more detail. 
4.4.1 Implications for the choice of exchange rate regime 
The growing evidence that sterilized intervention can indeed be effective, 
together with the finding that intervention is much more successful when 
misalignments are large, has strong implications for exchange rate manage- 
ment regimes based on sterilized intervention in a world with free movement 
of capital. 
Firstly, the finding that sterilized intervention can have strong effects on 
misalignments, but negligible effects on the equilibrium rate is in-keeping 
with the received wisdom that a country cannot maintain an exchange rate 
policy wholly independent of other policy choices. Instead, the role of in- 
tervention is likely limited to maintaining exchange rates at levels broadly 
in keeping with underlying economic conditions. Secondly, the large gains 
in efficiency of intervention when misalignment are large provides further 
ammunition to the case for intermediate exchange rate regimes based on 
exchange rate bands. Clearly, the quantity of intervention required to keep 
the exchange rate within a band falls rapidly as the width of the band in- 
creases. More importantly perhaps, the size of intervention necessary to 
significantly influence the exchange rate when it is close to equilibrium is 
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so laxge as to make such a policy unworkable in practice. 
A key feature of much of the discussion surrounding the likely success of a 
target zone is the focus on the credibilitY of the authorities' commitment. 
For example, Krugman and Miller (1993) argue that traders' speculation 
shifts from being destabilizing to stabilizing as long as they are assured 
that the target zone will be maintained. Their argument focuses on the role 
of stop-loss traders, who cover their exposure to large losses by selling their 
assets when prices fall below a certain level. If a target zone commands 
sufficient credibility to assure such traders that their stop-loss orders will 
not be triggered, it removes the fuel for destabilizing speculation. A sim- 
ilar case is put forward by Jeanne and Rose (2002), who suggest that a 
sufficiently credible commitment to keep the volatility of the exchange rate 
within a preannounced range can prevent destabilizing speculators entering 
the market. This effect is achieved by lowering the risk premium on for- 
eign. bonds which removes the high excess returns on foreign assets which 
lure destabilizing speculators in the first place. Note however, that the re- 
sults discussed here suggest that an exchange rate band could still prove 
effective even when laking full credibility. While an even partially credible 
announcement to intervene does improve the effectiveness of intervention in 
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the model presented here'O it is not necessary to reduce the attractiveness of 
chartist strategies. This is because, by it's very nature, chartist behavior is 
back-ward looking. Intervention which reduces the profitability of technical 
rules in one period therefore affects the strategy choice the next. 
What kind of exchange rate band would be most appropriate given these 
results? A key implication of the use of sterilized intervention is that even 
massive interventions may not be immediately successful in reversing desta- 
bilizing trends. Given this observation, and the well documented susceptibil- 
ity to speculative attack of target zones where the authorities are committed 
to defending the edges of the band, the most appropriate arrangement would 
seem to be the 'Monitoring Exchange Rate Band' proposed by the Thrapore 
committee and discussed by Williamson (1998). In a monitoring band, the 
authorities announce their intention to maintain the exchange rate within 
a band, but are not committed to intervene when the edge of the band is 
reached. Thus there is a public threat that intervention may be triggered 
once the exchange rate reaches a prearmounced deviation from fundamen- 
tals, whereafter interventions continue until the exchange rate is brought 
back inside the band. This allows for flexibility in the face of overwhelming 
1OAn announcement by the authorities to intervene improves interventions effectiveness 
when market participants condition their choice of forecasting strategy on the likelihood 
of intervention. They do so because they are aware that intervention will reduce the 
profitability of chartist strategies. 
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market pressure, and removes the threat of speculative attack. 
This kind of regime would take full advantage of the increased efficiency 
of intervention at laxge misalignments. The results presented here demon- 
strate that, since interventions of a practical size only have a reasonable 
change of success outside a region of around 12 percent around fundamen- 
tals, a monitoring band policy is exactly what is called for in order to place 
realistic limits on the size of persistent exchange rate fluctuations. There 
is also no requirement for the announced band to be fully credible. Pro- 
longed misalignments are generated when traders find forecasts based on 
past movements in the exchange rate more profitable than forecasts based 
on underlying economic conditions. Intervention can be successful because 
it reverses this situation. Indeed, this is exemplified by the Japanese expe- 
rience: since intervention proved quite successful despite the absence of a 
announced band for the exchange rate. 
4.4.2 The efficiency of Japanese intervention opera- 
tions in the 1990's 
The distributions illustrated in figure (4.7) may be used to calculate the 
ex-ante probability that actual intervention operations by the Japanese au- 
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thorities would result in a reversal of trend in the exchange rate" These 
probabilities are illustrated in figure (4.8), together with actual interven- 
tion operations and the estimated deviation from fundamentals when the 
intervention took place. 
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Figure 4.8: Probability of Actual Interventions Inducing Miming Points 
The figure highlights how the efficiency of interventions by the Japanese 
monetary authorities has varied with the period in which they occurred. In 
particular, it lends further support to the results of Ito (2002), who finds 
that interventions conducted when Eisuk-e Sakakibara was Director General 
"While the analysis presented here focuses on the probability that intervention will 
reverse the trend in the exchange rate, there is also evidence (e. g. Ito (2002)) that 
intervention is used to reinforce stabilizing trends in the exchange rate. Clearly this type 
of intervention could be considerably smaller and yet remain effective. 
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of the International Finance Bureau at the MOF. Referring to his book 
(Sakakibara (2000)), Ito details how intervention policy under Sakak-ibara. 
was distinctively different from that of his predecessor. Specifically, in- 
terventions became much less frequent, and were considerably laxger than 
before. Ito's results indicate that, in contrast to his predecessor, interven- 
tion under Sakakibara was successful in producing the authorities desired 
effects on the yen. Figure (4.8) illustrates a sharp contrast in the probability 
of intervention being effective between the periods when Sakakibara was in 
office at the MOF from 1995 to 1999, and the periods prior to him taking 
up his position and after he had left. For exwnple, the interventions carried 
out during September 1995, when both the estimated deviation from fun- 
damentals and the size of intervention were large , are estimated to have a 
relatively large probability of success (approximately 80%). Prior to 1995, 
the probability of intervention being effective never exceeded 38%, and was 
often considerably smaller. Similarly, the results indicate that interventions 
after April 2000 have had less than 20% chance of changing the trend in the 
exchange rate. 
It is interesting to note that the model identifies many interventions as 
having a significant effect on the path of the exchange rate, even in case 
where they do not seem to effect the trend in the short run. These can be 
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interpreted as instances when, although interventions apparently failed to 
'burst bubbles', the movement of the exchange rate away from fundamentals 
would have been more pronounced in their absence. This is because even if 
the intervention fails to prompt enough traders to switch to the fundamen- 
talist strategy to burst the bubble, it will nevertheless result in a reduction 
of the mass of traders on the chartist strategy, thereby reducing the force 
of the trend away from equilibrium. Furthermore, even if the intervention 
fails to result in the exchange rate bubble bursting immediately, it may still 
prove effective in prompting a medium-run collapse of the bubble at sig- 
nificantly lower levels of the exchange rate than would have been the case 
had the authorities not intervened. To see why this is the case, recall that 
in the medium run the proportion of traders employing the chartist strat- 
egy inevitably falls as the exchange rate moves further from equilibrium. 
An intervention operation by the authorities has the effect of reducing still 
further the proportion of traders using the chartist rule. Although the in- 
tervention will only be successful in bursting the bubble if it is large enough 
to prompt enough traders to switch to the fundamentalist strategy to result 
in a move toward equilibrium in the exchange rate. However, even if the 
size of the intervention is insufficient to result in the bubble bursting right 
away, the weight of traders using the chartist strategy will still be somewhat 
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reduced, which will have two key consequences. Firstly, the rate at which 
the exchange rate is moving away from equilibrium may be substantially 
reduced. Secondly, if the reduction in the mass of traders on the chartist 
strategy persists (i. e. traders who switched to the fundamentalist strategy 
following the intervention do not switch back to the chaxtist strategy one 
the authorities stop intervening), then, as the bubble grows further, a rel- 
ativelY smaller proportion of traders is required to endogenously switch to 
the fundamentalist strategy in order for the bubble to collapse. This im- 
plies that even if the intervention is unsuccessful in the short run, it may 
well result in the collapse of the bubble in the medium run at substantially 
smaller deviations from fundamentals than would have been the case had 
the authorities failed to intervene. 
This delayed effect of intervention may be clarified, and a fuller picture of 
the actual effect of intervention operations gained, by simulating the path of 
the exchange rate subject to the realized sequence of shocks in the absence 
of intervention by the authorities. The simulated path of the exchange rate 
in the absence of intervention is compared with the actual path in figure 
(4.9). 
Figure (4.9) clearly illustrates how intervention by the Japanese authori- 
ties has been successful in reducing medium run volatility in the exchange 
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Figure 4.9: Simulated Path of Exchange Rate in Absence of Intervention 
rate. While many interventions apparently failed to reverse the trend of the 
exchange rate away from equilibrium, the figure illustrates how they were 
effective in reducing the strength of the trend. Intervention by the author- 
ities thus seems to be have been highly successful in limiting erratic and 
persistent movements in the exchange rate created by herding behaviour 
amongst market participants. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Recent work on the presence of noise traders and chartists in the foreign 
exchange market suggests that the large and persistent swings evident in G3 
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exchange rates have little relation to movements in economic fundamentals. 
In order to limit the negative effects of these misalignments on competi- 
tiveness, inflation, and financial stability, foreign exchange intervention by, 
for example, the Japanese monetary authorities, is often used to reduce the 
severity of such swings. The central hypothesis of this paper is that such 
interventions can be successful by reducing the profitability of destabiliz- 
ing trading strategies, thereby inducing market participants to base their 
forecasts on economic fundamentals. It has been shown how even when 
interventions are sporadic in nature they can significantly alter the path of 
the exchange rate in the medium term, effectively bursting bubbles in the 
exchange rate. 
Drawing on twelve years of data on Japanese interventions, there is sig- 
nificant empirical support for the model. Even when intervention by the 
Japanese authorities has apparently failed to burst bubbles in the exchange 
rate in the short run, simulations of the model suggest that interventions 
have often led to the collapse of bubbles somewhat earlier than would have 
been the case in the absence of intervention. Furthermore, we have pro- 
vided estimates of the ex ante probability that interventions of a given size 
will be effective in bursting bubbles. For these results to provide an op- 
erational guide to the authorities on the size actual interventions clearly 
165 
requires modeling at daily or higher frequencies. However, they do provide 
an indication of the likely efficiency of interventions in the medium term. 
The emphasis in this paper has been on limiting exchange rate misalign- 
ments brought about by the use of backward looking trading strategies. 
The exchange rate fluctuations studied are generated and corrected in an 
endogenous manner by traders' selection of forecasting rule. This provides 
an explanation for the market's own tendency to correct extreme misalign- 
ments. One implication of this framework is that it provides an explanation 
for the rather mixed evidence on the efficacy of intervention in the literature. 
It was found that traders' high sensitivity to differences in the profitability 
between competing strategies allows intervention to be effective in reduc- 
ing misalignments, even when it is of insufficient size to generate portfolio 
balance effects capable of influencing the equilibrium exchange rate. It is 
possible that the failure of many studies to differentiate between these ef- 
fects has resulted in indeterminate results. 
From the perspective of the monetary authorities, the mechanisms under- 
lying the type of misalignment studied here can be harnessed to increase 
the efficiency of intervention operations. At laxger misalignments a greater 
proportion of traders base their forecasts on fundamentals. As a result, a 
smaller quantity of intervention is required to tip the balance and achieve a 
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)critical mass' of traders who forecast a shift in the exchange rate to levels in 
line with economic fundamentals. In this way, intervention is seen to become 
more efficient as the size of misalignment increases. On the other hand, this 
implies that the efficiency of sterilized intervention is greatly reduced close 
to equilibrium. Based on these results, one can conclude that the optimal 
policy regime for the use of sterilized intervention would resemble a target 
zone. 
While this paper has focused on the role of heterogenous expectations in 
explaining exchange rate fluctuations and the role of sterilized intervention, 
an alternative explanation could draw on the role of asymmetric informa- 
tion between market participants ". Further work could assess the role of 
intervention in such a framework. This would also enable an assessment of 
the role of aural intervention by the authorities in controlling exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
1'See, for example Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) 
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4.6 Appendix: Computation of Size of Ef- 
fective Interventions 
The method for computation of the quantity of intervention necessary to 
burst a bubble is based on the calculation of nonlinear impulse response 
functions as described by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). 
Impulse response functions trace the effect of a one-off shock on the fore- 
cast of variables in a given model. The response of a variable following a 
shock must be compared to a baseline 'no shock' scenario. An 'generalized' 
impulse response function (GIR) of a variable X can be expressed (using 
Koop et al's notation) as 
GIRx(n, vt, wt-, ) = E[Xt+ivt, wt-, ] - E[Xt+iwt-, ], n=0, l,.. - 
(4.16) 
where n is the forecast horizon, vt is the shock generating the response, wt-I 
is the 'history' or initial values in the model, and E[. ] is the expectations 
operator. 
For the purposes of the calculation, an 'effective' intervention is defined as 
one which reverses the trend of the exchange rate relative to the 'no shock' 
forecast. 
First define the trend indicator variable tt as 
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1 if Xt >0 and E[Xt+l - Xtlwt-1] >0 
tt -1 if Xt <0 and E[Xt+l - Xtlwt-1] <0 (4.17) 
0 otherwise 
so that tt =1 when the baseline forecast of Xt follow a positive bubble path, 
and tt =-1 when the baseline forecast of Xt follows a negative bubble path. 
Let the level of exchange rate above which a single intervention of magnitude 
A is triggered be denoted by r. Then, conditional on r, an intervention at 
time t of magnitude A is identified as 'effective' by the indicator variable IT: 
T(A"r) =1 
if tx E[Xt+l - Xt li9t, wt-11 <0 (4.18) 
0 otherwise. 
Thus following an effective intervention an increasing trend in the baseline 
forecast becomes decreasing in the shocked forecast, while a decreasing trend 
in the baseline forecast becomes increasing in the shocked forecast. 
Due to the nonlinear nature of the model, the response of the variables to 
shocks must be conditioned on a given initial history. Furthermore, the ef- 
fects of future shocks to the variables must be drawn from some distribution 
and averaged out over a large number of draws. In order to deal with these 
complications, the effects of interventions must be computed by simulating 
the model, for which the following algorithm is used. 
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The model is assumed to be known, so that sampling variability is ig- 
nored. Baseline forecasts are computed for q periods, and a single shock 
to the intervention variable Ot of size A occurs in period i<q such that 
JE[Xi-llwt-I]l < -r < JE[Xilwt-ill and t -7ý 0. 
1. Pick an intervention threshold -r. 
2. Take an initial history wtr-, from the actual values of the variable X 
at a given date. 
b 3. Take a sequence of shocks vi+,,, n=0,..., q, where the shocks are 
drawn with replacement from the estimated residuals of the model. 
b 4. Given wl and vi+,,, simulate the evolution of xt+,, over q+1 periods. 
b Denote the resulting baseline path Xt+"(Wtr-l, Vt+n), n 
5. From the baseline forecast, choose a date i such that JE[Xi-11wt-111 
< JE[Xilwt-ill and ti :ý0. Then set i9t = ti x Aj for t=i, and 
t9t =0 for t :ýi. Simulate the evolution of Xt+,, over q+1 periods 
b 
and denote the resulting path Xt+,, (t9t, wtr-,, vt+,, ), n=0, q. 
6. Calculate 
I(Aj, 
1 if tx E[Xt+l - Xtjt9t, wt-j] <0 
0 otherwise. 
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7. Repeat step 5J times, and denote the smallest value of A such that 
Ab, ýn(, r). I(Ai, 7-) =1 by mt 
8. Repeat steps 3 to 7B times to obtain the distribution of effective inter- 
ventions conditional on initial histories from [A"ý (7-),. .., A 
Br (7-)]. 
min min 
9. Repeat steps 2 to 8R times, and average the distributions obtained 
over initial histories to obtain distributions of effective intervention 
conditional only on the threshold r 
In this paper, in step 1 7- ranged from 0.05 to 0.3 in steps of 0.01. R was set 
to 30, using the first set of 30 observations from the data, and B was set to 
1000. Figure (4.7) in the main text plots the 25%, 60% and 70% percentiles 
of the distributions thus obtained against the threshold value T. 
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Financial Innovation and 
Stability in the International 
Financial System 
172 
Chapter 5 
Introduction 
The number and variety of types of financial contracts has increased rapidly 
over the past twenty five years, and continues to grow. One area of inno- 
vation in particular which has seen remarkable growth is that of derivative 
contracts: financial contracts which derive their value from the price of some 
other, underlying asset. 
The implications of the rapid growth in derivatives markets have been hotly 
debated, with regular calls to increase their regulation and slow the pace of 
their growth. At its heart, the controversy surrounding derivatives stems 
from leverage they provide: derivatives transactions allow investors to take 
a large price position in the market while committing only a small amount 
of capital. This ability to take high leveraged positions in markets has 
lead to their widespread use not only for hedging purposes (reducing the 
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risk resulting from the potential future movements in a market variable), 
but also for speculation (placing a bet on the future direction of a market 
variable) 1. 
In theory the low-cost hedge provided by derivatives should increase the ro- 
bustness of financial markets by facilitating risk-shaxing, and hence reduce 
frictions and increase efficiency. However, at the same time their use has 
been closely associated with several episodes of severe stress in the inter- 
national financial system. Recent examples of this double-edged nature of 
derivatives usage are provided by the contrast between the turmoil follow- 
ing the near collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge 
fund in 1998, and the relatively muted impact on the real economy of the 
collapse in the NASDAQ stock index in 2000. 
LTCM widely used financial derivatives to achieve an extremely high degree 
ofleverage 2. The principal trading strategy it used is known as 'convergence 
arbitrage', whereby pairs of securities are identified which should theoreti- 
lLeverage makes it cheaper for hedgers to hedge, but it also makes it cheaper to 
speculate. Instead of buying $1 million of Treasury bonds or $1 million of stock, an 
investor can buy futures contracts on $1 million of the bonds or stocks with only a 
few thousand dollars of capital committed as margin (the capital commitment is even 
smaller in the over-the-counter derivatives markets). The returns from holding the stocks 
or bonds will be the same as holding the futures on the stocks or bonds. This allows an 
investor to earn a much higher rate of return on their capitaJ by taking on a much larger 
amount of risk. 
2 At the beginning of the 1998, LTCM had capital of $4.8 billion, a portfolio of $200 
billion (borrowing capacity in terms of leverage) and derivatives with a notional value of 
$1,250 billion. 
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cally trade at the same price, and if there is a current divergence in their 
market prices, bets are placed on them moving together. In the case of 
LTCM, bets were taken on convergence between liquid treasury bonds and 
more complex instruments that commanded a credit or liquidity premium, 
these bets were enacted by using derivatives know as interest rate swaps 3. 
Furthermore, because LTCM was largely unregulated it was able these put 
these interest rate swaps at the market rate for no initial margin - an es- 
sential part of its strategy. This meant it was able to borrow 100% of the 
value of any top-grade collateral, and with that cash buy more securities 
and post them as collateral for further borrowing: in theory allowing it to 
leverage itself to infinity. 
In August 1998 Russia declared its intention to restructure all official debt 
obligations falling due at the end of 1999, and imposed a 90-day moratorium 
on the repayment of private external debt4 This led to a 'flight to quality" 
in international bond markets and subsequent large jumps in spreads on cor- 
porate and emerging market bonds. This sudden increase in corporate bond 
spreads worked strongly against the assumptions behind LTCM's trading 
3An interest rate swap amounts to an agreement for two parties to exchange the 
interest rate payments from two different securities without exchanging the underlying 
debt. 
4 Kharas, Pinto, and Ulatov (2001) provide a discussion of the Russian crisis. 
'In this case with large scale sales of low graded and emerging market debt and 
purchases of e. g. US treasury bonds. 
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strategy'. Jorion (2000) documents that between the end of December 1997 
and the end of August 1998, LTCM lost more than 50 percent of its capital, 
and increased its assets-to-capital ratio from 28-1 to 55-1. 
The position of LTCM was made more difficult by the fact that many other 
hedge funds were following similar convergence arbitrage strategies. After 
the Russian default and the flight to quality, LTCM tried to liquidate paxt 
of its portfolio to meet its cash needs. However, other hedge funds were 
facing similar problems to LTCM and attempting to make similar trades. 
This exacerbated the situation, causing liquidity spreads to be even higher 
than they would otherwise have been, reinforcing the flight to quality. 
During this period of extreme volatility, the U. S. Federal Reserve cut in- 
terest rates aggressively in three steps between the 29th of September and 
the 17th of November, 1998. This sharp easing in U. S. monetary policy 
was in part motivated by growing concerns that the U. S. economy was on 
the verge of experiencing a liquidity crash as corporate bond spreads in the 
U. S., as well as in other countries, had risen to exceptionally high levels, 
dramatically increasing the cost of financing for corporations. The poten- 
tial sYstemic effects of LTCM, and other large hedge fund collapses, and 
6AIthough LTCM did not have large exposures to Russian debt itself, the flight to 
quality resulted in large increases in spreads between liquid and illiquid securities. 
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the consequent implications for the U. S. economy as a whole, prompted the 
New York Federal Reserve to organize a bailout of LTCM by encouraging 
14 banks to invest in the hedge fund. 
The LTCM episode highlights how the growth in usage of derivatives can 
create substantial risks for the international financial system. However, 
the insulating effects of their use for hedging have received somewhat less 
attention. One high-profile example of the positive effects of derivatives 
was the apparent ease with which the U. S. economy recovered following the 
collapse of so called 'New Economy' technology stocks in 2000 - 2001. 
The late 1990's saw a surge in business investment in the U. S., much of which 
was linked to computers and information technology. During these years, 
measured productivity growth picked up, inflation remained low, and the 
unemployment rate declined. Such observations were often cited as evidence 
of a permanent structural change - one that portended faster trend growth in 
the yeaxs ahead. Widespread belief in the so-called "new economy" caused 
investors to bid up stock prices to unprecedented levels relative to earnings 
(see, for example Lansing (2002)). 
It is now clear that the investment boom of the late 1990s was overdone. 
Firms vastly overspent in acquiring new technology and in building new 
productive capacity - with an attendant increase in employee headcount - 
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in an effort to satisfy a level of demand for their products that proved to 
be unsustainable. A recent study by Gordon (2003) documents the many 
transitory factors that boosted the demand for technology products during 
the late 1990s. These include: (1) telecom industry deregulation that led 
to the creation of new firms, each demanding large amounts of equipment 
to build communication networks, (2) the need to replace computers in 
order to run a new generation of software staxting with Windows 95, (3) 
the one-time invention of the world wide web, (4) the surge in equipment 
and software demand from the now defunct dot-coms, and (5) a compressed 
PC replacement cycle heading into Y2K. 
This extraordinary burst of investment during the late 1990s coincided with 
the emergence of a major speculative bubble in the U. S. stock market - itself 
fueled by the very same optimistic projections about the future. In a recent 
paper, Caballero and M. L. (2002) present the view that the stock market 
bubble and the investment boom were mutually reinforcing phenomena. In 
particular, rapidly rising stock prices provided firms with a low-cost source 
of funds from which to finance their investment projects. The resulting surge 
in capital accumulation served to increase measured productivity growth 
which, in turn, appeared to justify the enormous run-up in stock prices. 
Following the bursting of the NASDAQ bubble beginning in March 2000, an 
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estimated 8 trillion dollaxs of wealth was wiped out. Based on the experience 
of similax events in the past, one would expect the welfare costs of a shock 
of this size to be dramatic. However, the actual effects of the bursting of 
the tech bubble seem to have been rather limited (see, for example, Lansing 
(2003)), to the extent that the role of derivatives in enhancing the robustness 
of the U. S. financial system in the face of such a large shock was celebrated 
by the Chairman of the U. S. Federal reserve, Alan Greenspan in an address 
to the U. K. Treasury in 2002. An important source of resilience singled out 
by the Fed Chairman was the widespread use of financial derivatives. 
While the LTCM debacle has provoked a raft of research which highlights 
the risks posed to the financial system by the widespread use of derivatives 
(see amongst others, on Financial Markets (1999), and Kharas, Pinto, and 
Ulatov (2001) and Kumar and Persaud (2001)), less work has been un- 
dertak-en to examine the extent to which their usage can insulate the real 
economy from financial and monetary shocks. This part of my thesis exam- 
ines these issues in some detail. The next chapter begins by examining the 
theoretical channels by which financial shocks can impact the real economy, 
focusing on the role of credit market frictions in amplifying the real effects 
of these shocks. A simple model is then presented which both provides a ra- 
tional for the growth in derivatives usage - in particular interest rate swaps 
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- and their role in reducing frictions, allowing credit markets to function 
more efficiently so that the impact of financial shocks on the real economy 
is reduced. 
The subsequent chapter addresses the empirical evidence regarding the role 
of swaps in lessening the impact of monetary policy. The empirical literature 
on the importance of credit market frictions is surveyed, as is the evidence 
on the role of derivatives in reducing frictions at the disaggregated level. 
New aggregate level evidence is then presented for the U. S., drawing on a 
hitherto unexploited data set from the U. S. Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC), on aggregate derivatives usage. The findings indicate 
some qualified support for the theory that exponential growth in the usage 
of interest rate swaps has resulted in a reduction in the impact of interest 
rate shocks on the real economy. 
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Chapter 6 
Corporate use of interest rate 
swaps and the monetary 
transmission mechanism 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the implications of financial innova- 
tion, in particular the growth in use of derivatives contracts, for the linkages 
between the real and financial sides of the economy. 
In the complete absence of frictions the economy should display the 'classical 
dichotomy' (Modigliani (1963), Patinkin (1965)); where real variables such 
as output, consumption, and the real interest rate axe determined indepen- 
dently of nominal financial variables such as asset prices, nominal interest 
rates and financial asset demand and supply factors. In practice however, 
there are a wide range of frictions present in the economy which can lead 
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financial developments to have real consequences, at least in the short-run. 
For example, inertia in wages, prices and inflation can lead to dependencies 
of consumption on financial factors through wealth effects, and dependen- 
cies of investment on financial developments can occur via cost-of-capital 
effects. 
In addition to these 'traditional' channels of monetary transmission, more 
recent work has examined the consequences for the real sector of develop- 
ments in credit markets. One important feature of these markets which 
has been emphasized in the literature is their response to the presence of 
informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders which can drive 
a wedge between the cost of internal and external financial of investment 
projects. In this case, a rise in interest rates may have a much stronger 
contractionary impact on the economy if balance sheets are already weak, 
introducing the possibility that nonlinearities in the impact of monetary 
policy may be important. The potential for amplification of the impact of 
monetary shocks in this manner has lead this channel of monetary trans- 
mission to be termed the 'financial accelerator'. 
While the theoretical foundation of amplification of shocks through the 
financial accelerator is based on underlying agency problems, recent work 
has shown that the most popular type of derivatives contract, the interest 
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rate swap, is desirable precisely because it mitigates this cost. If true, the 
aggregate impact should be a weakening of the financial accelerator due to 
the recent increase in usage of these contracts. 
The use of swaps has grown rapidly in recent years, helped along paxtly by 
financial deregulation and reflected in the success of the financial industry in 
designing a great variety of OTC and exchange-traded contracts. The over- 
all scale of interest rate hedging policies implemented by non-financial firms 
seems to be substantial. The 1995 BIS survey on global derivatives markets 
reports a global gross market value of OTC interest rate contracts equal to 
$647 billion as of end-March 1995, while the notional amount outstanding 
in OTC and exchange-based markets for interest rate contracts was about 
$36 trillion. The latest BIS survey reports gross market values of about $5.3 
trillion for OTC interest rate derivatives as of end of December 2004 and 
$187 trillion of notional amounts outstanding in the combined markets for 
interest rate derivatives. With 16.1% of the gross market values and 13.3% 
of the respective notional amounts falling to non-financial customers, this 
suggests that a maximum of one sixth of the interest rate derivatives out- 
standing at that time were potentially held for corporate hedging purposes. 
While the'likely sensitivity of the financial accelerator to financial innova- 
tion has been discussed in the literature (see, for example Krishnamurthy 
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(2003)), to my knowledge there has been no attempt to explicitly model the 
role of interest rate swaps in this regard. In addition, several studies ex- 
amine the evidence for agency-cost reduction effects of swaps at firm level. 
However there are no studies that I am aware of that look at evidence of an 
impact at the aggregate level. 
This chapter begins by examining the nature of the derivatives markets 
which have developed over the last twenty years. Evidence is presented 
that the most widespread of all derivatives contracts are interest rate swaps. 
Section one begins by presenting some stylized facts describing derivatives 
markets in general, and swaps markets in particular. The leading theories 
which account for the use of this kind of financial instrument are then 
examined in some detail. In section two, the discussion moves onto the 
question of how developments in financial markets may impact on the real 
economy, in particular output and employment. Particular emphasis is 
given to the role of the credit channel of monetary transmission, whereby 
agency problems between debtors and lenders lead borrowers to be credit 
constrained, with the amount they can borrow being dependent on their 
net worth. 
The third section then introduces interest rate swaps into a model with 
credit constrained firms. It is demonstrated how the agency problems which 
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amplify the propagation of financial shocks to the real economy are also a 
key motivating factor for the use of interest rates swaps. Le. it is desir- 
able for a firm to enter into a swap precisely because this kind of contract 
can mitigate higher costs of borrowing associated with asymmetric informa- 
tion between lender and borrower. As a result, the agency cost reduction 
achieved by the usage of interest rate swaps can counteract the amplifica- 
tion of financial shocks caused by information asymmetries. In this way, 
the model demonstrates how a increase in the 'completeness' of financial 
markets leads the economy closer to the 'classical dichotomy', which in the 
extreme case describe a condition where developments in financial markets 
have no impact on the real economy. 
6.2 The usage of interest rate swaps 
The rapid growth of the market for financial derivatives in recent years 
has spurred considerable controversy over the economic rationale for these 
instruments. Many observers have expressed alarm over the growth and 
size of the market, arguing that such instruments threaten the stability 
of financial markets, a fear which was confirmed by the market turmoil 
following the near collapse of the Long Term Capital Management hedge 
fund in the wake of the Russian default in 1998. 
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Unlike standard financial contracts which are traded on exchanges, the ma- 
jority of derivatives contracts axe traded over the counter. The over-the- 
counter (OTC) market is comprised of a group of dealers, consisting of major 
international commercial and investment banks, who communicate offers to 
buy and sell contracts over telecommunications networks. OTC dealers in- 
termediate cash flows between different customers, acting as middlemen for 
each transaction. These dealers act as market makers who quote bid and 
asked prices at which they stand ready to either buy or sell an contract 
before a customer for the other half of the transaction can be found. 
The dramatic growth in the global usage of derivative contracts is most 
broadly captured by surveys conducted by the Bank for International Set- 
tlements'(BIS). According to these statistics, the notional amounts out- 
standine of OTC derivatives accounted for a fairly constant proportion of 
total (OTC plus exchange-traded) derivatives, being 82% in 1995 and 81% 
in 2004. 
The lions share of growth in the OTC market can be attributed to inter- 
est rate derivatives, whose growth in turn is dominated by the increase in 
'The BIS releases statistics from both its Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange and Derivatives Maxket Activity, and its Semi-Annual Regular OTC Deriva- 
tives Market Statistics. 
'The size of the payments exchanged by the counterparties under a derivatives con- 
tract is based on some stipulated notional principal amount, which itself is not paid or 
received. 
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Figure 6.1: Outstanding amounts of Exchange traded versus OTC deriva- 
tives. 
outstanding interest rate swap contracts; as indicated by figures (6.1) and 
(6.2) respectively. 
An interest rate swap is a contractual agreement between two parties to 
exchange a series of interest rate payments without exchanging the under- 
lying debt. The most common type of interest rate swap is the fixed/floating 
swap in which a fixed-rate payer promises to make periodic payments based 
on a fixed interest rate to a floating-rate payer, who in turn agrees to make 
variable payments indexed to some short-term interest rate. In this way, 
an interest rate swap essentially transforms variable interest rate debt into 
fixed rate debt. 
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Figure 6.2: Breakdown of OTC derivative usage by type of underlying in- 
strument. 
Because swap dealers act as intermediaries, a swap customer need be con- 
cerned only with the financial condition of the dealer and not with the cred- 
itworthiness of the other ultimate counterpaxty to the agreement. Coun- 
terparty credit risk refers to the risk that a counterparty to an interest 
rate swap will default when the agreement has value to the other party. 
Managing the credit risk associated with swap transactions requires credit- 
evaluation skills similar to those commonly associated with bank lend- 
ing. As a result, commercial banks, which have traditionally specialized 
in credit-risk evaluation and have the capital reserves necessary to support 
credit-risk management, have come to dominate the market for interest rate 
swaps (Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986)). The discussion that fol- 
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Figure 6.3: Breakdown of OTC interest rate derivative usage by type of 
contract. 
lows largely abstracts from counterparty credit risk and the role of swap 
dealers. In addition, the description of interest rate swaps is stylized and 
omits many market conventions and other details so as to focus on the 
fundamental economic features of swap transactions. For a more detailed 
description of interest rate swaps and other interest rate derivatives, see 
Kuprianov (1994). Burghardt, Belton, Luce, and McVey. (1991) and Max- 
shall and Kapner (1993) provide more comprehensive treatments. 
The growth and development of the interest rate swap market has been 
surveyed by Kuprianov (1993) who also provides a description of swap deal- 
ers, swap market conventions, and swap transactions. Smith et al. (1988) 
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demonstrate the methods that financial managers can use in order for inter- 
est rate swaps to hedge interest rate exposure. The increased use of interest 
rate swaps as a hedging tool has helped the swap markets grow. Hedging 
has a cost to the firm and offers benefits to the firm. However, it is difficult 
to measure and analyze the cost benefit effects of interest rate swaps from 
publicly available financial statements. A survey by Bodnar, Hoyt, and 
Marston (1995) finds that swap contracts are the most common interest 
rate derivative contract used and indicates that more firms swap floating- 
rate for fixed-rate debt than fixed-rate for floating-rate, although both are 
common. This survey is also consistent with Fenn, Post, and Shaxpe (2002) 
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which finds that 58% of their sample firms were on the pay-fixed side of the 
swap. 
6.2.1 Accounting for growth in interest rate swap us- 
age 
The rapid growth of the swaps market in recent years strongly suggests that 
market participants must perceive significant benefits associated with their 
use. Mile it is generally accepted that the ultimate gain from their use is 
a reduction in funding costs, the sources of this cost reduction axe yet to be 
fully understood. Financial economists have proposed a number of different 
hypotheses, amongst which the key rationales axe: comparative borrowing 
advantages, the mispricing of credit risk, information signaling, obtaining 
an optimal debt level, and agency cost reduction. 
Comparative advantage 
Perhaps the best known explanation of the benefits of interest rate swaps is 
based on the principle of compaxative advantage. In international trade the- 
cry, the principle of comparative advantage explains the economic rationale 
for international trade by showing how different countries facing different 
opportunity costs in the production of different goods can benefit from free 
trade with other countries. In the context of borrowing cost reduction, 
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Bick-sler and Chen (1995) observe how the comparative advantage principal 
can be applied to differential information in different maxk-ets, institutional 
restrictions, and transactions costs. They note that these frictions may cre- 
ate some market imperfections and the presence of comparative advantages 
among different borrowers in these markets (p. 646). These maxket imper- 
fections, according to Bicksler and Chen, provide the economic rationale for 
interest rate swaps. 
However, the comparative advantage explanation for interest rate swap us- 
age is not without problems. For example, Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman 
(1986), Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1988) observe that much of the 
apparent savings from the use of swaps can be attributed to the absence of 
a prepayment option on generic swaps. Fixed-rate bonds typically carry a 
prepayment option that allows the borrower to call and refund a debt issue 
should market interest rates fall. The cost of this option is incorporated into 
the interest rate the firm is required to pay on such bonds. In contrast, the 
generic interest rate swap carries no such prepayment option. Early termi- 
nation of a swap agreement requires the value of the contract to be marked 
to market, with any remaining amounts to be paid in full. A borrower 
can buy a callable swap, which permits early termination, but must pay 
an additional premium for this option. Thus, to be fair, the cost of actual 
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long-term debt should be compared to the cost of callable synthetic fixed- 
rate financing, which would reduce the measured cost advantage resulting 
from the use of interest rate swaps. 
Mispricing credit risk 
The mispricing of credit risk is also offered as another theoretical explana- 
tion for interest rate swaps (e. g., Smith et al., 1988; Arak et al., 1988; Wall 
and Pringle, 1989; Litzenberger, 1992). The methods used by floating- and 
fixed-rate lenders to evaluate credit risk may lead to credit risk mispricing. 
However, Sun et al. (1993) empirical test results suggest that the market 
does price credit risk. The Duffie and Huang (1996) swap valuation model 
demonstrates that credit risk asymmetry results in only a few basis points 
of notional principal. They find that a spread of 100 basis points due to 
credit risk results in less than a basis point in the coupon swap market. The 
market price of credit risk is very small. If maxket price of risk is small, 
then higher risk firms benefit more from an interest rate swap compared to 
lower risk firms. 
The comparative advantage principle has also been combined with the no- 
tion of mispricing of credit risk to explain the benefits of using swaps. All 
firms pay a credit-quality premium over the risk-free rate when they issue 
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debt securities. These credit-quality premiums grow larger as the maturity 
of the debt increases. Thus, firm A might pay a credit risk premium of 
50 basis points over the risk-free rate on its short-term debt obligations, 
the credit-quality premium it is required to pay on longer-term debt, say 
ten-year bonds, might rise to 100 basis points. Not surprisingly, firms with 
good credit ratings pay lower risk premiums than firms with lower credit 
ratings. Moreover, the credit-quality premium rises faster with maturity for 
poorer credits than for good credits. Thus, if firm B has a poorer credit 
rating than firm A, it might pay a credit-risk premium of 100 basis points 
on its short-term debt while finding it necessary to pay 250 basis points over 
the risk-free rate to issue long-term bonds. The quality spread between the 
interest rate paid by the lower-rated firm and that paid by the higher-rated 
firm is only 50 basis points in the short-term debt market, but rises to 150 
basis points at longer maturities. The quality-spread differential, the dif- 
ference in the quality spread at two different maturities, is 100 basis points 
in this example. Firm A has an absolute cost advantage in raising funds in 
either the short- or long-term debt markets, but firm B has a comparative 
advantage in raising funds in short-term debt markets. 
While intuitively appealing, the evidence on this theory is not compelling. 
For example, Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986), Smith, Smithson, 
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and Wakeman (1988) argue that observed behavior in the swap market 
is not consistent with classic financial arbitrage of the type described by 
proponents of the comparative advantage rationale. The use of interest rate 
swaps to arbitrage quality-spread differentials, they argue, should increase 
the demand for short-term loans among firms with poor credit ratings while 
reducing demand for overpriced long-term loans. Eventually, such a process 
should reduce quality-spread differentials and therefore reduce demand for 
interest rate swaps. In fact, Bicksler and Chen (1995) did report evidence 
of declining quality-spread differentials as interest rate swaps came into 
widespread use. But trading activity in interest rate swaps has shown no 
sign of abating even as quality-spread differentials have declined. On the 
contrary, as described above the market for interest rate swaps has gown 
exponentially since the early 1980s. 
Information signalling 
Information signaling due to asymmetric information can lead firms to be 
active in the swaps markets. Arak, Estrella, Goodman, and Silver (1988), 
Wall and Pringle (1989) and Titman (1992) hypothesize that if a firm pos- 
sesses information about itself that will lower its risk premium in the credit 
markets in the future, but it wants to borrow at a fixed rate now, it can ben- 
efit from the use of interest rate swaps. The firm would borrow short term, 
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then use interest rate swaps to obtain fixed rate borrowing that it needs to 
lower its financing costs. After the information is revealed in the market, 
and the firm receives a credit rating upgrade, the firm benefits from lower 
interest rates. However, previous studies show that there is no statistically 
significant stock price reaction to the announcement of rating upgrades and 
the reactions do not differ by initial credit rating (Hand, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich (1992); Nayax and Rozeff (1994)). 
Obtaining an optimal debt level 
Interest rate swaps can be used to address capital structure situations. A 
firm could'adjust its long-term debt structure up or down to reach and to 
maintain its optimal level, according to Wall and Pringle (1989) and Smith, 
Smithson, and Wakeman (1988). A firm that borrows long term to obtain 
a fixed rate could find itself committed to a level of debt that may not be 
optimal over the length of the loan. Then the firm can swap some fixed-rate 
debt for floating rate. On the other hand, using interest rate swaps, a firm 
can borrow short term to maintain an optimal debt level on its books and 
swap for a more cost effective fixed-rate debt. 
In summarizing the theoretical arguments about interest rate swaps, Litzen- 
berger (1992) makes several observations: (1) interest rate swaps are not 
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redundant financial products, (2) interest rate swaps do not display the 
volatile cyclical behavior evidenced by corporate bond spreads, and (3) 
firms do not pay-up to do swaps with highly rated counterparties. These 
three characteristics cannot all be explained by any one theory or any com- 
bination of the theories given above. Litzenberger notes that credit rating 
differences have no observable impact on swap spreads, which implies that 
fixed/floating interest rate swaps are mispriced, although Duffie and Huang 
(1996) believe this can be attributed to very small values. Furthermore, 
Litzenberger theorizes that the growth in the use of swaps may also be 
attributed to their usefulness in signaling events favorable to the firm, al- 
though no empirical test of the impact of signaling with interest rate swaps 
has been done. 
Agency cost reduction 
Perhaps the most important alternative theory to those based on compar- 
ative advantage is based on the swaps' potential for reduction of agency 
costs'. As defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship 
is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
3See, inter alia Wall (1989); Arak, Estrella, Goodman, and Silver (1988); and Titman 
(1992) 
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involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent (p. 308). If 
principals could always costlessly monitor the behavior of their agents, they 
could ensure that agents would always act in their best interests. Mon- 
itoring the behavior of agents is costly, however, and requires principals 
to expend resources. Thus, the agent might be required to incur certain 
bonding expenditures. Finally, if principals cannot ensure that agents will 
always act in their best interests despite monitoring and bonding, there 
may be some deadweight residual loss. Jensen and Meckling define agency 
costs as the sum of these expenditures. They show that debt finance can 
reduce overall agency costs for a firm, but their analysis does not consider 
the problem of interest rate volatility and the question of whether a firm 
should issue short-term or long-term debt, issues which lie at the heart of 
the usage of interest rate swaps. 
Wall (1989) emphasized the role of agency costs in providing incentives for 
firms to use swaps. He argues that the existence of agency costs is one rea- 
son why quality spreads widen with debt maturity. This is because while 
established firms with good credit ratings and access to low-cost credit have 
incentives to limit risks, newer and smaller firms do not have the same in- 
centives. Like Loeys (1985), Wall gives special emphasis to the influence 
creditors can exercise over borrowers when renegotiating short-term loans. 
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Wall was among the first to observe that synthetic fixed-rate financing ob- 
tained through the use of swaps carries different incentives for borrowers 
than actual fixed-rate financing. To understand why this might be so, notice 
that the interest rate lenders chaxge a borrower when renewing a short-term 
loan can change for two reasons: (1) a change in market interest rates or 
(2) a change in the firm-specific credit-quality risk premium. Interest rate 
swaps compensate the borrower only for changes in market rates, and not 
for changes in the short-term quality spread. Thus the total cost of syn- 
thetic fixed-rate financing is given by the swap fixed rate plus the quality 
spread between the rate the firm pays on its short-term debt and the swap 
floating-rate index. A firm that chooses synthetic fixed-rate financing faces 
the risk that the quality spread might rise if lenders realize that manage- 
ment has increased the firms riskiness. In extreme cases, the firm might 
even find itself unable to roll over its outstanding short-term debt and be 
forced into bankruptcy proceedings. 
Capital markets fear that high-risk firms may borrow long term at fixed 
rates and then engage in asset substitution. Therefore, high-risk firms pay 
a premium for long-term fixed rates. A high-risk firm borrowing short term 
will reduce these agency costs because short-term borrowing increases moni- 
toring and reduces the risk of asset substitution. A high-risk firm can reduce 
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its agency costs and obtain fixed-rate terms by borrowing short-term and 
swapping for fixed rates. A reduction of agency costs will not necessax- 
ily result in a credit ratings upgrade, but could materially benefit the firm 
through credit risk improvement. 
Walls (1989) rationale for interest rate swaps lies with the observation that 
synthetic fixed-rate financing should discourage management from pursuing 
risky investment strategies. According to this argument, interest rate swaps 
lower funding costs by controlling the adverse incentives a firms manage- 
ment might have to increase the risk assumed by the firm to the detriment 
of creditors. Thus, interest rate swaps do make it possible for firms to re- 
duce financing costs in Walls theory. But the savings attributable to the 
use of swaps result from lower agency costs and do not constitute arbitrage 
in the sense that term is normally understood. 
In addition to providing a rationale for the use of swaps, agency costs have 
also been highlighted as a potentially important friction which can lead 
shocks originating in the financial markets to impact the real economy. We 
turn to this literature in the next section. 
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6.3 The credit view of monetary policy trans- 
mission 
In this section, the corporate finance foundations of monetary transmission 
are explored to understand how the usage of derivatives may alter the impact 
of monetary policy on output. Specifically, we follow the recent literature 
on the so-called credit view of monetaxy transmission. 
In the previous section, the only sources of financing available to the firm 
were either long-term or short-term debt. In this section the menu is ex- 
tended to allow for internal financing of investment projects. In the credit 
view of monetary policy, by emphasizing a combination of market imper- 
fections such as informational frictions and portfolio balance effects, theory 
suggests that the state of a firms balance sheet has implications for its ability 
to obtain external finance. Policy-induced interest rate changes will, there- 
fore, not only work through the traditional interest rate effect, but will also 
be reinforced by balance sheet effects. The existence of informational fric- 
tions thereby creates a separate channel for policy transmission. By virtue 
of this financial accelerator or, focusing on monetary transmission, 'broad 
credit channel', seemingly small changes in interest rates can have a large 
impact on real variables. 
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The concept of the financial accelerator derives from informational asym- 
metries in the credit maxkets, which drive a wedge between the costs of 
external and internal finance. In the early literature, the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) theorem states that financial structure is irrelevant to corpo- 
rate investment decisions. More recent research, however, has questioned 
the assumption of perfect substitutability of external and internal funds by 
pointing to the existence of capital market imperfections. The most com- 
mon argument posits that asymmetric information and problems of contract 
enforcement lead to the emergence of agency costs, thereby driving a wedge 
between the cost of external and internal finance. As outside investors re- 
quire a premium for unobservable or uncontractable risks, external finance 
becomes more costly than internal finance. 
In such a situation, internally generated funds enable firms to reduce their 
demand for costly external finance. Hence, a fall in a borrowers net worth or 
cash flow raises the demand for external finance and subsequently reduces 
investment. Given that negative shocks affect cash flow individually, the 
effect of an initial shock to the economy may be amplified. Small shocks 
might therefore create large cycles, hence the term financial accelerator. 
A contractionary monetary policy shock now reduces investment spending 
through the traditional cost-of-capital effect and, given that changes in in- 
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terest rates affect corporate cash flows, lowers a firms cash flow and its 
ability to borrow. Consequently, monetary policy impulses are reinforced 
by cash flow effects. 
Examples of a theoretical link between balance sheet positions and invest- 
ment appear, amongst others, in Bernanke and Gertler (1990) and Calomiris 
and Hubbard (1990). Both papers predict that borrowers investment de- 
cisions will be excessively sensitive to current cash flow: A rise (fall) in 
cash flow strengthens (weakens) the firms balance sheet and thus lowers 
(increases) the cost of capital. It is, hence, possible to rationalize income 
accelerator effects on investment. Fazzari, Hubbaxd, and Petersen (1988) 
provide empirical support for these various propositions. They conduct a 
time series and cross-sectional analysis of a broad class of firms. Their main 
result is that investment is significantly more sensitive to current firm cash 
flow than a frictionless model would predict. 
The informational asymmetries which axe at the heart of these models of 
the monetary transmission mechanism create incentives for corporate risk 
management strategies based on interest rate derivatives such as swaps. 
Hence, broad credit channel effects may be minimize, thereby reducing the 
impact of interest rate changes to the pure cost-of-capital (interest rate) ef- 
fect. This suggests that financial derivatives may have quite a strong impact 
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on this specific transmission channel. This study thus contrasts with the 
analysis of Romer and Romer (1993), who argue that: [ ... 
] it is difficult to 
see how recent financial market innovations could have significantly affected 
this component of the transmission mechanism [ie the financial accelerator 
or broad credit channel]. 
In the next section these ideas are stated more formally and a theoretical 
model is developed to demonstrate the impact of interest rate swap usage 
on the credit channel of monetary policy. 
6.4 Interest rate swaps and the credit chan- 
nel of monetary transmission 
In this section a model of the financial gains from interest swap usage, due to 
Li and Mao (2003), is extended to allow for internal financing of investment 
projects in order to directly model the impact of swaps on the financial 
accelerator. 
Eaxlier theories of interest rate swaps emphasize firms's choice between com- 
mercial paper and long-term fixed-rate debt. As described in section (6.2) 
a key feature of the these models is that firms can benefit from their con- 
stantly changing credit quality by rolling over short-term debts at frequent 
intervals. However the disadvantage of short-term debts is that they expose 
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firms to interest rate fluctuations. Interest rate swaps allow firms to benefit 
from borrowing short-term debts and avoid the associated interest rate risk. 
The existing theories provide important insights on interest rate swaps, but 
also have certain limitations. For example, by focusing on debt maturities, 
they can only explain the combination of short-term loans and interest rate 
swaps, but cannot explain why firms choose to borrow long-term floating- 
rate loans and enter interest rate swaps. 
Li and Mao's (2003) extend work by Holmstr6m and Tirole (1997) to develop 
a model of interest rate swaps which is based on the difference between 
bank loans and public debts. Their framework captures important features 
of the agency cost/information asymmetry argument by allowing for banks 
that are good at discerning the credit quality of their borrowers, and in 
addition, that restrictive covenants of bank loans are another important 
way to mitigate agency costs'. If the borrower's credit quality deteriorates 
significantly, banks can demand their money back and effectively accelerate 
the maturity of the debt. Thus, the distinction between long-term and 
short-term bank loans is not important for mitigating agency problems; 
restrictive covenants make bank loans short term with respect to their credit 
risk regardless of their stated maturity. While restrictive covenants of bank 
4 See for example Diamond (1984); Leland and Pyle (1977); Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984) 
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loans help reduce agency costs, banks have natural disadvantages in bearing 
interest rate risk due to their floating liabilities. A firm that wants a fixed- 
rate loan can borrow a floating-rate loan from a bank and enter an interest 
rate swap to hedge the interest rate risk. 
In models of the financial accelerator discussed in section (6.3), the effects 
of financial shocks on the real economy are amplified because agency costs 
drive a wedge between the costs of internal and external financing. This 
in turn makes firms' ability to fund investment dependant on their balance 
sheets. The impact of interest rate swaps on this mechanism is explored 
by extending Li and Mao's model to allow for internal financing, drawing 
on work by Gertler and Hubbard (1989). In this framework it is shown 
how the use of interest swap can reduce the magnitude of wedge between 
internal and external financing, and thus at the aggregate level mitigate the 
amplification effects of the financial accelerator. 
6.4.1 Model 
The model is partial equilibrium in nature, and consists of two periods, and 
three dates: t=0,1,2. There are three types of firms: Good, Super Good, 
and Bad, all assumed to be risk neutral; and two types of available project, 
Risky and Safe. 
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The key source of heterogeneity between firms lies in the different production 
technologies which ar available to them. Although both of the available 
technologies require the use of a single input xt. The safe project's return 
is deterministic and is given by: 
s yi+i = g(xt). 
For the Risky project two possible states, "good" and "bad", are realized 
after the investment decision is made: 
f b(xt) with probability p, (6.2) 
tab(xt) with probability (1 - p) and 0<a< 
The expected return for the risky project is thus 
pb(x) + a(l - p)b(x). (6.3) 
The production technologies are assumed to be twice continuously differen- 
tiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. They satisfy the following 
constraints: 
g(0) = b(0) = 0; g'(O) = b(O) = oo, (6.4) 
and 
g'(x) > B'(x); g"(x) < B"(x) < 0. (6.5) 
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Whereas Good firms have both types of project available Bad firms only 
have access to the risky project. Thus the Bad firms axe 'bad' in the sense 
that they only have access to limited technology. These two types of firm 
exist in proportions: 
fG + fB --` 
1- (6.6) 
The remaining type of firm, Super Good firms, have one project with ex- 
tremely high net present value, and are default free. The Good and the Bad 
firms in the model represent medium-sized, middle-rated firms with different 
qualities, while the firms the Super Good firm represents are highly rated, 
publicly known firms. 
The Good and Bad firms start at period t=0 with an exogenous endowment 
of net worth, N. Firm's borrowing is given by: 
D(x) =x-N, (6.7) 
so that investment is partially financed internally using the firm's cash flow, 
as well as externally by borrowing money. The up-front investment for either 
project is financed at time t=0 by a loan at the risk-free rate which must 
be repaid at time t=2. 
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The risk free rate in the first period is zero, and in the second period is a 
random variable which can take on two possible values, RH and RL, with 
RH > RL. The probability that the high interest rate occurs is 7r. The 
risk-free interest rate R satisfies: 
7r 7r 
(6.8) WH + RL 
which rules out arbitrage opportunities. 
It is assumed that the random processes governing the outcomes of the 
interest rate and the output from the risky project axe independent, and 
furthermore that the following restrictions apply: 
b'(x) > RH > 9'(x), > B'(x) >R> RL > ab'(x). (6.9) 
This set of restrictions implies the following: 
1. The safe project has higher NPV than the risky project, since g(x) 
B'(x). 
2. The risky project has positive expected NPV, since B(x) > R. 
3. The good firm is subject to default risk if it borrows a floating rate 
loan, since g'(x) < RH- 
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4. The bad firm is always subject to default risk whether it borrows a 
fixed or floating rate loan since R> ab'(x) and RL > ab'(x). 
Finally it is assumed that there is an exogenous fixed cost 0 associated with 
bankruptcy of either firm. 
There are two types of lenders in the economy, banks and private investors. 
Due to their expertise in credit analysis and large number of investments in 
small firms, banks are able to actively monitor loan agreements, although 
they charge a cost c for their monitoring service. However since bank's 
liabilities are sensitive to interest rate volatility they prefer to lend either 
short term or floating rate loans. Because of this, they charge a premium S 
for bearing the interest rate risk associated with long-term fixed rate loans. 
Private investors on the other band, are unable to identify ex ante whether 
or not a firm has access to the superior 'safe' technology. They are therefore 
subject to an asymmetric information problem which leads to agency costs 
and ultimately financial accelerator effects on investment. 
In the analysis that follows, we focus on the financing problem facing the 
manager of the good firm. While similax results can be derived for the bad 
firm (see Li and Mao (2003)), this does not affect the results derived in this 
paper. Therefore for ease of exposition these are not discussed here. In the 
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sections following we consider the (good) firm's investment decision when it 
obtains 1) fixed rate financing from public investors, 2) fixed rate financing 
from a bank, and 3) floating rate financing from a bank. 
6.4.2 Optimal investment decision: Private investor 
financed 
When borrowing from the public investors, the goal of the manager of the 
good firm is twofold. Firstly she must choose whether to invest in the Safe 
or the Risky project, and secondly she must choose the amount to borrow 
for investment purposes. However, these decisions are constrained by the 
terms of the loan contract offered by the investors. From their point of 
view, there are two key conditions which the terms of the contract need to 
satisfy. Firstly they must be reassured that investment in the firm yields a 
return which is at least as good as investing at the risk-free rate. Secondly 
they will wish to set the terms of the contract to ensure that all firms that 
are able to will invest in the safe project. We now discuss these issues in 
more detail. 
The key feature of the problem facing the firm when borrowing from public 
investors is the presence of asymmetric information. Suppose, as alluded to 
earlier, that the public investors are unable to identify whether an individual 
borrower is a good or a bad firm. This assumption reflects the difficulties 
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small-scale investors face in identifying the credit risk of a potential borrower 
given there limited resources for credit analysis. Given this asymmetric 
information problem, both the good and bad firms will be pooled together 
and charged an additional premium above the risk-free rate. The public 
bondholders axe aware of the proportions of good and bad firms in the 
economy as a whole (fG and fB), and as such they are able to calculate 
the riskiness of their loans on aggregate, and hence set the terms of the 
contract optimally. However, it is possible that some of the good firms, 
having obtained financing at a preferential interest rate, cheat and divert 
funds to invest in the risky project. To prevent this occurring, the private 
investors therefore structure the loan contract to prevent this happening. 
To avoid this, the private investors specify the terms of the contract such 
that the good firm will always prefer to invest in the safe project. 
The contract specifies a quantity borrowed, B(x) =x-N, a payment P. 
to the intermediary in the event that the Risky project yields the "good" 
output level, b(x), and a payment Pb in the event that the risky project 
yields the "bad" output level ab(x). The features of the contract are chosen 
to ensure the financial intermediary receives an expected return equal to 
the opportunity cost of its funds, the gross risk-free rate times the quantity 
borrowed. The contract payments must therefore satisfy 
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g= 
RD (x). (6.10) fB(PPg + (1 - P)Pb) + fGFý, 
However, the amount that Bad firms can credibly commit to pay should 
the bad state occur is limited by their available assets. This implies the 
following limited liability constraint on the optimal contract 
Pb: 5 ab(x). 
Similarly, the amount that good firms can credibly commit to pay is limited 
by the return on the safe project, so that 
.q 
:ý g(x). (6.12) p 
Finally, to ensure that all good firms invest in the safe project, financial 
intermediaries will set the terms of the loan contract so that the present 
value of the expected payoff from investing in the safe project is at least as 
high as that from the risky project. Le. 
max, B(X) p p "o, j IB(x) < Pgj- (6.13) E -q(l) E Pr 
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Note that (6.13) implies that the firm's incentive to cheat and invest in the 
risky project is increasing in the degree of leverage (and hence decreasing in 
net worth), and decreasing in the cost of financial distress. To see this, let 
A represent the present value of the difference between the expected payoff 
from the risky and safe projects: 
A p)lýg, - (1 - p)Q + pb(x) - g(x). (6.14) 
Then, 
aA (1 - P) aA (1 - P) 5-p > 0, and, < 0' (6.15) 
9RR 
If the above constraint were not satisfied, the private investors would charge 
all firms a risk premitm, d, which solves 
Elmin[B, R+ dll} 
R= 
D(x), 
yielding, 
(6-16) 
di = 
(1 - p)(R - ab(x)) (6.17) 
p 
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If, on the other-hand, the firms can be trusted to commit sufficient internal 
funds so that (6.13) holds, the private investors only require a risk premium 
which solves 
fbEf min[B, R+ d2l} + fg min[g(x), R+ d2l 
R= 
D(x), (6.18) 
yielding 
d2 --,: 
fb(l 
- p)(rD(x) - ab(x)) (6.19) (1 - (1 - P)fb) 
which together satisfy d, > d2. The private investors are therefore assumed 
to set the terms of the contract such that (6.13) holds, and charge a risk 
premium d2 given by (6.19). 
This implies that 
(1 - p)lý - (1 - p)9 + pb(x) - g(x) :50. .9 
(6.20) 
Under these conditions, the good firm chooses an amount of x* to invest 
so as to maximize the present value of the expected payoff from the safe 
project: 
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1 
maxW(g(x) - D(x)). (6.21) 
x 
Following Gertler and Hubbard (1989), we assume the limited liability con- 
straint (6-11) is binding. Combining constraints (6.10)-(6.20), together with 
equation (6.7) then yields 
f, e(l - p)ab(x) + 9(pfB + fc) + 
(g(x) - pb(x» (pfB + fa) - R(x - N) > 0. 
p) 
(6.22) 
It is important to note the role of firm's net worth, N, in determining 
whether or not this constraint is binding. Rom (6.22) it is clear that as 
N decreases and leverage rises, for a given level of x there is some critical 
value of N, N*, such that (6.22) must hold with equality. 
The good firm now maximizes its objective function (6.21) subject to the 
constraint (6.22). There are two general solutions to this contracting prob- 
lem. In the first case, internal funds (i. e. net worth) will be high enough 
to ensure that (6.22) is non-binding. In this case investment demand will 
adjust to the optimal level x* which is the solution to the f. o. c: 
(6.23) 
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In such a case, the internally generated share of funds is high enough to 
reduce the underlying asymmetric information problem in a way that is 
sufficient to support the optimal volume of investment. Finance and in- 
vestment decisions will thus be independent, as under the condition of the 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). 
However, the situation will be quite different if (6.22) binds with equality. 
In this case, financing and investment decisions will be mutually interde- 
pendent. As long as the firm's cash flow is too low, (6.22) will hold with 
equality and investment will be restricted to a level lower the MM opti- 
mum. In particular, solving the constrained optimization problem when 
(6.22) yields the suboptimal level of equilibrium investment, x such that 
9'(x*) < g, (X), (6.24) 
which implies that 
x* > x. (6.25) 
This is the problem of 'underinvestment' resulting from informational fric- 
tions in the credit market. The extent of the underlying agency problem is 
given by the default premium charged by the private investors, d2 given in 
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equation (6.19). This has the effect of driving a wedge between the cost of 
internal finance and external finance. For a given gross interest rate and the 
optimal level of investment, the critical level for the firm's flow of internal 
finance, N*, can be defined by 
N*=x*- 
1 (fB(1 -p)ab(x*)+Q(pfB+fo)+ 
('(X*) Pý-())(pfý, +fg)). R (1 P) 
(6.26) 
For any flow of internal finance lower than the critical N*, equation (6.22) 
will bind with equality. The relative values of R and N* thus determine 
the firm's feasible volume of investment. That is, the firm's investment 
demand is now implicitly defined by equation (6.22) and may be written in 
the following form: 
d= 
th(Rt) for Nt > N;, 
xt h(Rt, Nt) for Nt < Nt*. 
(6.27) 
In addition, the present value the Good firm gets at t=0 is given by 
X= 
1-(g(x*) - B(x*) - di) for Nt > Nt*, Pvfj R 
p1 (g (X) -B (x» - d2) for Nt < Nt*. 
(6.28) 
W 
For firms that are low on cash flow, i. e. with N< N*, a reduction of the 
firm's income reduces the shaxe of own funds devoted to the investment 
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project, thereby increasing the underlying agency problem. As a result, 
feasible investment will fall. Hence the scale of investment plans is deter- 
mined not only by traditional factors, i. e. investing up to the point where 
marginal cost equals marginal benefit, but also by the resources available 
internally. 
The financial accelerator has strong implications for the functioning of the 
monetaxy transmission mechanism. Given that firm investment is a function 
of internally generated funds, as standard theory and evidence suggest, cash 
flow and market interest rates being negatively correlated, a credit channel 
effect arises. An increase in interest rates will affect investment spending 
not only by changing the cost of capital. In addition, cash flow will decrease 
and therefore enhance the impact of a given change in interest rates. 
This is what Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) call the 'broad credit channel' 
and what is otherwise termed the 'balance sheet channel' of monetary trans- 
mission. In such a model, monetary policy, that is a change in interest rates, 
exhibits a direct as well as an indirect effect. The direct effect of a change 
in the cost of capital is thus reinforced by an indirect effect which oper- 
ates though the interest rates' impact on cash flow. It is this effect which 
is at the heart of the "balance sheet channel" of monetary transmission. 
Given that a firm's cash flow declines when interest rates rise, the decline in 
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cash flow will enhance the depressing impact of interest rates on corporate 
investment spending5. 
6.4.3 Optimal investment decision: Bank financed 
Public investors are not the only source of investment financing available to 
the firms. They can avoid paying the agency cost faced when their cash flow 
is below N* by borrowing instead from a bank. Bank's expertise in credit 
analysis and close relationships with their borrowers means that they are 
able to correctly differentiate the Good firms from the Bad. However the 
costs of collecting and analyzing this information means that they chaxge 
firms a cost, c, for this service. It is also assumed that the bank is able to 
monitor borrowers perfectly. While this assumption abstracts from many 
details of the actual relationship between the bank and its borrower, it sim- 
plifies the analysis greatly. We follow Li and Mao (2003) in assuming that 
the covenants of the bank loan specify that the firm can only borrow from 
them to invest in the safe project. Implicitly, following Diamond (1991), the 
covenant is specified in such a way that, were the bank to discover that the 
firm had chosen the risky project, it would liquidate the loan early yielding 
the bank the present value of the quantity borrowed, and the firm nothing. 
5See Mishkin (1996) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for details. 
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Due to the floating-rate liabilities of banks, they would prefer to lend either 
at fixed rates for short-term, or at floating interest rates. Therefore, if the 
firm wishes to borrow a fixed rate loan from the bank it will be charged an 
additional interest rate risk premium S, in addition to the monitoring cost, 
C. 
Since the firm can avoid the agency problem altogether by borrowing from 
the bank, it's investment decision in this case is not influenced by it's cash- 
flow. This leads it to invest at the MM optimal level x*. The net present 
value of the project to the firm when borrowing at a fixed rate from the 
bank is thus 
Pyf x=-1 ü(g(x*) - D(x*) -c- S). (6.29) 
Alternatively, the firm may choose to borrow a floating rate loan from the 
bank. However in this case, since g'(x) < RH, the firm will be subject to 
default risk in the event of a realization of the high interest rate. The bank 
will therefore charge the firm a default risk premium, d3 which solves 
minfg(x*), (R + d3)D(x*)] 1+c (6.30) E 
R 
yielding 
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7r(RH - g(x»RL + 
RLC 
d3 :- -(l 
- 7r)RH (1 - 7r)R* 
In this case the present value the firm gets at t=0 is given by the present 
value of the firm's equity minus the expected cost of financial distress, i. e. 
P fl 
1 
VIJ3 = -Tý(g(x*) - D(x*) -c -7rQ). (6.32) 
Given the present value of the firms' investment under the various financing 
options, in the next section we turn to an analysis of the conditions under 
which the will lead the firm to choose any given one of the various available 
options. In addition we will examine the implications of the model for 
financial accelerator effects on the evolution of the business cycle. 
6.4.4 Firm's choice of financing and the financial ac- 
celerator. 
Given the economy described in the previous sections the firm's choice of 
financing source, and the potential for financial accelerator effects, will de- 
pend on the costs of the various frictions present. In addition, the choice 
of lender will also be affected by the state of the firms cash flow available 
for internal financing. The good firm must choose the source of financing 
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from the following: borrow a fixed rate loan from public investors, and get 
PVpf, '; borrow a fixed rate loan from the bank and get PVf'- or borrow a BI 
floating rate loan from the bank and get PVf' PI, 
In equilibrium, the firm compares the net present value of these financing 
options, given by equations (6.28), (6.29) and (6.32). In general, it will 
borrow from the public investors if the cost of the bank loan, which equals 
R-1 (c + S) for the fixed-rate, or R-1 (c + 7rQ) for the floating rate loan, 
exceeds the benefit of distinguishing itself from the bad firm. Le. the firm 
will always borrow from the public investors if 
1 d2 (fB) < Wmin (c + S, c+ 7rQ). (6.33) 
However, in this case the firms' investment will be constrained below its 
optimal level if it's net worth is lower than the critical level N*. In addition, 
a rise in net worth allows the firm to increase investment towards the optimal 
level, x*, since it permits an increase in investment without a consummate 
increase in the degree of leverage. There are two important information 
frictions in this economy: a) the public investors are unable to differentiate 
the good firms from the bad, and b) there is a risk that good firms will 
cheat and redirect funds to invest in the risky project. The key problem 
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is that the firm's incentive to invest in the risky project depends positively 
on the degree of leverage. Hence additional net worth makes it feasible to 
invest more without violating the incentive constraint. 
The dependence of the level of investment on net worth when condition 
(6.33) holds implies that the economy will exhibit financial accelerator ef- 
fects when faced with a shock to interest rates. For example, an increase 
in policy interest rates should reduce the value of firms' assets (e. g. eq- 
uity holdings), implying a fall in their net worth. In the case where firms' 
leverage ratio is at the threshold level D*, firms will be forced to reduce 
investment to prevent violation of the incentive compatibility constraint. 
This reduction in investment will be over and above the traditional cost- 
of-capital effect on investment, i. e. the financial accelerator amplifies the 
effect of the shock on output. 
6.4.5 The role of interest rate swaps 
The firm prefers to borrow from the public investors because of the cost 
of bearing either interest rate risk or credit risk when borrowing from the 
bank. At an aggregate level, this implies the impact of interest rate shocks 
on output may be amplified via a financial accelerator mechanism. However, 
it is possible for the firm to lessen the costs of borrowing from the bank by 
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utilizing interest rate swap contracts. Swaps can facilitate this by enabling 
the transformation of floating rate debt into fixed rate debt. 
Assume that in the swap contract, either the good firm or the bank hedges 
its interest rate risk by paying R-d, to the super-good firm in exchange 
for receiving jý, where ds is the swap spread, and is assumed to satisfy 
ds E (0, g'(x) -R- c]. The super-good firm is willing to enter into this 
contract since in doing so it obtains floating rate financing for its investment 
at rate of R- ds, which is lower than the risk-free rate. 
R+ds 
Good Finn L 
--d 
Super Finn 
IRI 
R+c R 
Bank II Public 
Figure 6.5: Firm enters swap contract with Super Good firm. 
Figure (6.5) taken from Li and Mao (2003) illustrates the mechanism by 
which swaps can reduce firms' borrowing costs when entering directly into 
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Good Finn II Super Finn 
R+c+ds 
I 
-., 
ýý ýR+ 
ds 
IR 
Bank II Public 
Figure 6.6: Bank enters swap contract with Super Good firm. 
a swap contract with the super-good firm. In this case the good firm borrows 
a floating rate loan from the bank. However in doing so it exposes itself to 
default risk. It can then hedge its credit risk by entering into a swap contract 
with the super-good firm. The super-good firm profits by simultaneously 
borrowing a fixed rate loan from the public investors, thereby receiving a 
net income equal to the default premium, ds. 
The benefits to firms of borrowing cost reduction facilitated by swaps can 
also be realized even when the firm does not itself directly enter into a swap 
contract. This case is illustrated in figure (6.6). Here, the firm borrows a 
fixed rate loan directly from the bank, and the bank hedges its interest rate 
226 
risk by entering into a swap contract with the super-good firm, and recovers 
the cost of the swap contract by shifting the swap premium onto the good 
firms' borrowing costs, charging them R+C+ ds. As long as the swap 
premium, ds is lower than the interest rate risk premium, S, the firm finds 
its borrowing cost reduced by the introduction of swaps. 
This borrowing cost reduction feature of swaps can influence the impact 
of the financial accelerator. The model developed in the previous section 
demonstrated how the financial accelerator is engaged by firms borrowing 
from public investors who are unable to correctly identify firms quality. 
However, given the cost to the firm of interest rate risk and default risk 
when borrowing from the bank the firm may still prefer to borrow from the 
public investors as long as the risk premium charged by the public is lower 
than the costs of the bank loan, i. e. 
1 
d2(fB) < -R min(c + S, c+ 7rQ). (6.34) 
At the margin, the introduction of swaps will reduce the cost of borrowing 
sufficiently to allow some firms to switch from issuing public sector debt, 
and instead borrow from the bank. In doing so, the link between the firm's 
investment decision and it's net worth is broken, and hence it's investment 
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is no longer subject to a financial accelerator'. In effect, the use of swaps 
allows the firm to avoid agency costs, which in aggregate has the effect of 
reducing the financial accelerator. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The high degree of leverage provided by derivatives makes them powerful 
financial instruments, capable of providing low cost hedging against risk, or 
the taking of large speculative positions. While the risks to the financial 
system generated by the use of derivatives for speculation have received close 
scrutiny, the insulation provided to the system by their use for hedging has 
received less attention. 
In this chapter, a model has been presented which demonstrates how by far 
the most popular type of derivative contract, the interest rate swap, can 
enhance the stability of the financial system. 
The sensitivity of the real economy to developments in credit maikets can 
be increased by the presence of informational frictions such as agency prob- 
lems. Shocks to interest rates effect firms' cash flow and collateral, thereby 
influencing the proportion of their own funds they can commit to financing 
'Recall that because of the bank's expertise in monitoring firms, it is able to enforce 
loan covenants which stipulate the good firm may only invest in the safe project, so that 
it does not suffer from an asymmetric information problem. 
228 
investment projects. In the presence of asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders, this can lead lenders to raise the cost of funds. This 
in turn leads to reductions in investment and ultimately output, in excess 
of levels predicted by the traditional cost of capital effects. 
In this paper it has been shown how the use of interest rate swaps can 
dampen this amplification mechanism. A principal motivation for firms to 
use swaps is to reduce borrowing costs by mitigating agency costs. In doing 
so, the degree of magnification of shocks via the financial accelerator should 
be reduced, since firms' cost of borrowing should become less dependant on 
the availability of internal funds. 
The use of interest rate swaps has grown dramatically since their introduc- 
tion in the early 1980s. As increasing numbers of non-financial firms employ 
swaps to lower borrowing costs, the model developed here implies that finan- 
cial accelerator effects should be progressively weakened, and interest rate 
shocks have progressively smaller impacts on the real economy. In the next 
chapter, these predictions axe tested empirically for the U. S., employing a 
hitherto unexploited data set on the total notional amount outstanding of 
interest rate swaps since the beginning of the 1990s. 
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Chapter 7 
The usage of interest rate 
swaps and their effect on credit 
market frictions: empirical 
evidence 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents some empirical evidence on the central proposition 
of the previous chapter: that usage of interest rate swaps may have led to 
a reduction in the impact of U. S. monetary policy shocks. The traditional 
approach to examining the impact of monetary policy is to employ a vector- 
autoregression (VAR) model. In this chapter, the effect of the swap usage 
on monetary transmission is investigated by modeling the coefficients in the 
VAR as a function of the extent of swap usage. This is accomplished by 
employing a non-linear, smooth transition VAR model. In addition this 
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study uses a hitherto unexploited data set on activity in U. S. OTC interest 
rate swaps, provided by the U. S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
The next two sections survey the empirical evidence on the impact of interest 
rate swap usage, and the empirical evidence on the credit channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism respectively. 
The following sections introduce the empirical methodology, and the discuss 
the data set employed in the analysis, after which results from a baseline 
analysis using a linear vector auto regression (VAR) model are presented. 
Tests for nonlinearity of the type predicted by the model are then discussed 
and assessed before developing and implementing the nonlinear framework. 
The implications of the estimation results are then assessed using general- 
ized impulse response analysis. The final section concludes. 
7.2 Empirical evidence on the benefits to firms 
from interest rate swaps 
In order for firms to achieve a reduction in borrowing costs with swaps, Wall 
(1989) emphasizes the case where firms can reduce agency costs by employ- 
ing a combination of short-term debt and interest rate swaps. Evidence on 
the financial profiles of the type of firms that use swaps has been described 
in recent studies. For example, Fenn, Post, and Sharpe (2002) find that 
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swap users are larger and use more short-term debt than non-swap users. 
They also find that the greater the proportional amount of short-term debt 
used the larger the notional value of interest rate derivatives employed. 
Other implications of Wall's agency cost reduction theory can also be tested 
empirically. In the literature, many tests examine the prediction that higher 
risk firms should experience larger benefits from interest rate swaps than 
lower risk firms. In one of the earliest studies, Wall and Pringle (1989) test 
theories on interest rate swaps based on information contained in the foot- 
notes of Annual Reports for the yeax of 1986 and find supporting evidence 
for agency theory. 
Samant (1996), using the 'Compact Disclosure' database from June 16,1990 
to June 15,1992, also finds evidence that supports the agency theory of Wall 
(1989) and the information asymmetry explanation of Titman (1992). The 
results from Samant (1996) show that fixed-rate payers compared to non- 
swap users have increased profitability, more divergent earnings estimates, 
higher leverage, and more growth options. In other words, fixed-rate payers 
face higher agency costs. He also shows that floating rate payers do not have 
characteristics that are significantly different than non-swap users which 
demonstrate lower agency costs. 
Harper and Wingender (2000) also test the agency theory using the 'Com- 
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pact Disclosure' database, but for the years of 19861991. With a small 
sample of 24 observations, they find a significant positive relationship be- 
tween the risk of the firm and the reduction of agency costs. Their results 
are consistent with Wall's hypothesis and other theories on swaps. 
More recently, Li and Mao (2003) find that fixed-rate swap payers generally 
have lower credit ratings, higher leverage ratios, higher percentages of long- 
term floating-rate loans, and are more likely to use bank loans than floating- 
rate swap payers. On the other hand, they find little differences on debt 
maturities and percentages of short-term debt between the two groups of 
swap users, which is not consistent with existing theories. 
Generally, the literature suggests there is strong support in. the data for 
Wall's theory in explaining the benefits of interest rate swaps due to in- 
creased market discipline and monitoring. 
7.3 Empirical evidence on the credit channel 
of monetary policy 
The evidence in support of the broad credit channel of monetary policy 
has been surveyed by, inter alia, Bernanke (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1993), Kashap and Stein (1995), Hubbard (1995), and Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1996). The last two of these surveys list several implica- 
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tions of the broad credit channel. First, external finance is more expensive 
for borrowers than internal finance. This greater expense should apply 
particularly to uncollateralized external finance. Second, because the cost 
differential between internal and external finance arises from agency costs, 
the gap should depend inversely on the borrower's net worth. A fall in net 
worth raises the cost of external finance. Third, adverse shocks to net worth 
should reduce borrowers' access to finance, thereby reducing their invest- 
ment, employment, and production levels. In addition, the credit channel 
also operates when shifts in monetaxy policy alter either the efficiency of 
financial markets in matching borrowers and lenders, or to the extent that 
borrowers face rationing in credit markets so that aggregate spending is 
influenced by liquidity constraints. 
Non-price credit rationing can be characterized as the situation where, at 
current interest rates, creditworthy borrowers are denied credit even when 
they are demonstrably able and willing to pay a higher rate of interest. In 
other words, the situation of non-price credit rationing is characterized by 
persistent excess demand for credit and a failure of interest rates to adjust 
to clear the market. (See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Jaffee and Stiglitz 
(1990)). 
One approach to examine the evidence for credit rationing is to estimate 
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demand and supply schedules for bank loans. King (1986) estimated that 
loan supply is positively related to the volume of deposits, suggesting that 
banks axe liquidity constrained. He also estimated that the loan maxket is 
dominated by periods of excess demand (i. e. estimated demand exceeded 
actual loans in 63 out of 99 observations). On the other hand, however, 
the estimated loan supply schedule is also upward sloping with respect to 
the loan rate. This contradicts the hypothesis of credit rationing. It is also 
uncleax whether perhaps the estimates of excess demand fall within normal 
standard errors of the estimated equations. 
Lown (1990), Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik (1990), and Morgan (1992) 
examined the evidence on credit rationing with loan commitment data. 
Under a loan commitment agreement, a bank promises to issue a borrower 
a loan up to an agreed amount as long as the borrower satisfies the terms of 
the contract. Because rationing can only affect firms that do not have such 
agreements, the percentage of total loans made under commitments should 
increase in periods of tight credit. Lown (1990) found that the percentage of 
new loans made under commitment has a significant negative relationship 
with real output. Hirtle (1990) found that noncommitment loans appear to 
(weakly) Granger cause output, whereas commitment loans do not. Morgan 
(1992) confirmed that loans made under commitment track movements in 
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economic activity. Loans not made under loan commitments begin to fall 
relatively quickly, responding as fast and as sharp as monetary aggregates 
in response to movements in monetary policy. 
It is important to recognize that credit rationing is sufficient but not nec- 
essary for a credit channel to exist. A theme of Gertler (1989), Bernanke 
(1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and shared by the model developed in 
the previous chapter is that agency costs in credit markets will vary coun- 
tercyclically; a monetary tightening that raises interest rates and generates 
a real economic slowdown' will cause firm balance sheets to deteriorate, 
raising agency costs and lowering the efficiency of credit allocation. 
Considerable effort has gone in to testing these theories. The empirical lit- 
erature, starting with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), finds that in- 
vestment and cash flow are usually positively related, even after investment 
opportunities, represented by Tobins q, are controlled for. For example, 
Kashap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) find that inventory investment by firms 
without access to public bond markets appeared to be affected by liquidity 
constraints. These relationships are stronger for small firms, corporations 
with low dividend payments, and firms with low credit ratings. That is, 
1The credit rationing story developed in the previous Chapter only generates real 
persistence, so that for monetary policy to have an effect on real interest rates there also 
must be some kind of nominal rigidity (e. g. due to menu costs). 
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firms which would usually be expected to have less access to the credit mar- 
kets seem to display a greater sensitivity of investment demand to internal 
financing. 
Other authors, such as Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), investigate the mon- 
etary policy implications of these theories. Changes in credit conditions 
axe not reflected solely in interest-rate levels. If, as emphasized under the 
broad credit channel, agency costs worsen during recessions and in response 
to contractionaxy monetary policy, then the share of credit going to low- 
agency-cost borrowers should rise. Because small firms are presumably sub- 
ject to higher agency costs than are laxge firms, much of the evidence for 
a broad credit channel has been sought by looking for differences in the 
behaviour of large and small firms in the face of monetary contraction. 
Empirical evidence based on partially disaggregated US data seems to sup- 
port this effect. One of the most prominent papers in this area is Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994), who document that small firms behave differently than 
large firms over the business cycle, with small firms being much more sensi- 
tive to cyclical fluctuations. Applying the VAR methodology, an empirical 
study of the comprehensive QFR (Quarterly Financial Report for Manufac- 
turing, Mining, and Trade Corporations) dataset for the United States is 
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used to assess the impulse response functions of corporate sales, inventories 
and short-term debt. Gertler and Gilchrist use the QFR data to construct 
series of growth rates for small and large firms. In addition, QFR data on 
firm size is then used as a proxy for credit market access and the possible 
importance of informational asymmetries. 
The impulse response functions estimated by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
show that small firms contract substantially, relative to larger ones, in re- 
sponse to tight monetary policy. Shocks have a greater cumulative impact 
on small than on large firms and the differences are reasonably significant 
for inventories and short-term debt, though not for sales. The evidence from 
the QFR data is thus consistent with a differential impact of monetary pol- 
icy on small firms. Credit market imperfections are relevant to the story, to 
the extent that they may explain why small firms behave differently from 
larger ones (Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)). 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) also assess the role of financial factors by 
using the OFR data for another study that yields similar results, examining 
the behaviour of small and large firms around changes in monetary policy. 
Interest rate increases in response to a monetary contraction lower asset 
values and hence the value of collateral, increasing the cost of external 
funds relative to internal funds. Since agency problems are likely to be 
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more severe for small firms than large firms, the linkage between internal 
sources of funds and investment spending should be particularly strong for 
small firms after a monetary contraction. Oliner and Rudebusch do find 
that the impact of cash flow on investment increases for small firms, but 
not for laxge firms, when monetary policy tightens. 
These studies show that the responses of small and laxge firms to monetary 
impulses differ and that the reaction of small firms seems to be more pro- 
nounced than the respective response of large firms. This, again, is seen as 
evidence of the importance of financial propagation mechanisms, i. e. finan- 
cial accelerator effects for monetary policy and aggregate activity. 
7.4 An empirical framework for assessing swap's 
impact on monetary transmission 
Perhaps the most striking stylized fact concerning interest rate swaps pre- 
sented in the previous chapter is the expontential growth in their use. One 
theoretical implication of the growing importance of corporate hedging is 
that any differences in the behaviour of small and large firms in response to 
monetary policy measures should vanish over time. This follows, because 
small and less mature firms are commonly regarded to be more affected 
by problems of asymmetric information than larger or more mature ones. 
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Large firms will usually be able to replace any shortfall in internal funds 
with some other form of financing during a monetary tightening. However, 
this possibility might not be available to small firms. Under the condi- 
tions of a broad credit channel, small and large firms will hence respond 
differently to monetary policy shocks. 
Froot, Schaxfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that the very assumptions that 
are at the heart of every model featuring broad credit channel effects, namely 
informational asymmetries, will also create incentives for corporate risk 
management. According to this theory, firms operating under a financial 
accelerator will engage in cash flow hedging programmes that engineer their 
internal cash flows so as to meet their feasible investment needs and to avoid 
any further deadweight costs induced by underinvestment. 
Optimal risk management strategies thus manipulate the interest rate risk 
exposure of corporate cash flows in an attempt to stabilize agency costs. 
This, in turn, should diminish any credit channel effect of monetary policy 
and hence reduce monetary policy transmission to the pure cost-of-capital 
effect. Given these theoretical results, there should be little room for a 
sizeable credit channel in the presence of widespread corporate risk man- 
agement. 
The theory developed in chapter 6 produces a number of testable hypothe- 
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ses. The most important one is that, due to the introduction of interest 
rate derivatives and the rapid development of their markets, the financial 
accelerator (broad credit channel) effect in operation should have dimin- 
ished over time. One should therefore be able to detect an incremental 
weakening in the monetary transmission process as swap usage has become 
increasingly widespread. 
Recent research seems to point in this direction. Taylor (1995) estimates 
interest rate elasticities of investment for the US, Germany and Japan with 
data from two sample periods, one from the early 1970s through 1985 and 
the other from 1986 through the mid-1990s. A comparison of these two 
sets of estimates gives an idea of the magnitude of change in the monetary 
transmission mechanism over time. In the US, the interest rate elasticity of 
investment has declined. The same is true for real output, which responds 
differently to monetaxy policy in the three countries mentioned above. On 
balance, the monetary transmission mechanism has changed so as to reduce 
the impact of a given change in short-term interest rates. While this seems 
to be true for all three countries, the change in the US seems to be larger 
than the one in Germany and Japan. 
The approach taken here employs data on the aggregate use of interest rate 
swaps in the U. S. since 1990. We augment a standaxd monetaxy policy 
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VAR model to allow for possible effects of aggregate interest rate swap 
usage on the transmission of monetary shocks. In addition, we allow for 
possible nonlinear effects due to increased usage of swaps by employing a 
'Logistic Smooth Transition VAR (LSTVAR) approach'. The discussion in 
the previous chapter indicated how swaps may have important effects on 
the parameters governing, for example, the response of output to changes in 
interest rates. In general, we would expect that output would respond less 
strongly to movements in interest rates and inflation of the same magnitude 
when the use of swaps is widespread. 
In addition, another implication of the model presented in chapter 6 is that 
the demand for swaps should be counter-cyclical. An important prediction 
of the model is that a fall in net worth during economic downturns leads to 
an increase in agency costs. This should increase the demand for interest 
rate swaps to mitigate the increase in borrowing costs. This prediction 
agues for the inclusion of an equation in the VAR to measure the impact 
on the growth rate of swaps usage of aggregate economic conditions. 
Consider a lineax Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model, written in standard 
form: 
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p 
Xt +E 'Djxt-j 
j=l 
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter predicts that the 
parameters in equation (7.1) are a function of the 'completeness' of finan- 
cial markets - which is captured by the state variable Zt-d. The smooth 
transition vector autoregression (STVAR) model is 
pp 
xt I+E ýDjjXt-j (1 - 
F(Zt-d)) +2+E 4)2jXt-j F(Zt-d + ft 
j=l j=l 
(7.2) 
where ct - iid(O, a'), and the parameters of equation (STVAR) shift accord- 
ing to the regime defined in terms of a function of the observable transition 
variable zt-, j, where d is a delay parameter. The transition function, F(Zt-d), 
is bounded between 0 and 1, so that the range of parameters is (Al 7 111 + A2) 
and (4)1,4)1 + 'ýN) - It is assumed to take the form of the logistic function: 
F(zt-d : -y, d, c) = 11 +exp[--y(zt-d - c)la(zt)] I-', -Y >0 (7.3) 
The parameter c in this equation represents the threshold around which 
the dynamics of the model change. In the limit as (zt - c) approaches plus 
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(minus) infinity, F(zt-d) approaches one (zero). The parameter -y controls 
the 'smoothness' with which F(Zt-d) moves from zero to one as zt changes. 
As -y approaches zero, F(Zt-d) converges to a constant, the nonlinear terms 
become redundant, and the model becomes linear. As -y approaches infinity, 
small changes of zt around the threshold value c result in abrupt shifts in 
the parameters of the model, so that the model approximates the threshold 
autoregression model due to Tong (1990). 
7.4.1 Specification of the Benchmark Model 
In order to gauge the importance of possible nonlinear effects of the re- 
cent explosion in swaps usage on the monetaxy transmission mechanism, we 
initially specify and estimate a standard linear, unrestricted Vector Auto- 
Regression (VAR) model given by equation (7.1). In our model, the vector 
Xt consists of variables capturing growth in real US output, inflation, mon- 
eta. ry policy, and growth rate notional amounts outstanding of swaps. The 
model includes the first differences of the logs of real GDP, the consumer 
price index, money (Ml), and notional amounts outstanding of interest rate 
swaps for the U. S. reported by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency of 
Depaxtment of 'Reasury, 1990: Q1 to 2004: Q3, giving a total of 55 observa- 
tions. 
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The first three variables are from the International Monetary Fund's IFS 
data base. The orders of differencing and lag length, p, of the liner model 
are chosen on the basis of conventional specification tests. Each of the series 
is stationary according to augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. 
There is mixed evidence on co-integration: Engle-Granger tests tend to 
suggest the presence of a co-integrating vector, while Johansen tests tend 
to reject co-integration. The only choice of a cointegrating vector suggested 
by theory is given by the 'quantity theory of money'. However, ADF tests 
conducted on the velocity 2 of M1 in the U. S. indicated it is non-stationary 
in levels. Since co-integrating relationships by definition can only exist 
between variables which are integrated of the same order, and no other co- 
integrating vector would be suggested by theory, the series axe assumed not 
to be co-integrated. While the Schwartz criterion suggests using 3 or 4 lags, 
the Akaik-e Criterion suggests four lags. However, due to the constraints 
imposed by the small sample size, three lags were used in the estimations. 
This proved to be the smallest lag length such that serial correlation in the 
residuals of the model was insignificant according to standard tests. 
Under the hypothesis that the true data generating process is nonlinear, the 
2The series for velocity was constructed as the ratio of nominal GDP to Ml, using 
data from the IFS. 
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techniques described above for determining the specification of the model 
are not applicable. For the purposes of comparison, the nonlinear model 
was estimated with the same specification as the benchmark linear model. 
7.4.2 Testing for nonlinearity 
This section details the test employed to find evidence of nonlinearity in the 
baseline VAR and reports results. The linearity tests are the multivariate 
versions of the Lagrange multiplier tests due to Granger and Ter5svirta 
(1993), and described in chapter 3 of this thesis. These tests provide strong 
evidence against linearity and in favor of the LSTVAR model. 
Testing for nonlinearity in the STVAR model using the logistic transition 
function is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis HO : -y =0 against the 
alternative H, : 'Y >0 in equation (7.2). Following Luukk-onen, Saikk-onen, 
and Terisvirta (1988), linearity testing equation by equation employs a three 
step procedure based on a first-order Taylor approximation of the transition 
function around -y = 0. Consider a k-variable VAR with p lags and let wt = 
(Xlt-IýXlt-2i 
-** 7XIt-piXV-17 *-- iXkt-p). Assume the switching variable zt 
is known. To test linearity equation by equation: 
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1. Estimate 
pk 
xij = fli'o + 1"aijwjt + Uit (7.4) 
j=l 
and collect the residuals fiit. Define SSRo =E filit. 
2. Use these residuals to run the regression 
pk pk 
iýjt = ajo +L aijwjt + L' Jiztwjt + 77it (7.5) 
j=l j=l 
and collect the residuals ýjt. Define SSR, =Eý, t * 
3. Compute the test statistic LM = T(SSRoSSR, )ISSRO, where T is 
the number of observations. 
Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed X'(pk). In small samples, the 
equivalent F statistic is 
F= 
[(SSRo - SSR, )Ipk] (7.6) 
[SSRol(T - (2pk + 1))]' 
The model developed in chapter 4 suggests that asymmetry is present si- 
multaneously in all of the equations of the VAR under the alternative hy- 
pothesis. Thus the appropriate test of linearity in the system as a whole is 
a log-lik-elihood test of the null hypothesis Ho :y=0 simultaneously in all 
of the equations. 
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LM test for STAR-type nonlinearity 
Equation Y 7r ml SwP 
F-Statistic 12.50 28.69 32.518 17.645 
LR statistic 143.09 
Table 7.1: Nonlinearity test equation-by-equation and for whole system 
Let SIO =E fitfi'IT and ill =E ýtýt'IT be the estimated variance-covaxiance t 
matrices of residuals from the restricted and unrestricted regressions re- 
spectively. Then the statistic LR = T(log I Po I- log I Q, 1) is asymptotically 
distributed )ý2(pk). 
Table (7.4.2) reports the results of these linearity tests using the data de- 
scribed in section (7.4.1). The evidence against linearity in the output and 
outstanding swaps equations is weak for all choices of the delay parameter, 
while there is consistently strong evidence of nonlinearity in the inflation 
equation and the money equation in particular. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the primary channel through which the use of swaps influ- 
ences the monetary transmission mechanism is through the credit channel. 
The tests for nonlineaxity in the system as a whole provide very strong evi- 
dence against the null hypothesis in the standard VAR, and in favor of the 
LSTVAR specification. However, whether this nonlinearity results in eco- 
nomically meaningful effects on monetary policy shocks must be determined 
by examining the dynamic effects of these shocks in the LSTVAR model. 
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7.5 Estimation Results 
The estimation of the model given by equation (7.2) is carried out using 
a grid search, whereby values of -y, c and d are fixed and the equation is 
estimated by equation by equation nonlinear least squares. The log of the 
determinate of the variance-covariance matrix, log IQ 1, is then calculated 
and the process repeated for different values of -y, c and d. The estimates 
of these parameters that minimize log I f2l are those that are used in the 
final regressions. One drawback of this method is that standard errors are 
not computed for -y, c or d. The final estimates are -y = 3.2, c=0 and 
d=2. This relatively low value of -y indicates a relatively smooth tran- 
sition from one regime to another, which is consistent with the intuition 
that increasingly use of interest rate swaps have an incremental effect on 
the monetary transmission mechanism, as opposed to a sudden transition 
to another regime which would imply the existence of a 'critical' thresh- 
old of swaps usage above which the nature of the monetary transmission 
mechanism is substantially altered. 
Table (7.2) presents results of F- tests for the hypothesis that the 0 coef- 
ficients in the model are equal to zero in each equation and the system as 
a whole. These tests also provide strong evidence in favor of our nonlin- 
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F test for nonlinearity 
Equation y 7r ml Swp 
F-Statistic 32.15 24.69 49.52 19.53 
LR statistic 63-17 
Table 7.2: F-tests for nonlinear adjustment equation-by-equation and for 
the whole system 
ear model. The null hypothesis of linearity is rejected in all equations at 
the 5 percent significance level. Linearity for the system as a whole is also 
rejected. 
7.6 Calculation of Impulse Response Func- 
tions 
In this section we outline the procedure used to calculate impulse response 
functions from the estimated model. These functions trace out the dynamics 
response one variable to a shock in another variable in the system. 
In order to allow for correlation in the error terms across equations, the 
equation errors of the nonlinear STVAR model are orthogonalized using 
the Choleski decomposition so that the covariance matrix is diagonal. One 
disadvantage of impulse response analysis is that it is sensitive to the order- 
ing of the variables in the system, in that different orderings of the variables 
can lead to different results. To reduce this problem, the ordering needs to 
be chosen such that the first variable is the only one with a potential con- 
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temporaneous impact on the other variables in the system. The second 
variable then needs to be chosen such that it may have a contemporaneous 
impact on the other variables in the system, but not the first one, and so 
on. We impose the ordering y, 7r, M1, Swp, so that while shocks to output, 
inflation and Ml may have a contemporaneous impact on the growth of 
swaps usage, changes in trading volume do not instantaneously impact on 
the other variables in the system. 
In contrast to lineax models, shocks occurring in nonlinear models depend on 
the history of the variables as well as the magnitude of the shocks. In order 
to deal with these problems, in this paper we calculate generalized impulse 
response functions as detailed by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and 
D. Van Dijk, Tergsvirta, and Ranses (2001). 
The impulse response functions are calculated using the following proce- 
dure. In order to account for the effects of different initial conditions on 
the impulse response functions, the data set is split into four sub samples 
according to the quantity of swaps outstanding, so that impulse responses 
are calculated for low, medium, high and very high initial levels of trading. 
The final impulse response functions for each level of trading axe calculated 
by averaging over the impulse responses for every set of initial values within 
each sub sample. To compute individual impulse responses, shocks for pe- 
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riods 0 to j are drawn with replacement from the residuals of the estimated 
LSTVAR model. For a given set of initial values of the variables, the shocks 
are fed through the estimated model to compute baseline forecasts of the 
variables. The procedure is then repeated using the same initial values and 
bootstrap draw, but with the shock to the interest rate in period 1 set to 
one standard error of the nonlinear model. As the shocks pass through the 
estimated model, a new forecast value is computed. The impulse response 
function for this set of initial conditions is then calculated as the differ- 
ence between the dynamic path of each variable under the shock and the 
baseline dynamic response in the absence of shocks. For each set of initial 
values, this procedure is repeated one hundred times with different boot- 
strap draws, and the average taken so that the impulse responses -become 
conditional only on initial values. When averaged over the set of initial 
conditions for each sub sample of the data, this procedure produces impulse 
response function for each regime. Thus the impulse response functions for 
regime 1 are the estimated responses of output and inflation to interest rate 
shocks when the total amount of swaps outstanding is over $29.75 billion, 
regime 2 when trading volume is between $29.75 and $17.62 billion, regime 
3 for trading volume between $17.62 and $10.30 billion, and regime 4 when 
trading is less than $10.30 billion. 
252 
7.7 Discussion of results 
7.7.1 Regime Identification 
The relationship between the values of the transition function and the quan- 
tity of outstanding swaps is reported in Figure (7.1). The figure also illus- 
trates the smoothness of the transition between the low trading volume 
regime and the high trading volume regime. Increases in trading volume at 
low levels of trading have a large impact on the transition function, but the 
size of this impact decreases as the trading volume reaches higher levels. 
This suggests that the effects of further increases of usage of swaps had 
little effect on the monetary transmission after the end of 1999, when the 
total amount of swaps had reached $36 billion. 
0.6 
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Figure 7.1: Impact of derivatives usage on model coefficients 
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An alternative representation of the effects of swaps usage is presented in 
Figure (7.2). Here, the cumulative coefficients on the money supply terms 
in the output equation of the model are plotted against total amount of 
swaps outstanding. The figure indicates how higher usage leads to monetary 
shocks having a reduced effect on output. However, it also emphasizes how, 
even with prolific usage of swaps, changes in the money supply continue to 
have an (albeit reduced) effect. While an increased ability to hedge against 
a vaxiety of risks can reduce frictions in financial markets, speed up the 
transmission of monetary shock to prices, and insulate firms from adverse 
effects of shocks, the use of swaps will not affect other maxk-et imperfections 
which can give rise short-run non neutrality of money. Thus while there 
is evidence that the effect of monetary shocks on output is reduced by a 
increased usage of swaps, there remains some scope for the use of monetary 
policy by the authorities. 
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Figure 7.2: The changing impact of monetary shocks due to increased swap 
usage. 
7.7.2 Assessing the asymmetric effects of monetary 
shocks 
The nonlinear approach taken in this paper allows us to directly identify 
the effects of different levels of swaps usage on the dynamic response of the 
economy to monetary shocks. Within our nonlinear framework, we are able 
to investigate the impact of shocks conditional on the volume of trading 
at the time of the shock-, and the size/sign of the shock. This approach 
enables us to address a number of questions. Firstly, do higher levels of 
swaps usage significantly alter the response of output to monetary shocks? 
Secondly, does the degree of usage of swaps result in output responding 
differently to positive versus negative money shocks, and finally is the effect 
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of shocks of different magnitude influenced by the degree of swaps usage? 
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Figure 7.3: Generalized cumulative impulse responses of output growth to 
a1 standard deviation shock to M1 
Figure (7.3) presents the estimates cumulative response of output growth 
to a one-time shock to the change in All. The shock is one standard de- 
viation, or 1.53 percent. The graphs can be interpreted as the response of 
the log level of output to a permanent 1.51 percent increase in the federal 
funds rate. The response of output growth shocks of one and two standard 
deviations were computed for comparison. However, there was no evidence 
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of significant asymmetric effects, so the results are not reported here. In 
addition, there was no evidence of asymmetry in the effects of positive or 
negative shocks. However, the initial level of swaps usage at the time of the 
shock has a maxk-ed effect on the impulse responses. For the lowest initial 
levels of swaps usage (less than $10.3 billion), output growth falls strongly 
in response to a positive interest rate shock. However, as the initial level of 
trading rises, the estimated initial response of output growth falls rapidly. 
In addition to the size of the response, higher levels of swaps usage result 
in output growth responding more slowly to the interest rate shock. Also, 
when the level of trading is high, the initial effects on output growth die 
out more rapidly, so that increased use of derivative seems to be associated 
with a reduction in both size and duration of effect on output. 
Finally, we can consider a simple summary measure of the impact of swaps 
usage on the response of the economy to monetary policy. The impulse 
response functions in figure (7.3) imply that the impact of unanticipated 
monetary shocks on output growth has fallen by 60% since 1990 due to the 
use of interest rate swaps. While these results must clearly be viewed with 
caution due to the small sample used in this study, they nonetheless paint 
a striking picture. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented evidence that financial innovation, particulaxly 
the introduction and exponential increase in use of interest rate swaps, 
has brought with it the potential to significantly influence the monetary 
transmission mechanism in the U. S.. 
This provides some evidence that as corporate risk management has become 
more pervasive, the real side of the economy has become more insulated from 
monetary and financial developments. 
There are a number of policy implications of these findings. Firstly, they 
suggest that the monetaxy authorities in industrialized countries may need 
to consider the impact of developments in derivatives markets when formu- 
lating monetary policy. For example, there has been considerable recent 
interest in the causes of the 'great stability': the historically low levels of 
price and growth volatility observed during the past decade in the G7 coun- 
tries (excluding Japan). Indeed, consistent with the theory developed and 
tested in this part of my thesis, the increased usage of derivatives for risk 
management has been highlighted as a likely contributing factor. In a recent 
speech, Charles Bean, Chief Economist at the Bank of England, noted: '[A] 
source of this "Great Stability", ... can be found in the consequences of fi- 
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nancial deregulation, innovation and integration. ... . Financial innovation 
has led to the development of new derivative assets that allow idiosyncratic 
risk to be diversified more effectively, again making the economy more re- 
silient to shocks. ' Bean (2005). 
At first sight, the policy conclusions from this analysis may not be comfort- 
ing, since it seems that monetary authorities in industrial economies have 
lost some of their punch in pursuing monetary policy. However, it is not 
clear that the implications are truly that negative. Financial innovation 
has brought with it many positive elements, such as more efficient markets 
and better techniques for the management of risk, which must be weighed 
against any losses in monetary control. Finally, to the extent that markets 
are functioning more efficiently, they may be performing some of the tasks 
that were formerly required of the monetary authority. The consequences of 
financial innovation can hardly be considered negative if they are reflective 
of a market that is doing its job. 
A major limitation of the results presented here is that they are based on 
a very small sample of data. More conclusive results would require either 
a considerable longer span of data, or alternatively data at a monthly fre- 
quency. As such the impact of derivatives markets and of risk management 
is not altogether clear, and the results may simply reflect a shortage of rel- 
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evant data. However, these conclusions should be taken as preliminary and 
not as definitive. The literature in this field is fairly scant, and there is a 
clear potential for much further progress, particularly on the empirical side. 
Moreover, as empirical evidence materializes, there may be a need to revisit 
the theoretical framework in light of any new results. 
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